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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the relationship between the body and space through the works of Henri 
Lefebvre, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The aim of the project is to move beyond 
Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space, which relies on a phenomenological 
understanding of the body and space. In order to do so, it will find in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of ‘territory’ a non-phenomenological and constructivist concept of space that does 
not posit the ‘lived body’ as a transcendent ground.  As a result, it will also attempt to trace 
out a non-phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’ that is not based on a concept of the 
subject, but is ‘involuntary’ and constructive, and emphasizes the spatio-temporal dynamisms 
or rhythms that a ‘space without world’ consists of. Finally, by being loosely guided by the 
global Occupy movement, it seeks to invoke a politics ‘of’ space, where the concept of 
‘occupy’ emphasizes a being-in-space that is primarily political and only secondarily 
ontological.  
Keywords 
Space, Territory, Lefebvre, Deleuze, Guattari, Phenomenology, Constructivism, Art, 
Abstraction, Body 
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Introduction 
The project that follows will attempt to determine a politics only of spaces. It is a politics 
without faces and, in lieu of actors, the spaces themselves will be central. They will be 
like the dramatizations of a mise-en-scène from where the people or actors are 
inextricable, tied to their surroundings and indistinguishable from the atmosphere. It is a 
project whose focus is specifically the organizations of space-times, pure blocs of space-
time. As Deleuze writes, these are “worlds of movements without subjects, roles without 
actors” (1994: 219). In fact, as the project develops, the focus will move from linear 
perspectives to perspectives with multiple lines, to a powerful abstraction, whose image 
emerges from a ‘cartographic eye’, which is capable of connecting different things into 
unnatural mixtures. We will be able to watch from above and survey [survol] the event in 
order to map out other possibilities and experiment with forms of space-time. 
This vantage point will also render an unrecognizable space, a space of disorientation. 
We will not recognize the objects, the people or their habits. It will be a space dissolved 
into fog and mist, “a corpuscular space” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 273), a space of 
intensity. New and unforeseen shapes will begin taking form in the fog. The project will 
attempt to trace out a space no longer human or phenomenological, but a space without 
world: the dramas of the desert at night.   
Space as an object of study often eludes traditional categories because it is neither an 
object nor a subject. The ontological and epistemological bases of space, what they are 
and how they are known, are difficult to grasp. Space is not a physical object that can 
literally be touched or picked up; it is ungraspable. Even the Oxford English Dictionary, 
which contains 17 different definitions of ‘space’, has difficulty. Common sense 
traditionally denotes space as an extended expanse and a passive locus where objects and 
events take place. It is the medium we live. In a sense, space renders objects and events 
perceptible, but what is space in itself. Or, it is understood through distance and time: 
space is the span of here to there, or the time it takes to from there to here. It is what is in 
between. In contrast, in French, the definition of space takes a more qualitative sense. 
L’espace can designate a region or a place (lieu) that has a qualitative significance, which 
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is typically how phenomenology understands it. That is, space is given meaning by the 
subject it surrounds, who appropriates and suffuses that particular space.  
Modern philosophers have tended to place a stronger emphasis on questions of time and 
finitude, and in consequence have generally overlooked questions of space. As Rob 
Shields indicates, for most of the history of thought, “[s]pace is just there (and thus 
colonized): a context that will be ignored by most analysts in favour of the objects it 
contains and their interaction and development” (2013:15). Space is either a category for 
classifying sensations or phenomena, or an Absolute like the Cartesian res extensa or in 
Newtonian physics. As a result, it is either completely subjective, a form of intuition, or 
completely objective, equated with physical, extended matter. In either case, absolute or 
transcendental, space as such is impossible to define.  
However, beginning with Einstein and theories of relativity in physics, the constitutive 
and relative nature of space, space’s constitutive power, becomes more apparent. No 
longer a passive, absolute background to physical processes, space consists of the threads 
of the social fabric that constitute subjects and objects. And with the advent of topology 
in mathematics and non-Euclidean geometries, the idea of an absolute space dissolves; 
instead, it is something that can be experimented with. There are spatial scales, layers of 
spatialities nested in other spatialities. Instead of speaking of space, we are forced to 
speak of spaces. They are not passive, static mediums, but dynamic, multilayered and 
constitutive. Again, as Shields writes, space is “an operation rather than a fact” (2013: 
137). Space is operative: not simply something that is there, but is fully bound up with 
power; not only as something that contains, but has a productive power.  
In his The Production of Space, published in the original French in 1974, Henri Lefebvre 
offers a critique of the Enlightenment idea of space as a container (the Aristotlian topos). 
For Lefebvre, then, as the title indicates, space is a product; it is not a naturally eternal 
topos. Instead, he illustrates “the active — the operational or instrumental — role of 
space, as knowledge and action, in the existing mode of production” (1991: 11). For 
Lefebvre, space is both a product of the social relations that it consists of, but is also 
operative in its (re)production in relation to the current mode of production. As a result, 
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space is not simply the locus of politics, but the object of politics; politics for Lefebvre is 
a politics of space.  
Lefebvre’s thesis re-focused the understanding of space, from abstract measurements and 
distances to its social and qualitative diversity. Space is, undoubtedly, social: “(Social) 
space is a (social) product” (1991: 26). However, it is not simply a product like a 
commodity, or a thing, “rather, it subsumes things produced and encompasses their 
interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity” (73). Shields refers to Lefebvre’s 
concept of ‘social space’ as “spatialization” (1999: 161), in order to stress its fluid and 
processual nature. Space is not a static container, but the network of relations that 
composes a bloc of space-time.  
Space, in other words, is not solely at the level of actualized, interacting objects, but is 
instead also, to borrow a term from Gilles Deleuze, virtual. It is intangible, ungraspable, 
uncontainable, and yet real. Space, as such, can never be completely actualized; it always 
contains possibilities. Space is “not a concrete object, but a ‘virtuality’, or set of relations 
that are real but not actual” (Shields, 2013: 8). As Lefebvre affirms, social space is a 
product “conceived not as a completed reality or an abstract totality, but as a set of 
possibilities in the process of being realized” (2008: 134). He also defines the ‘urban’ 
form, “not as an accomplished reality, situated behind the actual in time, but, on the 
contrary as a horizon, an illuminating virtuality” (2003c: 16-7). Space, in other words, is 
never a homogeneous realm, but is in continuous variation. It is not simply the res 
extensa, the extended reality of actualized objects, but contains a depth, an intensive 
spatium.  
As the ‘illuminating virtuality’ or horizon, space is also the enabling constraint for action; 
it is the local horizon of meaning. It is the set of possibilities that allow subjects and 
objects to act; or, in other words, the set of affects that determines what a body can do in 
a given situation. In phenomenological terms, Jeff Malpas calls it a ‘spatial framework’, 
that allows a creature to be able to have a “grasp of space” (1999: 49). A being is oriented 
according to its surrounding space; it allows it to grasp the difference between oneself 
and what it encounters: “for otherwise it would be unable to distinguish, and so to 
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control, its actions in contrast to those other events” (1999: 50). The spatial framework, 
in other words, allows a being to navigate space; it gives objects signification and sense 
and provides direction.  
The philosophical collaboration between Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari develops a 
philosophy that focuses more precisely on a concept of space as such, abstracted out of 
the subject-oriented spaces of phenomenology. In What is Philosophy?, they call it a 
‘geophilosophy’, where thought does not occur between a subject and object, but rather 
“thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (1994: 86). The actors 
of this philosophy are not subjects and objects, but territories, sets of possibilities and 
spatio-temporal dynamisms. It is an attempt to “reorient philosophy from a concentration 
on temporality and historicity to spatiality and geography” (Protevi and Bonta 92). 
Geophilosophy moves beyond the subject-object divide, to questions of assemblages, 
events and territories. The territories themselves are the focus. Philosophy is more like a 
cartographic project that maps out the sets of possibilities, or the relationships between 
different territories.  
As a result, Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy moves beyond Lefebvre’s theory of 
space because Lefebvre’s concept of space is limited to a ‘phenomenological’ space; it is 
always tied to the subject. In this case, space is simply the illuminating horizon for a 
subject. Therefore, it is a ‘transcendental’ space, yet one that remains Kantian.1 In 
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the territory as the set of possibilities is 
illuminated by a virtual space of real conditions (the Earth). 
This project will thereby be an attempt to move Lefebvre’s concept of space beyond its 
phenomenological restrictions through Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy, and in 
particular, their concept of the territory. In the process, it will also seek to develop a non-
phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’, which will be called ‘occupation’. Here 
‘occupation’ will be understood as the art of the territory; it will be an attempt at 
understanding how the territory functions in space. Therefore, where Lefebvre’s concept 
                                                
1 That is, only concerned with the possible conditions of experience.  
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of space functions around a phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’, this project will 
attempt to situate Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of territory in relation to a concept of 
‘occupation’. In general then, while subjects dwell in phenomenological spaces, 
territories occupy spaces without worlds, or the Earth.2  
Moreover, the central issue throughout the project is the idea of a politics of space: a 
politics of spatial forms or territories. As a result, it will posit that Deleuze and Guattari 
develop a ‘geo-politics’, a spatial politics that emphasizes becoming over being.3 First, it 
will be a politics of space that stresses the ahistorical and the asubjective. As a 
geopolitics of becoming, it is an ‘involuntarism’, where “the will no longer precedes the 
event” (Zourabichvili, 1998: 350). There are only involuntary and unpredictable 
encounters that invariably take place in space, for instance, an encounter in the street. 
Thus, a geopolitics “wrests history from the cult of necessity in order to stress the 
irreducibility of contingency” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 97), the necessity of 
contingency.4 It emphasizes the unpredictable, the untimely, and the unrecognizable.  
Secondly, it will stress the necessity of construction or creation. It does not assume that 
we are always already in the world, but that worlds or territories need to be constructed, 
which is always political. As Deleuze writes in an essay on May ’68, the event “creates a 
new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations with the body, with time, 
sexuality, the immediate surroundings, with culture, work…)” (2007a: 234). Territories 
are not naturally there, but need to be constructed in response to the event that forces 
                                                
2 In fact, we can say that while Lefebvre, in a move similar to Marx’s, strove to put Heidegger ‘back on his 
feet’, i.e., to concretize his phenomenology, Deleuze removes the ground out from under Lefebvre’s feet. 
The empirical space that Lefebvre grounds his theory of space is inadequate for a politics that seeks to 
develop new spaces. As a result, we need to go beyond, into spaces that precede us,  ‘spaces without 
worlds’, where we no longer recognize our surroundings, where we no longer confront Worlds and Worlds 
no longer confront us.  
3 As Deleuze notes, “Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exists” 
(2002: 3). 
4 Quentin Meillassoux describes contingency as “something that finally happens — something other, 
something which, in its irreducibility to all pre-registered possibilities, puts an end to the vanity of a game 
wherein everything, even the improbable, is predictable” (108). 
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thought or creation.5 Where the world and the subject are assumed to be in a ‘pre-
established harmony’ in phenomenology, in contrast, a ‘geopolitics’ will emphasize the 
necessity to construct territories in order to establish provisory instances of ‘harmony’. 
Revolution is then always a question of organization: what sort of connections can we 
experiment with in order to adequately confront a certain set of problems and 
possibilities. It is a matter of constructing different space-times and thus different 
assemblages, which are always geographical in nature: they are written in space, not 
history. As Deleuze states, “[t]he Question of the Future of the revolution is a bad 
question because, in so far as it is asked, there are so many people who do not become 
revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the 
revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place” (2002: 147). 
Revolutions occur in situations in everyday life, in contracted space-times; they are 
untimely and ahistorical. They are not about beginning again, but about living differently, 
according to a new set of possibilities, a new territory.     
Ultimately, this project will attempt to drag Lefebvre’s thought through the machinery of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy in order develop non-phenomenological concepts 
of space and dwelling. The first chapter will outline Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the 
production of space; 6 and will conclude by describing its limitations, in particular the 
fact that his concept of space relies on an idea of the ‘lived body’: space is explained via 
the body, but the body as such remains unexplained. The second chapter will then find 
within Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘territory’ a non-phenomenological concept of 
space; the ‘territory’ is the set of possibilities within a particular space and time. In fact, 
here, the concept of ‘territory’ replaces that of the ‘body’ from Lefebvre’s thought, but 
instead of focusing on what a body or what a ‘territory’ is, Deleuze and Guattari focus on 
                                                
5 It is important to note, that for Deleuze and Guattari, the notion of the ‘subject’ is fundamentally spatial; 
in fact, the concept of the ‘territory’ replaces the subject in their thought. As Deleuze notes: “there is a 
whole geography in people” (2002: 10); the subject as territory is the set of affects that one is capable of at 
a particular moment in space and time, and thus the construction of territories is always the production of 
subjectivities, or new ways of being-in-the-world.  
6 Lefebvre’s concept of space is almost indistinguishable from the notion of ‘world’ [Umwelt] in 
phenomenology.  
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the set of affects or possibilities of what a body can do. As a result, instead of an 
anthropomorphic understanding of space, there is a ‘geomorphism’. The third chapter, in 
consequence, will be an attempt to understand what ‘dwelling’ would be in terms of 
‘territory’; where instead of ‘dwelling’ in a territory, we ‘occupy’ them. Occupations are 
not the voluntary acts of a subject, but occur through the involuntarism of an ‘encounter.’ 
Occupations are not within territories, but as the ‘art’ of the territory, occupations are the 
constructions of territories; or in other words, they are the spatio-temporal dynamisms or 
rhythms that territories express.  
The thesis will conclude with a discussion of how the concepts of ‘occupy’ and ‘territory’ 
can be used for politics, and in terms of the contemporary political movements. The idea 
of ‘Occupy’ in this thesis is thus borrowed from the Occupy Movements that began in 
2011, including the political revolutions in the Arab Spring and the Gezi Park movement 
in Turkey. However, it will not be referred to in order to judge whether they have 
succeeded or failed in terms of history; the thesis will neither attempt to understand the 
Occupy movement through these philosophical concepts nor attempt to create solutions.7 
It will only take up the problematic that the Occupy movement has rendered visible in 
terms of our contemporary political moment, which is the problem of occupying space 
(squares, parks, streets, etc.) and to transform the way that this space is lived. Therefore, 
the question that implicitly resounds throughout this thesis is: ‘how do we occupy space 
and time politically’? 
 
 
 
                                                
7 In fact, in what follows, the Occupy Movement as such rarely manifests. It will only be used as a loose 
framework to guide us toward a concept of non-phenomenological dwelling. 
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Chapter 1  
1  Space: Henri Lefebvre and the Production of Space 
Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist and ‘phenomenological’ study of space, whether through his 
studies of urbanism or The Production of Space, develops a study of space, where space 
is the object of study in and of itself. It is not a concept qualified by adjectives, but 
becomes a character or actor on its own. It is the space that acts. In the same way that 
Henri Bergson focused on time in itself, as duration, and not time imagined through 
space, for instance, through the image of a line, Lefebvre’s work gives space an agency 
of its own. Moreover, Lefebvre’s work addresses how politics is not a politics in space, 
but ultimately a politics of space; space cannot be forgotten as a neutral backdrop, the 
mute setting to a scene, but has a constitutive effect and power of its own, which, in terms 
of contemporary political movements, from Occupy to the Arab Spring, has become 
increasingly evident. Think of the street, the square, the park, la place. Politics no longer 
simply occurs in space, but very much takes place; the actors are no longer parties, 
figureheads, or faces, but the crowds, the masses, and the spaces that they constitute, like 
a flock of birds or a cloud of flies. In other words, space itself has agency; it is not only a 
politics in the street, but of the street, where the form of the street transforms and 
becomes another form of the street, a different street. As a result, Lefebvre’s ‘dialectical 
thought’ accounts for difference and contradictions, not just through time, but also, 
through space. There are not only contradictions in space, but also contradictions of 
space.  
Here, the texture of space gains focus. Being in space is not being in a void, in a pure 
distance, but being in a meshwork or a network. Space is an entanglement of relations 
that affords a particular manner of being in space, a particular spatial practice. As 
Lefebvre writes, “it is helpful to think of architectures as ‘archi-textures’, to treat each 
monument or building viewed in its surroundings and context, in the populated area and 
associated networks in which it is set down, as part of a particular production of space” 
(1991: 118). There is a fabric or texture of space, which, moreover, contains shadows, 
folds, ripples, and holes. Here Lefebvre refers to Georg Lukács’s idea of the ‘chiaroscuro 
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of everyday life’ (2002: 356; 1991: 174), where the lived experience of space is not a 
totally enlightened space, but is full of shadows. The light of space always brings with it 
its shadows. For Lefebvre, this means that space holds within it possibilities, spaces for 
other ways of living. 
1.1  What is (Social) Space? 
Space is neither a subject nor an object. For Lefebvre, it is a product and a work, a set of 
relations and a process. At the beginning of The Production of Space, Lefebvre lists 
previous concepts of space, from Descartes’ idea of the res extensa, space as the 
objective world, to Kant’s concept of space as an a priori form of intuition, internal to 
subjectivity, and to the “‘indefinity’ so to speak, of spaces” (2) that mathematicians have 
invented (“non-Euclidean spaces, curved spaces, x-dimensional spaces,” etc. (1991: 2)). 
Yet each of these concepts of space fail to adequately address what space is. Negatively, 
space, for Lefebvre, is not an eternal and natural background or container wherein things 
and events take place. An understanding of space will thereby need to move beyond the 
idea of space as an empty container: Euclidean, isotropic, homogeneous and infinite.  
In fact, Lefebvre is hardly interested in the question about what space is in itself. As he 
writes, “(Social) space is a (social) product” (1991: 26). It is produced through social 
relations as they interrelate with one another. Therefore, he is not interested in the actual 
consistency of space, its ontological status, or the metaphysical substance of space. As 
Christian Schmid highlights, “[s]pace should be understood in an active sense, as a 
multilayered fabric of connections that are continually produced and reproduced” (2014: 
74). Space is both a product of societal relations, but also has a constitutive power that 
produces things in space: “itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits 
fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others” (1991: 73). As 
mentioned already, Rob Shields offers another term that seeks to emphasize the fact that 
space, for Lefebvre, and in general, is not a thing or object, but is a collectively (socially) 
produced process, a “spatialisation”, which, for Shields, “stresses relationships and 
settings” (2013: 20). Space is then not a thing but a set of relations between things; it is 
multilayered and constantly fluctuating. Lefebvre refers it to as a “structure far more 
reminiscent of a flaky mille-feuille pastry than of the homogeneous isotropic space of 
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classical (Euclidean/Cartesian) mathematics” (1991: 86). There is a plurality of 
spatialisations interacting with other spatialisations, interpenetrating one another. Another 
analogy he uses, which better stresses the fluid nature of these spatialisations, is from 
hydrodynamics: “where the principle of the superimposition of small movements teaches 
us the importance of the roles played by scale, dimension and rhythm. Great movements, 
vast rhythms, immense waves — theses all collide and ‘interfere’ with one another” 
(1991: 87). As a result, space, or spatialisations, for Lefebvre, is closer to the idea of a 
network, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, an assemblage.  
Space is then not an eternal container that we walk through and build things upon and it 
does not fill a room like air. For Lefebvre, the image or representation of space as a 
homogeneous isotropic space is simply that: a representation of space that was 
historically produced. It is a product of thought, yet nevertheless integral to a concept of 
space because space is both a mental representation or abstraction and concrete. 
Therefore, for Lefebvre, space is a ‘concrete abstraction’, a ‘realized abstraction’. As 
Elden notes, “[h]ere there is a balance struck […] between idealism and materialism. 
Space is a mental and material construct” (2004: 189). That is, while a representation of 
space, for instance the plan of a neighbourhood, may be an abstraction, drawn out of 
reality, it nevertheless has a constitutive effect in the spatial practices and experiences of 
that space. Space, for Lefebvre, is “at once lived and represented, at once the expression 
and the foundation of a practice, at once stimulating and constraining” (1991: 288). In 
The Production of Space, Lefebvre also uses the example of a house to illustrate this. Our 
‘common sense’ image of the house is that of a rigid structure, with equally rigid rooms, 
each with an assigned function: kitchen, living room, washroom, bedroom, etc. But 
Lefebvre explains that this is an illusion. In fact, the house is “permeated from every 
direction by streams of energy, which run in and out of it by every imaginable route: 
water, gas, electricity, telephone lines, radio, and television signals, and so on. Its image 
of immobility would then be replaced by an image of a complex of mobilities, a nexus of 
in and out conduits […]. [T]his piece of ‘immovable property’ is actually a two-faceted 
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machine analogous to an active body” (1991: 289).8 Therefore, the house-space is lived 
or experienced both according to an abstraction, that of the immovable property, but also, 
perhaps imperceptibly, as a ‘hypercomplex’, multilayered, processual material space. 
Space is both lived immediately at a concrete level, but also mediated through concepts 
and abstractions; he understands this relationship through his version of the dialectic, 
which will be addressed below. 
Moreover, space is both a mental and material product: it is produced abstractly, 
according to plans or blueprints, and concretely, through the material and social relations 
that constitute it. But it is important to note that our experience with space is not clear-
cut; the way we experience it is dialectically intertwined with our conceptions or 
categories for experiencing space. As Elden describes it: “there is not the material 
production of objects and the mental production of ideas. Instead, our mental interaction 
with the world, our ordering, generalizing, abstracting and so on produce the world that 
we encounter, as much as the physical objects we create. This does not simply mean that 
we produce reality, but that we produce how we perceive reality” (2004b: 44). Thus, for 
Lefebvre, space is a concrete or real abstraction; it is akin to what Marx understands by 
commodities and money. They may be abstract, but nevertheless have a constitutive 
effect in reality; they are not illusions, masks, or fantasy, but are truly operative in the 
world. As Marx writes in the Grundrisse, “individuals are now ruled by abstractions” 
(321), money and capital as abstractions have real-world consequences. Therefore, for 
Lefebvre, there are ‘codes’ for spatial activity. As Lefebvre writes, “activity in space is 
restricted by that space; space ‘decides’ what activity may occur, but even this ‘decision’ 
has limits placed upon it. Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order — 
and hence also a certain disorder […]. Space commands bodies, prescribing or 
proscribing gestures, routes and distances” (1991: 143).  Space is not only a product, 
                                                
8 This example of the house foreshadows his discussions of Things and ‘thingification’ in Rhythmanlysis. 
For instance, he mentions how when one watches a garden from above there seems to be a “spatial 
simultaneity”, but this is only ‘apparent’, as he directs us: “Go deeper, dig beneath the surface” (2004: 31). 
There you will witness that each flower, each tree, each insect, etc., has its own rhythm, its own duration. 
Thus, the garden is not a space that is void and neutral, but full of interacting rhythms, movements and 
gestures. (2004: 31) 
12 
 
something produced, by social relations or mental activity, but also it, in the words of J.J. 
Gibson, affords or determines one’s behaviour in space. It does so either through its 
material layout, or according to how the space is designed, which is more evident in 
urban space than in natural spaces or environments. In sum, space is not a neutral milieu, 
but rather has a constitutive power of its own.  
Keeping in mind that space is produced both mentally and materially, Lefebvre posits 
two notions of production; the first is a Marxist-Hegelian notion, the second is more 
Nietzschean. In the first notion, production is in the industrial or Fordist sense. 
Production takes the form of a series of repetitive gestures, for instance how a commodity 
is produced in a factory production line. In this case, space is a product of the repetition 
of gestures, of movements, or of habits within a space. In contrast, space is also a 
production in the sense of a work or oeuvre, an artistic activity. The work of art, to 
borrow a term from Walter Benjamin, possesses an aura, a distance and uniqueness, 
whereas the product, in the industrial sense, can be reproduced exactly (1991: 70). 
Lefebvre uses the example of the city of Venice in order to exemplify the distinction. 
Thus, Venice “is a space just as highly expressive and significant, just as unique and 
unified as a painting or sculpture” (1991: 73); it is the expression of the everyday life of 
its inhabitants during a particular historical period. There is spontaneity to its architecture 
and planning; in other words, it is not a pre-planned urban form. There is a spontaneous 
texture to it, which expresses the space as it is lived, or as Lefebvre writes, “a sort of 
involuntary mise-en-scène” (1991: 74). However, for Lefebvre, the “moment of creation 
is past” (1991: 74) and the city as a work is disappearing. It is becoming more and more 
planned, more and more a product. The abstract is dominating the lived.  
This distinction between the ‘product’ and the ‘work’ of space can also be found in 
Lefebvre’s distinction between the ‘appropriation’ and ‘domination’ of space. 
“Dominated’ space would be related to space as a product. However, as Lefebvre notes, it 
is not a ‘product’ in the narrow industrial sense (they are not products according to a 
spatial activity, in other words) because they dominate space prior to the activity in 
space: “in order to dominate space, technology introduces a new form into a pre-existing 
space” (1991: 165). Space, here, is more like a construction site than a work [oeuvre], 
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where space reproduces the plan or blueprint. As construction sites, they are “closed, 
sterilized, emptied out” (1991: 165); Lefebvre uses the example of a motorway that 
“brutalizes the countryside and the land, slicing through space like a great knife” (1991: 
165). These ‘dominated spaces’, in a sense, construct a space, like concrete slabs, 
whereupon or wherein spaces as products can be produced, like the factory or urban 
space, and where a spatial consensus is forcibly ensured.  
In contrast, space can also be produced through what Lefebvre calls appropriation. 
Appropriated space is like an oeuvre, a work of art. As Lefebvre writes, “[a]n 
appropriated space resembles a work of art” (1991: 165); here space is either individually 
or collectively appropriated, and through these lived and spatial activities, a new space is 
spontaneously produced as a work of art. Appropriation is a creative activity. For 
instance, Lefebvre was interested in how the inhabitants of spaces were able to 
appropriate the spaces that pre-exist them in order to transform and create new spaces. In 
his study of the Pavillons in postwar France, Lefebvre introduces a concept of dwelling 
[habiter] in order to account for how the inhabitants appropriate space. Against the 
practice of ‘functionalism’ that was dominant at that time, Lefebvre wanted to show how 
people did not simply use space according to pre-assigned functions, but that they 
dwelled in them by appropriating and creating them according to their own aesthetic 
enjoyment.  
As Lukasz Stanek writes, “[f]or Lefebvre, [appropriation] became a way to grasp 
dwelling as a poetic practice, a possibility of shaping space as an individual work 
(oeuvre) within the overarching cultural and social reality” (2011: 89). This concept 
clearly refers to Heidegger’s concept of dwelling [wohen] and Bachelard’s idea of the 
poetics of space, both seek to move beyond the merely calculative planning and 
understanding of space that is based on Cartesian coordinates. However, Lefebvre does 
move beyond Heidegger’s understanding of production or creation as poiesis, which is, 
for Lefebvre, a “restricted and restrictive conception of production, which he envisages as 
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a causing-to-appear” (1991: 122), because it has no basis in concrete reality.9 Therefore, 
he seeks to put Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’ into everyday life, and he finds in the 
inhabitants of the pavillons examples of this mode of ‘dwelling’ [habiter], who transform 
their ‘housing’ through appropriation into an oeuvre or a ‘dwelling’.10 
Finally, for Lefebvre, space is a product of a society’s ‘mode of production’. Each ‘mode 
of production’ produces its own space, both abstract and material; and that the 
representation of space is utilized in order to maintain and reproduce space. The space of 
capitalism therefore is what Lefebvre calls ‘abstract space’, which is used to facilitate the 
flows and networks of capitalism. As he writes, “every society — and hence every mode 
of production with its subvariants […]— produces a space, its own space” (1991: 31). 
For Lefebvre, the importance of ‘space’ is that modes of production attempt to hide their 
contradictions through or in space. Yet, these contradictions in space inevitably become 
contradictions of space; each space, for Lefebvre, “carries within itself the seeds of a new 
kind of space” (1991: 51). Accordingly, as modes of production change there is a 
production of a new space. Moreover, in order to be successful, revolutions must create 
or produce new spaces; in fact, for Lefebvre, revolutions occur through the 
transformation of space, whether it is through the contradictions that a mode of 
production produces or through the creative appropriation of space by inhabitants. As he 
writes, “[a] revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full 
potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed 
ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses” (1991: 53); hence, for 
Lefebvre, the Soviet revolution did not succeed because it had not produced a new mode 
of spatialisation or social space, a new manner of living.  
The production of space indicates that space is not a natural, absolute space in the 
Newtonian sense. It is not a neutral background wherein or whereupon events take place, 
objects and subjects interact, things grow, etc., but that it has a constitutive effect in what 
                                                
9 cf. Lefebvre, 2003a: 112.  
10 As it is translated in The Production of Space, appropriation creates ‘residences’ [habiter] (314). 
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occurs. There is a politics of space. In fact, for Lefebvre, politics is fundamentally of 
space. There is, in other words, a history of space. In The Production of Space, he orders 
the history of space into different epochs, yet acknowledges that there is no distinct limit 
between epochs and they tend to bleed into each other: absolute (sacred) space, historical 
space, abstract space, differential space (urban space). It is important to note that each of 
these is associated with a particular mode of production: nature / feudal, city-states, 
industrial capitalism and what he calls, urbanization or planetary urbanization.  
1.2 A Dialectics of Space 
Lefebvre’s theory of space is an attempt to construct a unified theory of space. It is what 
he calls a ‘unitary theory’, or a unitary urbanism, a term he shares with the Situationists. 
Lefebvre describes that his project “does not aim to produce a (or the) discourse on space, 
but rather to expose the actual production of space by bringing the various kinds of space 
and the modalities of their genesis together within a single theory” (1991: 16). That is, 
space cannot be understood as a reality, a mere “collection of things or an aggregate of 
(sensory) data” outside of human thought, or as a ‘form’ “imposed upon phenomena” 
(1991: 27). Space has a multi-faceted social reality; it is also both static and processual, 
which Lefebvre attempts to encompass through his own version of the dialectic. As he 
writes, “the dialectic thus emerges from time and actualizes itself, operating now, in an 
unforeseen manner, in space” (1991: 129). This spatial dialectic is an attempt to 
understand space as one of coexistence, simultaneity and succession. The moments of the 
dialectic, therefore, do not simply succeed each other through time, but coexist, are 
simultaneous to each other. As Schmid writes, “Lefebvre advances his own version of the 
dialectic, the ‘triadic’ or the ‘ternary’, that is three-valued analysis. It posits three 
moments of equal value that relate to each other in varying relationships and complex 
movements wherein now one, now the other prevails against the negation of one or the 
other” (2008: 34). It is not a simple linear movement that ends with resolution or 
sublation. Instead, the dialectic ‘operative in space’ is more akin to a prism or crystal, 
where space is seen through three different lenses at one time. These lenses provoke 
conflicts or contradictions, or resonances and synthesis.  
Space is understood through three dialectically interconnected dimensions: ‘spatial 
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practice’, ‘representation of space’ and ‘spaces of representation’ (1991: 38-9).11 Space is 
the interaction of these three ‘moments’ or ‘formants’; in other words, it is through the 
simultaneous interaction of these three moments that space is produced and understood. 
Briefly, ‘spatial practice’ is related to the everyday practices and routines that make up 
space: it “secretes that society’s space” (1991: 38); it is how space is enacted or 
perceived. The ‘representations of space’ consist of the abstract knowledge or discourses 
about space that are utilized both by apparatuses of power in order to organize the spaces, 
but also by the users of space in order to conceive it. Lastly, ‘spaces of representations’ 
are spaces as they are lived by the inhabitants or users of space: the lived experience of 
space. It is within the third moment, the ‘spaces of representation’, where the 
contradictions of and in space are the most acute. As Rob Shields describes it: “[spaces of 
representation are] derived from both historical sediments within the everyday 
environment and from utopian elements that shock one into a new conception of the 
spatialization of social life” (1999: 161). It is therefore through these dialectically 
intertwined elements that the prism of space is formed; and it is through these lenses that 
Lefebvre wants to grasp space and its complexity.  
He also supplements this triad with a more phenomenologically-based dialectic, which is 
internal to the spatial dialectic. The three moments are the perceived [perçu], conceived 
[conçu] and the lived [veçu] and map onto the moments explained above, respectively. 
Most importantly, for Lefebvre, is that the phenomenological method, the perceived-
conceived-lived triad, grasps the concrete; it cannot be treated as an “abstract model” 
(1991: 40). As a result, this triad puts an emphasis on the role of the body in its 
relationship with the space surrounding it. As Lefebvre writes, “social practice 
presupposes the use of the body: the use of the hands, members and sensory organs, and 
the gestures of work as of activity unrelated to work. This is the realm of the perceived 
[perçu]” (1991: 40). And, the way we perceive space through our body is ultimately 
through or coded by our conceptions of space and of our body in space.  
                                                
11
 As Rob Shields indicates in his book on Lefebvre, the English translator of The Production of Space, 
Donald Nicholson-Smith had translated ‘espaces de la représentation’ as ‘representational spaces’. I will 
follow Shield’s amendment, however. 
17 
 
Finally, for Lefebvre, the lived experiences of space are different than how we perceive 
and conceive it; they seem to transcend them. It is therefore the third moment, the lived 
[veçu] spaces of representation as that which acts, in Hegelian terms, as the aufhebung or 
sublation in the dialectic. It is what resolves the conflicts between the perceived and the 
conceived. Moreover, the lived experiences of space occur through the body. This is 
because, for Lefebvre, “there is an immediate relationship between the body and its 
space, between the body’s deployment in space and its occupation of space” (1991: 170). 
It is this lived ‘total’ body that refers to the Nietzschean ideal of the ‘total person’, which 
is the “‘fully lived’, pre-conscious and authentic shards of spatiality that animate people” 
(Shields, 1999: 165). It is an immediacy that precedes one’s perceptions of space, which 
are influenced by the sort of knowledge or conceptions one has, or one has been taught, 
about that space. It is therefore the body, “which Lefebvre sees as the site of resistance 
within the discourse of Power in space” (Elden, 2004: 189).  
In other words, perceptions of space or how one acts in space are mediated by the 
conceptions of space, that is, the categories by which one senses and perceives things in 
space. But these conceptions of space are nevertheless susceptible to disruption through 
the contradictions that lived experiences in space provoke or experience. As a result, à la 
Michel Foucault, Lefebvre emphasizes that time and space are not eternal categories of 
experience, but they too are conditioned according to their historical epistemes. As Elden 
points out, “[n]o longer the Kantian empty formal containers, no longer categories of 
experience, time and space could be experienced as such and their experience was 
directly related to the historical conditions they were experienced within” (2004: 185). 
These categories of experience are also, therefore, tied to the modes of production and the 
spaces it produces.  
It is within the third moment of the dialectic, the lived ‘spaces of representation’, wherein 
the contradictions of and within space are expressed, or are the most evident. It is a 
creative moment of “poesy and desire as forms of transcendence” (Schmid, 2008: 33), 
that does not reconcile in a moment of synthesis or sublation, but rather keeps the 
dialectic open. As Elden illustrates, it is a non-linear and Nietzschean take on the 
dialectic. It does not simply resolve two conflicting terms, but rather opens them up into 
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“a three-way process, where the synthesis is able to react upon the first two terms. The 
third term is not the result of the dialectic: it is there, but it is no longer seen as a 
culmination” (2004: 37). The third moment becomes a moment of possibility. Lefebvre’s 
term for this moment is dépassement, which as Elden and Schmid point out, is closer to 
Nietzsche’s concept of Überwinden, that is, an overcoming or over-winding, than the 
Hegelian or Marxist aufhebung (which is a negation and a preservation). In other words, 
it is a moment of Dionysian expenditure and creation. To return to terms mentioned 
above: it is a moment of appropriation, where space becomes a work [oeuvre] of art, and 
not a product of repetition or reproduction.  
Therefore, while spatial practice seems to be ordered, stifled by conceptions, the conçu, 
into monotonous, repetitive rhythms, associated with capitalism, Lefebvre emphasizes 
that, despite the monotony of everyday life under capitalism, there remain  ‘moments’ of 
creation or appropriation. As he writes, a moment is a “higher form of repetition, renewal 
and reappearance”; they are societal paroxysms. Michael Gardiner describes them as 
“flashes of perception into the range of historical possibilities that are embedded in the 
totality of being” (2004: 243). They are “‘authentic’ moments that break through the 
dulling monotony of the ‘taken for granted’” (Shields, 1999: 58); or moments of 
‘presence’ where one can access possibilities to create another space, or another manner 
of living. The ‘moment’ is similar to Walter Benjamin’s notion of Jetzizeit, or ‘Now-
time’.12 The ‘Now-time’, for Benjamin, is a rupture within the historical continuum; it is 
a qualitative moment of lived time, a kariological moment that is discontinuous with the 
quantitative, abstract and mechanical time of capitalism. A moment of disalienation. It is 
a non-linear moment in history that opens history up to other possibilities. As Andy 
Merrifield writes, the moment “disrupt[s] linear duration, detonate[s] it, and drag[s] time 
off in a different contingent direction, toward some unknown staging post. The moment 
is thus an opportunity to be seized and invented” (2006: 28). It is a moment for accessing 
a set of possibilities: a moment of contingency, which escapes the limitations of the 
                                                
12
 Lefebvre’s theory of ‘moments’, here, is also comparable to Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the ‘Aeon’, 
which he contrasts with ‘Chronos’ in The Logic of Sense and with Martin Heidegger’s concept of the 
Augenblick or the ‘blink of an eye’. 
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principle of sufficient reason.  
In more spatial terms, the theory of moments is related to what Stanek has called ‘the 
dialectics of centrality’. For Lefebvre, urban space, the city, centralizes; it is where 
people, commodities, and capital gather. For instance, within the city the marketplace, the 
square, or le centre-ville attracts people and commodities. As Lefebvre writes, “[u]rban 
space gathers crowds, products in the markets, acts and symbols. It concentrates all these 
and accumulates them” (1991: 101). Centrality is a form that attracts content. It attracts 
everything: “piles of objects and products in a warehouse, mounds of fruit in the 
marketplace, crowds, pedestrians, goods of various kinds, juxtaposed, superimposed, 
accumulated” (2003c: 116). In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre describes the urban as a 
“pure form: a place of encounter, assembly, simultaneity. This form has no specific 
content, but is a centre of attraction and life” (2003c: 118). The dialectics of centrality is 
that the urban attracts, yet at the same time disperses and excludes: “the centre gathers 
things together only to the extent that it pushes them away and disperses them” (1991: 
386). As a result, the urban is in essence contradictory because it attracts heterogeneous 
things, people, etc., but at the same time desires homogeneity. Thus, the contradictions in 
space eventually lead to contradictions of space. While centrality may be a pure form 
with no specific content, it is nevertheless “not indifferent to what it brings together” 
(2003c: 116); in fact, the content informs the form: “the content of these forms 
metamorphoses them” (1991: 150). There is a unity in difference and when the difference 
cannot be contained it creates something new, a new form, a new space.  
For instance, Lefebvre uses the example of the form of the street. He writes that the street 
is “more than just a place for movement and circulation” (2003c: 18) because it is where 
people and things come together. The street is where unexpected encounters take place. 
As Lefebvre notes, but in relation to the urban form, “virtually, anything can happen 
anywhere. A crowd can gather, objects can pile up, a festival unfold, an event — 
terrifying or pleasant—can occur” (2003c: 130). It is fraught with contingency, the 
unexpected. In relation to his idea of the dialectic, it is where lived experience contradicts 
expected perception (perçu) or our ideas or knowledge of the space (conçu). As he writes, 
“[i]n the street and through the space it offers, a group (the city itself) took shape, 
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appeared, appropriated places, realized an appropriated space-time. This appropriation 
demonstrates that use value can dominate exchange and exchange value” (2003c: 19). 
The street, or in general terms, the urban, for instance, centralizes and creates the 
conditions for encounters or moments of spontaneity, and thus for creating new space-
times, or new ways of living. It is an example of how dialectics becomes operative in 
space.  
1.3 Abstract Space and Art 
While The Production of Space does trace a history of space, in its relation to different 
‘modes of production’, it is also fundamentally an indictment of the current mode of 
production (which for him was at a time when capitalism was transitioning from postwar, 
Fordist capitalism to what could be called ‘neoliberalism’), and the space it produces, 
what he calls ‘abstract space’. The capitalist mode of production therefore produces a 
particular knowledge of space that attempts to render space abstract. For Lefebvre, it is 
associated with modernity, capitalism and bureaucracy; it emphasizes, above the other 
moments of the dialectic, the conceived representations of space that aim to stifle spatial 
practices and the lived experiences of space into repetitive and monotonous routines; it 
aims at a spatial consensus, in order to facilitate the flows, expansions and flows of 
capitalism.  
For Lefebvre, it operates according to the triad of homogeneity-fragmentation-hierarchy. 
Space, under capitalism, is ordered hierarchically into homogeneous fragments. As he 
writes, “[e]verything that is dispersed and fragmented retains its unity, however, within 
the homogeneity of power’s space; this is a space which naturally takes account of the 
connections and links between those elements that it keeps paradoxically, united yet 
disunited, joined yet detached from one another, at once torn apart and squeezed 
together” (1991: 365-6). It is, moreover, a space of Cartesian co-ordinates and Euclidean 
dimensions: the “reduction of three-dimensional realities to two dimensions” (1991: 258). 
Or as Gardiner explains, “[t]here is a kind of ‘flattening out’ of spatial complexity and the 
depth of human experience occurring here, a reduction of the world to a single logic or 
plan” (2000: 246). In other words, the “Cartesian system of representation became 
‘practically true’ in capitalism” (Stanek, 2011: 152). Space is experienced and perceived 
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as if it is actually made up of Cartesian co-ordinates; it is how space is commonly sensed. 
Yet it is important to note, as Lefebvre does, that “[a]bstract space is not homogeneous; it 
simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its ‘lens’” (1991: 287). Instead, 
abstract space renders homogeneous continuously. Nevertheless, the repetitions and 
reproductions that occur in space produce a difference that it cannot contain. One just 
perceives space as if it is homogeneous.  
It also has three ‘formants’: the ‘geometric’, based on Euclidean geometry and Cartesian 
mathematics; the ‘optical’ or ‘visual’, what he calls, borrowed from Erwin Panofsky, a 
‘logic of visualisation’ based on the technique of linear perspective; and lastly, the 
‘phallic’, a space that “symbolizes male power and virility” (Gardiner, 2000: 248). 
Therefore, another triad: the geometric-optical-phallic. Here, for Lefebvre, there is a 
“predominance of the visual” (1991: 284), an ‘ocularcentrism’ that creates a voided and 
disembodied space. In the words of Derek Gregory, it acts through a process of 
“decorporealization” (392), as if, within space, “bodies are transported out of themselves, 
transferred and emptied out, as it were, via the eyes” (Production 98). This space in other 
words negates “the manifold qualities and potentialities of the human body” (Gardiner, 
2000: 248), wherein the gaze of the eye dominates. As a result, as Lefebvre writes, “lived 
experience is crushed, vanquished by what is ‘conceived of’” (1991: 51), namely abstract 
space(s), empty rooms and empty streets. Space is only experienced through the eyes 
detached from a body, and if the body experiences space, its experience leaks out of the 
eyes through visual or optical coordinates.  
Lefebvre traces the ‘logic of visualization’, which is what guides ‘abstract space’, to the 
emergence of the techniques of linear perspective in Renaissance or Quattrocento art. 
Linear perspective is, in art, an attempt to map three (or four) dimensional space onto a 
two-dimensional plane, the flat space of the canvas. As Erwin Panofsky describes, 
“perspective transforms psychophysiological space into a mathematical space” (31; 
italics removed); it is an abstraction of space out of space. In his essay, “Reverse 
Perspective”, Pavel Florensky formulates a list of more or less five premises of linear 
perspective: 1. it is founded upon a belief in Euclidean space; 2. it is based on a 
transcendental subject, or a transcendental Right Eye that “legislates the universe”; 3. and 
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not the eye of a fleshy body, but the static “glass lens of the camera obscura” (263); 4. it 
creates a static world, and; 5. a mechanical world (262-3). To summarize, linear 
perspective is an attempt to create a one-to-one correspondence between the world and 
the canvas. The perspectival picture therefore “wants to convey between the points on the 
skin of the world” to the “points of a representation”, the world itself (264). It is a way of 
framing and reducing the world to a single perspective and a single horizon: it creates a 
homogenous world, squeezing all of the difference out of a vanishing point. Space is 
limited to Alberti’s window frame.  
However, Lefebvre also locates within art the power to produce new kinds of spaces. For 
instance, he refers to Paul Klee’s statement that ‘art does not reflect the visible; it renders 
visible’ (1991: 125, fn. 16). Artists create spaces; in fact, art, particularly painting and 
sculpture, make or render space palpable. Lefebvre also claims that, “Picasso’s space 
heralded the space of modernity. It does not follow that the one produced the other. What 
we find in Picasso is an unreservedly visualized space, a dictatorship of the eye” (1991: 
302). Therefore, Picasso invented a new way of seeing space, for Lefebvre, that is 
without any points of reference (1991: 300); where reality cannot be distinguished from 
its own representation. It is a space without depth, no longer organized according to linear 
perspective. For Lefebvre, it is the abstract space of capitalism: at once homogeneous and 
fragmented. But, as a result, Picasso also “bore witness to the emergence of another 
space, a space not fragmented but differential in character” (1991: 303). In other words, 
the contradictions of abstract space are clearly expressed through the ‘spaces of 
representation’ that art creates. As Elden writes, “Cubism therefore both renders the 
abstract space of three dimensions perceivable (sensible) and makes the perceivable 
abstract” (2004: 182). Art is, for Lefebvre, then a way to express the ‘spaces of 
representation’, a way to expose the contradictions that the ‘representations of space’ 
produce when they are applied to the lived experience of space.  
Art is associated to Lefebvre’s ‘revolutionary romanticism’ and his theory of ‘moments’, 
where space and the ‘appropriation’ of space is a work [oeuvre] of art. Art is not 
necessarily a sculpture or painting, but could be the creation of situations in everyday life, 
a détournement à la the Situationists. It is, nevertheless, a means of constructing 
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moments of disalienation. They are the creations of ‘spaces of representation’, a mise-en-
scène, in other words. As he writes, a “[space of representation] is alive: it speaks. It has 
an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling; or: square, church, graveyard. 
It embraces a loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately 
implies time. […]. It may be directional, situational, or relational, because it is essentially 
qualitative, fluid and dynamic” (1991: 42). Art accesses this ‘affective kernel’ and 
exposes it, renders visible another type of space beneath the abstract spaces of capitalism: 
the immediate and qualitative space of lived experience.  
Against the ‘logic of visualization’ that organizes the abstract spaces of capitalism, 
‘spaces of representation’, whether in art or in revolution, would need to emphasize the 
lived experience of the body in space, or rather the body-space relationship. For Lefebvre, 
the “fleshy (spatio-temporal) body is already in revolt” (1991: 201) against the 
abstractions of capitalist space, which attempts to exclude the body. The body has an 
immediate relationship with space, a sort of natal secret or complicity. The total body, i.e. 
the synaesthetic body, is a “differential field”, that “breaks out of the temporal and spatial 
shell” (1991: 384) that is imposed upon it by capitalism and labour. As Lefebvre writes, 
“[t]he enigma of the body […] is its ability […] to produce differences ‘unconsciously’ 
out of repetitions — out of gestures (linear) or out of rhythms (cyclical)” (1991: 395). 
Space is, in other words, ‘biomorphic’ or ‘biogenetic’. It is generated via the total, 
synesthetic body. The body and its immediate experiences, gestures, rhythms, affects 
generate for instance, the internal rationality, or the immanent laws of space. Space 
emerges from the body itself prior to the production of space by architects or urban 
planners. As a result, the Lefebvrian art par excellence would be an embodied art whose 
‘spaces of representation’ would be of the lived experiences of space itself.13  
                                                
13
 A good example would be Paul Cézanne’s landscapes through the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in 
his two essays “Cézanne’s Doubt” and “Eye and Mind”. Merleau-Ponty describes Cézanne’s paintings as 
possessing a ‘duration’; it is a depiction of the “constitution of the landscape as an emerging organism” 
(2007a: 75), not as an abstract object within an abstract space. Here space is depicted in metastasis, as a 
complex organism in action. 
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1.4 Conclusions and Limitations 
Lefebvre’s history of space ultimately politicizes space; to reiterate, there is not simply a 
politics in space, but a politics of space. Space is not a neutral container, but rather is 
produced (there is a history of space) and produces (it is a tool for hegemony and 
revolution). In other words, it is a product of social relations, but also has a constitutive 
effect on social relations or social behaviour. The structure of space affords particular 
habits, spatial practices or behaviours. As a result, for Lefebvre, politics is fundamentally 
a politics of space because politics is about constructing or creating new spaces and thus 
new manners of being, new modes of behaviour or spatial activities. It creates a new 
‘everyday life’, new social rhythms.  
In The Production of Space, Lefebvre sought to construct a unitary theory of space and 
politics by positing a ‘spatial dialectic’, or a dialectics that is operative in space, which is 
capable of articulating or expressing the ‘contradictions of space’. The spatial dialectic 
therefore acts like a prism or crystal that shows how contradictions arise between one’s 
lived experience [veçu] of space and one’s perceptions [perçu] and conceptions [conçu] 
of that same space. The dialectic here does not solely occur through time, but is rather a 
way to conceive of differences at a particular moment, in a here-and-now. It shifts a focus 
from a historical narrative to a more geographical analysis and attempts to capture how 
difference can accumulate in a particular space at a particular time; it is akin to what 
Gilles Deleuze calls a ‘disjunctive synthesis’, a relation of non-relation, where 
heterogeneous things are in a synthetic relation at one point in time, that is, a 
simultaneous co-existence. Lefebvre will also call this dialectics a “unity in diversity” 
(2004: 77); for instance, the urban square does not assemble identical things, but different 
or heterogeneous things: it unites difference without reducing it.  
An example of the spatial dialectics is the ‘dialectics of centrality’, which is, for 
Lefebvre, the logic of urbanization, or what he calls, ‘planetary urbanization’,  “the 
complete urbanization of society” (2003c: 12; Brenner 2014). Capitalism centralizes, 
while at the same time pushes things and people to the peripheries. This works at multiple 
scales: at a global level, at state level and within the city itself. Capital assembles and 
gathers toward a centre, which, in order to maintain equilibrium and to avoid points of, to 
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borrow a word from Louis Althusser, ‘overdetermination’, needs to push the excess to its 
peripheries. Lefebvre also describes it as a dialectics of ‘implosion-explosion’, a term he 
borrows from nuclear physics. He describes it as “the tremendous concentration (of 
people, activities, wealth, goods, objects, instruments, means, and thought) of urban 
reality and the immense explosion, the projection of numerous, disjunct fragments 
(peripheries, suburbs, vacation homes, satellite towns) into space” (2003c: 14). 
Urbanization is the mode of production that gathers, yet disperses. It, therefore, for 
Lefebvre, creates conflicts or exacerbates contradictions between the ‘abstract spaces’ of 
capitalism and the differential spaces that capitalism nevertheless produces. He uses the 
example of the ‘street’, which, through the representations of space that capitalism 
produces, is a space of circulation and movement, but is also the space of encounter, of 
difference, of unpredictability. Unexpected events occur in the street: a car crash, a 
mugging, meeting unexpected people, etc. The street is “a form of spontaneous theatre, I 
become spectacle and spectator, and sometimes an actor” (2003c: 18). For Lefebvre, 
therefore, capitalism harbours within it, due to its own processes, a different from of 
space, what he calls ‘differential space’, that causes ‘contradictions’ between it and the 
representation of space (i.e. abstract space) that it produces or requires in order to 
function.  
Despite itself, capitalism sows the seeds of another space within its own. Lefebvre 
ultimately locates this sort of space emerging in the lived experience of space, in the grey 
zone between the body and space. Here differences emerge that cannot be contained, 
differences emerge that are not “induced differences”, or differences that are 
prefabricated or already ‘accepted.’ Instead, they are “produced differences” that 
“presuppose the shattering of a system; [they] are born of an explosion” (1991: 372). A 
space of difference, a differential space, emerges that calls for a new manner of being, 
that is, new habits and a new everyday life.  
However, there are some limitations. Following Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, it is 
important to note that “no one has ever died of contradictions” (1983: 151). By which 
they mean that capitalism feeds off of its contradictions, off of the instability that it 
creates; in other words, the ‘differential space’ it creates will not herald its demise, but 
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will simply provide another space for which it to grow and develop. As a result, Lefebvre 
does not go far enough: the ‘differences’ that he posits still rely on Identity. It is identity 
and difference. As Elden writes, in relation to Lefebvre’s understanding of ‘logic’: “We 
should note here that Lefebvre recognizes that as well as being crucial for identity ‘1+1’ 
also creates difference, because of the repetition. […]” (2004: 31); the second ‘1’ is 
already different than the first because it is second, repeated. In other words, for Lefebvre 
it is the repetition of representational forms that produces difference. There is no 
‘difference in itself’, as Gilles Deleuze would call it.  
In terms of phenomenology, Lefebvre’s ‘differential space’ is reduced to the lived body’s 
experience in space. The differences are therefore reduced to the ‘phenomenological’ 
body’s experience in space. The body is a transcendent ground that organizes space; it 
does not reach, what Deleuze and Guattari call, the ‘plane of immanence’ or the ‘Body 
Without Organs’. As a result, space is always recognizable and familiar: the body always 
experiences itself reflected therein. Lefebvre’s analysis does not go beyond the given, to 
address how the given is given. ‘Differential space’ is merely an extension of the body, or 
the immediate experience of a lived body.  
In his book, The Politics of the Encounter: Urban Theory and Protest Under Planetary 
Urbanization, Andy Merrifield seeks to develop a kind of synthesis of Deleuze and 
Lefebvre. Within it, he posits that Lefebvre’s notion of ‘differential space’ requires 
“another way of seeing”, no longer derived from the logic of visualization, that Lefebvre 
associates with the abstract spaces of capitalism, but “derived from abstract 
expressionism” (2013: xvii). Within this book, he delineates a theory of politics based on 
Lefebvre’s analysis of the urban under ‘planetary urbanization’, which emphasizes 
‘encounters’. For Merrifield, this politics occurs in an “[u]nframed space” (2013: 9), a 
space based on “fractal geography” (2013: xvii). It is not a space organized according to 
linear perspective, but which explodes into disorienting, unorganized and differential 
lines and colours, which, for Merrifield, become a non-representational means of 
expressing the spaces of urban protest or urban politics. This is a ‘representation of 
space’ [conçu] that does not attempt to smother the lived experience [veçu] of space, but 
only approximates it, tries to sketch, alongside it, what a ‘differential space’ may be like. 
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It seeks to let the differences vibrate in themselves. Therefore, Merrifield notes that the 
differential space creates a difference in itself that allows for a politics of ‘encounter’. It, 
in a way, urbanizes Deleuze’s political philosophy. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Territory: Deleuze and Guattari and the Art of Territories 
The world is layered in territories on multiple scales: from the territories of states and 
international actors, to the everyday territories of humans and animals, and to 
environmental and geological processes. Everything and everyone constantly claims and 
appropriates space and territories; the world is a sheaf or a stack of territories. However, 
as a concept, territory is not clearly understood. To begin, it needs to be distinguished 
from similar notions like space, region, place, etc.; as a result, it opens up to other 
problems and possibilities. ‘Territory’ typically has two broad understandings. The first, 
and the most common, is the territory tied to the sovereign State: the delimited space 
wherein the State governs. The second, which stems from processes of territoriality, and 
is derived from socio-biology, ethology, and phenomenology, is more of an existential 
territory than the traditional ‘political’ one. 
Traditionally, territory is understood as a passive background that the state operates and 
governs within. Territory is the space (absolute à la Newton) of the sovereign State. 
French geographer Jean Gottmann, in his essay on the concept of territory, illustrates this 
well: “[t]erritory is a portion of geographical space that coincides with the spatial extent 
of a government’s jurisdiction. It is the physical container and support of the body politic 
organized under a governmental structure. It describes the spatial arena of the political 
system developed within a nation state or a part thereof endowed with some autonomy” 
(29). Stuart Elden corroborates this definition in his history of the concept of territory, 
“[t]o be in territory is to be subject to sovereignty […]; [territory] is the spatial extent of 
sovereignty” (2013: 329). However, territory, as such, is not an empty space or passive 
background, but is permeated by power. Anssi Paasi highlights, as the etymology of 
‘territory’, which is derived from terrere, ‘to frighten’, suggests, “territory and power are 
inextricably linked” (110). This frightening nature is best manifested in Max Weber’s 
famous definition of the state: “a state is that human community which (successfully) 
lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory, this 
‘territory’ being another defining characteristic of the state” (310-11; Elden, 2013: 327-
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328). Territory in this case is the political and politicized space of the State.  
In fact, in a Foucauldian tenor, Elden states that “[t]erritory should be understood as a 
political technology, or perhaps better as a bundle of political technologies” (2013: 322). 
Territories are used by the State in order to regulate and govern its population; it is a 
means of measuring and controlling. As a result, ‘territory’ is not a static, passive product 
or object, but part of a political rationality that controls and regulates; it is a means of 
organizing the population of the nation, through an active and productive, governmental 
power.  
The concept of ‘territoriality’, on the other hand, assumes a concept of ‘territory’ 
detached from the nation-state. Instead, drawing from sociobiological and ethological 
studies, it asserts that everything living stakes a claim to territory. However, the problem 
with the original idea of ‘territoriality’ is that it is based on a ‘deterministic’ argument, 
where “the need for space is a characteristic innate to all species, including humans” 
(Storey 14). The naturalized concept of territoriality ignores the power relations involved 
in territorial processes.  
Beginning with Robert Sack’s defining study, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and 
History, territoriality is not understood as a basic and innate instinct, but is instead a 
‘spatial strategy’. As he writes, “territoriality is best understood as a spatial strategy to 
affect, influence or control resources and people, by controlling area […]. In 
geographical terms, it is a form of social behaviour” (1-2). Therefore, territories are not 
natural entities, like a particular section of ‘natural’, material space tied to basic instincts 
like aggression. As Elden points out, Sack’s thesis “effectively argues that territoriality is 
a social construct, forged through interaction and struggle, and thoroughly permeated 
with social relations” (2013: 4-5). Territories in this sense are constructions produced 
through social relations. As a result, the concept of ‘territoriality’ allows us to understand 
that “territories are not frozen frameworks where social life occurs. Rather they are made, 
given meanings, and destroyed in social and individual action” (Paasi 110). It allows us 
to rethink the limits and power of social relations.  
In A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, posit a different concept of 
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‘territory’ that resonates with Sack’s formulation of ‘territoriality’. However, in Sack’s 
formulation, territories are the products of social relations or territoriality, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thesis, it is the opposite, territories in fact precede territoriality and social 
relations; territories afford particular behaviours or functions. Territories, in other words, 
are similar to Lefebvre’s concept of ‘space’: both a product and productive. Yet here 
territories are not necessarily attached to the subjects, objects and functions that emerge 
from them. They have a power and life of their own. Therefore, contra Konrad Lorenz, 
who asserts that aggression or the defense of a resource through the making of critical 
distances produces territory, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the territories themselves 
are primary. Moreover, territorial processes precede the functions and activities that take 
place therein: processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, or what they call a 
‘geomorphism’ (1987: 319), the movements of the earth, are primary. Dynamic processes 
always precede the formed results. 
 Territories are not simply organizations or techniques for the management and control of 
a population, but organizations of desire and agency; they are the enabling constraints or 
the local horizons of sense [sens].14 Following from the geographer Claude Raffestin, 
who states that “[t]erritoriality is, in some sense, the ‘skeleton’ of everyday life as 
analyzed by [Henri] Lefebvre” (2012: 129), territories are bound up with a politics or 
praxis of everyday life. Our territories allow us to navigate the world. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept, therefore, tries to understand the political agencement or the political 
organization of affects, or territories, that occurs at a concrete and practical scale.  
To simplify, we can, by borrowing from the French geographer Jacques Lévy, posit four 
basic conditions of a territory: first, territories are ‘local spaces’ or horizons, that 
nevertheless have “linkages” and leakages “beyond the local” (273); second, territories 
are “limited and controlled spaces”: one must know thy borders (274); three, territories 
are ‘appropriated spaces’, they “would designate a space beholden, in one way or 
                                                
14 In French, ‘sens’ has a double meaning: the first has a psycho-physiological meaning, where information 
in the surrounding world impinges upon the body, makes it have sense; but it also means direction or way. 
That is, here, the territory provides a sense [sens]: a collection of information that directs one’s behaviour, 
where one should go, how to act, etc.  
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another, to an attribution of either ownership or identification” (274); and lastly, 
territories are inevitably ‘inhabited’ and occupied spaces, territories emerge from 
occupations (at any level or scale). 
2.1 An Introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Concept of 
Territory 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the territory is not strictly a political concept, but is 
drawn from ethological and ethnological studies (e.g. Jacob von Uexküll and Konrad 
Lorenz), developmental biology (e.g. Raymond Ruyer), and the theory of territoriality. 
Ronald Bogue remarks that the most common understanding of territoriality is a “mode 
of social organization whereby the strongest males (generally) secure mates and desirable 
habitats, establishing through various aggressive communicative actions with 
conspecifics an equilibrium of population density across a given area” (57). The territory 
in this sense would be the defended area or environment. This traditional definition of 
territoriality stems from studies of animal behaviour, ethology, by Konrad Lorenz, who 
ties aggression to territoriality. Lorenz understands aggression as a biological and hence 
natural instinct, that animals are programmed to fight over resources. For Lorenz, 
therefore, territoriality is based on a survival impulse. Or in other words, the function of 
aggression, of defending a territory, is the basis for territory. Bogue describes it is a 
“familiar mechanistic, stimulus-response model” where “territoriality is simply a random 
outgrowth of the primary drives that has proved to possess survival value” (57). In 
accordance with the mechanistic model, therefore, the birdsong is stripped of its aesthetic 
and playful qualities; it is no longer a complex gesture, but an ‘instinctual communicative 
signal’ for the function of sex or aggression.  
Deleuze and Guattari diverge from this functional understanding of territoriality — and 
this is where the novelty of their concept of territory arises. For them, territories are not 
based on functions because functions cannot explain territoriality. For them, “[f]unctions 
in a territory are not primary; they presuppose a territory-producing expressiveness. In 
this sense, the territory, and the functions performed within it, are products of 
territorialization” (1987: 315). Functions develop due to the fact that they are already 
territorialized and this is why they cannot accept Lorenz’s thesis, “which tends to make 
32 
 
aggressiveness the basis of the territory” (1987: 315; emphasis theirs).  
Instead territories are fundamentally artistic and appropriative.15 For them the territory is 
“a result of art. The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark” 
(1987: 316). As a result, territories, in themselves, are creations or constructions. 
Territories are “in fact an act that affects milieus and rhythms, that ‘territorializes’ them” 
(1987: 314).  More importantly, “there is a territory precisely when milieu components 
cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional 
to become expressive” (1987: 314-5). The territory vibrates, pulsates on its own, in itself. 
For example, the birdsong, no longer tied to a sexual or aggressive function in a milieu, is 
the expression of a territory: the territory vibrates with sound molecules; the song marks 
the limits of the territory. Or as Deleuze and Guattari write, in terms of the colours in bird 
feathers and in fish, “colour is a membrane state associated with interior hormonal states 
[i.e. interior milieus], but it remains functional and transitory as long as it is tied to a type 
of action (sexuality, aggressiveness, flight” (1987: 315), but they become expressive 
when they “acquire a temporal constancy and a spatial range that make it a territorial, or 
territorializing mark: a signature” (1987: 315). In other words, the territory is the art of 
expressing one’s territory, the sound or colour that permeates a specific time and space. 
Similar to Lefebvre’s notion of ‘appropriation,’ territory is the act of capturing and 
expressing one’s habitat or abode irreducible to function or spatial codes; it is primarily 
an artistic and aesthetic act.  
The territorializing act, however, is differentiated from Lefebvre’s notion of 
‘appropriation’ because territories are not tied to a subject or object.16 The expressiveness 
of a territory does not express “qualities that belong to a subject, but in the sense that they 
delineate a territory that will belong to the subject that carries or produces them” (1987: 
                                                
15 It is interesting to note the similarities between both Deleuze and Guattari and Lefebvre’s criticisms of 
‘functionalism’ in support of aesthetic and creative appropriations of space. For all three of them, space or 
territory at its foundations is artistic. 
16 In fact, as the concept of agencement or assemblage highlights, the territory is the subject or agent 
abstracted beyond its body in a phenomenological lived experience. The territory is Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of a subject: a particular set of affects and forces within a contract space-time, or assemblage. In a 
sense, our habits are our habitats.  
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316); in other words, the signatures that express a territory are not the signatures of a 
subject, but the “constituting mark of a domain, an abode. […] the chancy formation of a 
domain” (1987: 316). There is a sort of non-phenomenological ‘intentionality’ or 
creativity. In relation to their ‘geophilosophy,’ territories are not the creations of subjects, 
but emerge through the relationship of territories with other territories or with the Earth. 
Territories have a power beyond that of the subject. One can take anything from around it 
and make it express a territory that it possesses, but the territory itself has a life of its 
own, a style: there is a ‘geomorphism.’   
Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, territories are experimentations with one’s milieus 
that eventually take on a life of their own. Milieus, on their own, are pulsating space-
times, “a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component” 
(1987: 313); they are coded environments, ordered and measured space-times. They serve 
“as a frame, at both an organic and existential level, for our acts, for our ‘effectuations’” 
(Zourabichvili, 2012: 95). The milieu is the qualified space-time that we inhabit and the 
world that provides us with the components from which we use to orient ourselves, to 
give our actions meaning and significance. The repository for our territorializing acts.17 
In his essay on the milieu, philosopher Georges Canguilhem defines it as “the field of 
[one’s] pragmatic experience, the field in which his actions, oriented and regulated by the 
values immanent to his tendencies, pick out quality-bearing objects and situate them in 
relation to each other and to him” (118).18 The milieu contains the components that we 
appropriate to construct territories; territories are abstracted or carved out of milieus. The 
acts of territory cut into milieus and unclasp milieu components from their milieus in 
order for them to act as markers of new territorial limits. In other words, the milieu 
components are ‘deterritorialized’, unclasped from their original significations, and are 
creatively appropriated, open to other possibilities, and then reterritorialized and 
                                                
17 In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze describes this process in terms of cinema with the notion of 
the ‘close-up,’ where the close-up functions by tearing away the image from its spatio-temporal 
coordinates “in order to call forth the pure affect of as the expressed”; it, in other words, de-territorializes 
the face from its milieu and territorializes it someplace else. The face has a new meaning.  (95-97). 
18 In fact, Canguilhem also refers to Von Uexküll and his example of the tick in relation to its territory or 
milieu (110-112). 
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consolidated into another space-time expressing a different sense.  
Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the stage maker (Scenopoeetes dentirostris) who 
“lays down landmarks each morning by dropping leaves it picks from its tree, and then 
turning them upside down so the paler underside stands out against the dirt” (1987: 315). 
In other words, the stage maker constructs territories, a particular mise-en-scène, by 
appropriating the leaves from their natural milieu, the tree, removing them, and placing 
them elsewhere, giving them a different meaning. In this case, “[a] milieu component 
becomes both a quality and a property, quale and proprium (1987: 315): the expression 
of one’s home, or the signature of a delimited territory. But milieu components are also 
used in order to leave, to deterritorialize and create new territories. For instance, the 
Australian grass finch, who re-appropriates the grass stem: it is no longer for nesting, but 
for courtship. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “the matter of expression, ‘grass stem’, 
acts as a component of passage between the territorial assemblage and the courtship 
assemblage” (1987: 324); it acts as “an operator, a vector. It is an assemblage converter” 
(1987: 325). The grass stem is a vector to another territory; nothing is inextricably 
connected to a natural place; territories are not like trees deeply rooted in the ground, but 
spread out like rhizomes.   
The territory, it is important to reiterate, is not the result of the signature of a formed 
subject. In fact, it is an autonomous self-reproducing process that occurs prior to the 
division of a subject and an object. As mentioned above, the territory is prior to 
functionality; functions and behaviours arise out of a territory. In fact, territories need to 
be understood as expressions of, what Deleuze calls in Difference and Repetition, ‘spatio-
temporal dynamisms’ or rhythms (218). These are rhythms that occur underneath or 
beyond representational forms like the everyday habits of someone who, in the process, 
expresses their territories.19 Therefore, for them, territories are not simply the expression 
of a signature, but a ‘style’. This moves it further away from any phenomenological 
understanding. As a result, territoriality is not the aggressive defense of an already 
                                                
19 This will be worked out further at the end of the chapter.  
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established territory, but the constant constitution of a territory as one enters 
compositions and relations with other bodies (other territories). This ‘style’ is best 
illustrated as “two schizophrenics [who] converse or stroll according to laws of boundary 
and territory that may escape us [because they] draw an inflatable, portable territory” 
(1987: 320). Evidently, there is nothing eternal or natural about territory. They emerge as 
the consolidation of rhythms, the production of a provisory subjectivity, or to gain one’s 
bearings in a heterogeneous reality. The tortoise carries his territory on its back, in order 
to live as a tortoise in the chaos around it, yet as soon as it loses its utility, it discards it 
for another. Territories are like shells that emerge from the spatio-temporal dynamisms 
that express subjectivities, i.e. the space-times that are constructed through 
experimentation with the surrounding world.  
In order to stress the ethereal, fluctuating and compositional nature of the territory, 
Deleuze and Guattari utilize musical terms, drawn principally from the ethological 
studies by Jakob von Uexküll. Von Uexküll explains animal behaviour through what he 
calls, “[m]usic composition theory” (172). For him, nature harmoniously organizes the 
environment through contrapuntal relations. These relations between two organisms are 
characterized as relations between a ‘point’ and ‘counterpoint’ or ‘motif’20.  
Within Deleuze and Guattari’s own work, an example of a contrapuntal and 
compositional relationship is shown through the example of the wasp and the orchid, 
where there is a “becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp (1987: 
10). The wasp has taken up certain motifs of the orchid melody, and vice versa. Von 
Uexküll refers to this relationship as a musical ‘duet’, which is perhaps best exemplified 
through another relationship, that of the spider’s web and a fly: “the spider’s web is 
configured in a fly-like way, because the spider is also fly-like. To be fly-like means that 
the spider has taken up certain elements of the fly in its constitution: not from a particular 
fly but from the primal image of the fly” (2013: 190). In other words, there is no 
imitation. The spider does not reproduce an image of the physical fly in its web, but only 
                                                
20 Motif also signifies the meaning of a motive, a sort of musical intentionality beyond the subject. 
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its ‘primal image’ [Urbild]. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, there is “an exploding 
of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome” (1987: 
10). There is the creation of a disjunctive synthesis or a heterogeneous composition. In 
his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze also calls this relationship, in Spinozian 
terms, a ‘common notion’: “the idea of something in common between two or more 
bodies that agree with each other, i.e., that compound their respective relations according 
to laws, and affect one another in keeping with this intrinsic agreement or composition” 
(1988b: 44-5).21 The spider’s territory, the web, does not seek to imitate or reproduce the 
fly, but only what Von Uexküll calls its ‘primal image’, or the fly’s spatio-temporal 
dynamisms, or its Idea, in Deleuze’s terms. The spider attempts to map the fly’s 
dynamisms, to literally capture the fly’s imperceptible movements. 
Territories are also constantly deterritorializing because we are not simply one milieu, an 
interior milieu, in relation to an exterior milieu. One does not only have an ‘interior 
milieu’, but as Deleuze and Guattari point out, “the living thing has an exterior milieu of 
materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an 
intermediary milieu of membranes and limits and an annexed milieu of energy sources 
and actions-perceptions” (1987: 313). In addition, they insist that the milieu is not 
‘unitary’ because living beings do not only continuously pass from one milieu to another, 
but milieus are constantly passing into one another, communicating. These are processes 
of transcoding or transduction (1987: 313). The living thing is simply the milieus that 
they have, claim or inhabit and this act of claiming or selecting milieus is the act of 
‘territorialization’. Territorialization is the attempt to consolidate and make consistent the 
movements of the milieus. It is an attempt at getting a grasp, at holding onto and to 
inhabit. As they explain, “the territorial assemblage is a milieu consolidation, a space-
time consolidation, of co-existence and succession (1987: 320). This is the pragmatic 
aspect of the ‘territory’, which is the act of discrimination and selection: consolidating a 
                                                
21
 As Deleuze continues to explain, it is also when “our capacity for being affected is exceeded and we are 
content with imagining instead of comprehending” (1988b: 45) that we create abstract ideas. Or, in other 
words, as we shall see in the next chapter, we develop maps or diagrams (abstractions) in order to 
experiment with connections that exceed our territories (and our lived experiences), that is, in order to 
deterritorialize.  
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limited territory.22 It is the act of consolidating these heterogeneous blocks of space-time 
that communicate au milieu and making them become a sort of ‘monument’ or image that 
expresses itself.  
The question then is what takes hold of the heterogeneities and makes them consistent, or 
what holds things together in a consistency? How does the assemblage or the territory 
consist? Deleuze and Guattari reject the hylomorphic model.23 Instead they affirm the 
power of consistency as it arises from within the relationships of the material; the 
consistency or stickiness of consistent material originates from within the material itself 
through its contrapuntal relations. In their words, it is not an arborescent model, but the 
rhizomatic model: “there is no form or correct structure imposed from without or above, 
but rather an articulation from within” (1987: 328). The consistency of the material self-
organizes according to the relations that constitute it. Consistency comes from within. 
Deleuze and Guattari, moreover, call that which makes consistency a ‘transversal’24: 
“[w]hat holds all the components together are transversals, and the transversal itself is 
only a component that has taken upon itself the specialized vector of deterritorialization” 
(1987: 336). In other words, the feature that holds the components together is a 
specialized milieu component, but, importantly, this component that organizes the 
territory is also that which deterritorializes it.  
The ‘transversal’ is also what they call the ‘refrain’ [ritournelle]. The refrain is the 
central organizing principle of the territory. It territorializes a space and a time, a 
situation, but at the same time enfolds the outside into it, opening itself up to new 
                                                
22
 This is why Deleuze and Guattari are very interested in the example of the tick, which they get from Von 
Uexküll. The tick is able to contract or comprehend a limited territory (three affects) out of the vast given 
diversity of the forest. The tick is a clear example of how the process of territorialization works, of 
contracting habits and subjectivities, our capacities to act, out of milieus.  
23 The hylomorphic model, which comes from Aristotle, explains that matter is organized according to a 
transcendent form. Deleuze and Guattari take their critique of hylomorphism from Gilbert Simondon, who 
posits a non-hylomorphic understanding of production or individuation; form emerges immanently 
according to an internal consistency or information.   
24 This is a concept that comes from Félix Guattari. See “Transversality” in Molecular Revolution: 
Psychiatry and Politics (18). 
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territories or directions for action and thought. Deleuze and Guattari, at the beginning of 
the plateau on the refrain, tell us that there are three simultaneous aspects of the refrain. 
First, the refrain can act as a little phrase, a ‘tra la la’ or “rough sketch” (1987: 311) that 
constructs a fragile but stable territory. Second, the refrain can be used to construct a 
territory or home out of ‘sonic bricks’; it “organize[s] a limited space” (1987: 311). The 
refrain is a tool for the territorialization of a space and a time. However, thirdly, the 
refrain is the component or tool that allows one to launch out into chaos. The refrain 
enables one to deterritorialize: “[o]ne launches forth, hazards an improvisation. […]. One 
ventures from home on the thread of a tune” (1987: 311). The labour of the refrain is at 
once to create a stable territory, but also to launch from it in search of new territories. As 
Zourabichvili tells us, “the refrain does not delimit a territory without at the same time 
enveloping the outside from which it distinguishes itself (without being detached from it). 
It therefore virtually implicates a movement of deterritorialization and refers the territory 
(which is consequently never originally) to an ‘Earth’” (2012: 134, fn. 6).  
The refrain or the ritournelle is a portmanteau of Nietzsche’s eternal return (éternel 
retour, or flipped retour éternel). Thus Deleuze and Guattari write, “[l]et us recall 
Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return as a little ditty, a refrain, but which captures the 
mute and unthinkable forces of the Cosmos” (1987: 343). The refrain is what constantly 
returns, a beginning again, which creates a difference, or a reterritorialization. One cannot 
reterritorialize on the same spot, or as Deleuze and Guattari claim, “[t]he great refrain 
arises as we distances ourselves from the house, even if this is in order to return, since no 
one will recognize us any more when we come back” (1994: 191). The refrain allows one 
to comfortably confront and experiment with chaos; we leave home, yet ‘come home 
with bloodshot eyes’. It the bare and empty repetition, a musical note, that allows us to 
breach the chaos without becoming mad or falling apart; it remains with us throughout 
life, a constant and empty repetition, allowing us to experience difference as such.25 The 
refrain reassures us, like the child in the dark, to create connections with the outside, to 
                                                
25
 It is interesting to note that there is a form of music therapy for people who suffer from Alzheimer’s and 
dementia. After we lose the memories of our selves, we cling to the musical refrains of our lives.  
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soberly venture out.  
 
The refrain and the territory become a means of orienting oneself and of organizing a 
local horizon of sense in order to experiment from. Experiments and experience do not 
occur in a void. Either one utilizes a piece of the territory in order to venture out, or digs 
into the territory in order to infect it. However, the refrain is the stabilizing force. In the 
words of Jean-Clet Martin, “the ritornello [refrain] is in effect completely devoted to the 
possibility of rendering the earth practicable” (181). It is Ariadne’s Thread, which guides 
us through the labyrinth of the Earth.  
2.2 A Territory is not a Place: Heidegger and Deleuze 
The territory is a de-limited and organized structure of sense [sens]. In the similar way 
that territories appropriate and are abstracted out of milieus, assemblages [agencements] 
are able to de-territorialize or abstract out of the territories. Thus, territories are 
understood as the limited frameworks for pragmatically orienting oneself. It is what gives 
one meaning and direction. In this sense, it has apparent resonances with a 
phenomenological Umwelt or surrounding world, particularly the concept that Martin 
Heidegger develops in Being and Time. This section will, first, describe Heidegger’s 
understanding of the ontology of space, both from Being and Time and in some of his 
later writings, through certain commentators (Jeff Malpas and Edward S. Casey) who 
find in Heidegger a phenomenological concept of ‘place’. Secondly, it will draw a 
distinction between Deleuze’s non-phenomenological concept of ‘territory’ from the 
phenomenological concept of ‘place’.  
Heidegger’s ontology grants precedence to questions of temporality and finitude, where 
the inevitability of one’s own mortality, one’s finitude, is constitutive for one’s 
possibility to live. However, he does address questions of space and place, which are 
concerned with how one, or how Dasein, pragmatically circumnavigates the world. Jeff 
Malpas, in his formulation of a concept of ‘place’, points to the importance of this 
concept throughout Heidegger’s oeuvre. For Malpas, place is the transcendental source or 
origin for being: “being has to be understood as, one might say, an ‘effect’ of place […], 
being emerges only in and through place” (2006: 7). Place, in Malpa’s understanding of 
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Heidegger, is therefore the sort of matrix or khôra of being. 26  Furthermore, places are 
not simply where beings emerge, but the place of a gathering, i.e. where subjects and 
objects take on significance within a network of meaning in relation to one another. As 
Malpas defines it, place is “indeed just the idea and image of a concrete gathering of 
otherwise multiple elements in a single unity” (2006: 16); they are, in other words, 
multiple unities.27 Place is then seen as that which colours the world and gives objects 
meaning within a cohesive unity.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger departs from the traditional metaphysical concept of space 
drawn from Newtonian and Cartesian physics, where space is understood as the empty 
container wherein objects are placed and thus where place is understood as a position or 
location, a point on an x-y grid. In contrast to this objectively present space is the 
existential spatiality of Dasein. In fact, for Heidegger, the objectively present space 
emerges from Dasein’s ‘world’ [Umwelt], the ‘wherein’ [Worin] of Dasein: “the world is 
not objectively present in space; however, only within a world can space be discovered” 
(2010: 351). The existential spatiality of Dasein, moreover, does not precede Dasein’s 
encounters in the world, but is rather equiprimordial with Dasein; in other words, it 
emerges with Dasein’s circumspective encountering of things-at-hand in the world, 
namely its being-in-the-world.  
For Heidegger, Dasein has a particular way of ‘being-in’ [Sein-in] the world that is 
distinct from the objectively present object, which would be how one is in a Cartesian 
space. Instead of a res extensa, Dasein occupies space by being ‘absorbed’ in its world, 
that is, through a circumspective ‘taking care’ of the world. In other words, Dasein dwells 
in its world. As Heidegger explains this idea of ‘being-in’ or dwelling: “‘In’ stems from 
innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell. ‘An’ means I am used to, familiar with, I take care of 
something. […] “Ich bin” [“I am”] means I dwell, I stay near…the world as something 
familiar in such and such a way” (2010: 54-5). Dasein is ‘in’ the world by dwelling with 
                                                
26 In relation to Heidegger, it has a meaning of the ‘clearing’ [lichtung], where Being takes place.  
27 It is similar to Lefebvre’s definition of the dialectic as a ‘unity in diversity’ (2004: 77).   
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it, by taking care of it, through a familiarity. Moreover, Dasein is pragmatically ‘in’ 
space because it encounters things-at-hand [Zuhandene] according to the structure of its 
‘in order to’, namely utility. In other words, things-at-hand are never encountered 
individually, but “[t]here always belongs to the being of a useful thing a totality of useful 
things in which this useful thing can be what it is” (2010: 68). Thus, Dasein does not 
simply encounter objects objectively present in an objectively present space because 
Dasein first encounters the totality of useful things, i.e. the context within which some 
thing becomes useful (Heidegger also calls this context a ‘region’ [Gegend]), which is 
what Malpas calls ‘place’). Dasein’s being-in-the-world, in other words, is a dwelling in a 
place. Dasein is in the world as an inhabitant who dwells or inhabits. Importantly, the 
world emerges from its dwelling as it dwells in its world; they are equiprimordial, co-
constitutive. One dwells in ‘nearness’ within what is familiar.  
Dasein is not a subject prior to an objective space; it is not, what Heidegger calls, a 
‘cabinet of consciousness’. In fact, it is more ‘spatial’, a being-there. It is an inside that is 
always outside of itself, a sort of fold. As Heidegger points out, “[i]n directing itself 
toward…and in grasping something, Dasein does not first go outside of the inner sphere 
in which it is initially encapsulated, but, rather, in its primary kind of being, it is always 
already ‘outside’ together with some being encountered in the world already discovered” 
(2010: 62). Dasein is therefore suffused throughout its region, its place; it is like a mist or 
an atmosphere that is spread throughout its surrounding world. Dasein designates its 
placed-ness by taking care and bringing things near, that is, by dwelling. It is the 
organizing principle of its region or place.  
There are two ways in which Dasein organizes its space, creating a place: de-distancing 
and orientation or directionality. First, Dasein occupies space and creates place through a 
circumspective bringing near of beings into its surrounding world, by and for taking care 
— it gives them relevance. This is ‘de-distancing’. Hence Dasein’s Da- or its being-there. 
In Heidegger’s words: “Dasein understands its here in terms of the over there of the 
surrounding world” (2010: 105). Dasein does not move through space through measured 
distances, but rather creates its own space by bringing things near, that is by organizing 
spaces into places filled with meaning. Moreover, Dasein needs to be oriented in order to 
42 
 
de-distance, and for Heidegger it is important to note that the “directionality that belongs 
to de-distancing is grounded in being-in-the-world” (2010: 106). That is, Dasein orients 
or marks out space according to ‘indicators’ or signs embedded within a totality of 
relevance. As Heidegger explains, “[t]he sign applies to the circumspection of heedful 
dealings in such a way that circumspection which follows its direction brings the 
aroundness of the surrounding world […] into an explicit ‘overview’” (2010: 78). Space 
becomes a place. Signs, as that which provide direction to Dasein’s actions within the 
world, do not mark out the edges of the world that pre-existed Dasein’s being-in-the-
world, but emerge from within it.  
As a result, Dasein actually generates the place surrounding it; it never leaves its 
workshop.28 It, in other words, never encounters an outside that has not already been 
absorbed into a network of meaning. The region wherein Dasein dwells has an 
“inconspicuous familiarity” (2010: 101). The ‘there’ is always already subsumed ‘here’; 
the ‘there’, the surrounding space, is always there from the position of the ‘here’ or the 
subject. This is exemplified through an example where Heidegger asks us to imagine 
walking into a familiar room that has been disorganized, where the lights have gone 
out.29 He begins by rejecting Kant’s (early) position that, in the dark, we orient ourselves 
according to the asymmetry of the body, left and right. In contrast, he claims, “I 
necessarily orient myself in and from already being in a ‘familiar’ world” (2010: 106). 
Moreover, he insists that the directions ‘left’ and ‘right’ is “grounded in the essential 
directionality of Dasein in general, which in turn is essentially determined by being-in-
the-world” (2010: 107). Therefore, the orientation of space is oriented according to a 
subject’s a priori being-in-the-world.  
As a result, there is no leaving one’s territory; instead, the outside is necessarily 
transformed into an inside as the subject makes it familiar. In the later Heidegger, the 
                                                
28 Compare this to Lefebvre’s thesis that the lived and differential ‘body’ generates the surrounding space 
of a subject. We dwell in space because our body has already pre-emptively sensed it (gave it direction) and 
oriented it for us.  
29
 We will return to this example in the succeeding chapter.  
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idea of ‘place’ is the gathering place of the Fourfold: it is the Clearing [Lichtung] for 
Truth or Being to appear. Despite, Heidegger’s Turn, there is still a sense of ‘dwelling’ in 
Truth. In contrast, for Deleuze and Guattari, the organizing principle of territory, the 
refrain, is not a model in the search of Truth; it is not a return to an Origin. Instead, the 
refrain generates disguises and masks, simulacra. As Deleuze argues in Difference and 
Repetition, “this modern ontology nevertheless remains inadequate” because it 
“[substitutes] for the force of repetition the impoverishment of the already said or the 
stereotypes of a new common sense” (196). It operates according to the model of 
recognition: the surrounding world [Umwelt] is just a mirror for reflection, for 
recognition. Refrains, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, do not operate under the form of the 
Same, but as the secret within the repetition, it is more like a ‘synthesizer’, which “unites 
disparate elements” (1987: 434). No longer grund, the refrain, a repetition of difference, 
is the creation of variations on a theme. 
2.3 Ethology 
Territories are not phenomenological places emanating from a transcendent and 
primordial subject. To repeat, territories are prior to the distinction between subject and 
object. Instead of phenomenology, Deleuze and Guattari refer to ‘ethology’ in order to 
understand territory and territoriality. In his lecture on Spinoza, Deleuze defines ethology 
as the “practical science of the manners of being”.30 In other words, the study around the 
question of what one can do. Hence the petite phrase, or refrain, of Deleuze and Guattari: 
what can a body do? The study of territory is concerned with the conditions of what one 
can do, i.e. where does the territory permit one to go.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s ethology departs from traditional ethology because it does not 
give primacy to animal behavior; instead, the territory is primary because the territory or 
territorial assemblage is what constitutes or marks out the limits of what is possible. As 
Zourabichvili explains, “the territory marks out the relations of propriety or of 
appropriation (and concomitantly, of distance) in which all subjective identification 
                                                
30
 Deleuze, Spinoza Lecture, 21/12/1980, webdeleuze.com. 
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consists” (2012: 167). One’s capacity to act, or the field of meaning, the set of 
possibilities, that enables one to act, is formed by territorialization. Behaviour is 
determined according to the relations or assemblage [agencement] that constitute them. It 
is here that “all subjective identification consists” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 167). The subject 
is the territory or territories it inhabits. As Deleuze and Guattari assert the “I is a habit” 
(1994: 105), which relates to the idea of a “having [that] is more profound than being” 
(1987: 316). The subject is the territory: the expression of a particular set of spatio-
temporal dynamisms or rhythms and habits within a delimited set of possibilities.31 The 
subject is, in ethological terms, its capacity to act, what it can do. As Zourabichvili 
clarifies, “[t]he Deleuzian cogito is an ‘I inhabit’ or an ‘I claim’” (2012: 95). Ethology in 
this sense is a study of spatial relations and subjectivity: the study of what one can do 
according to the territories one has, that one has appropriated, instead of what one is, in 
terms of history and typology.  
Again, we can see how this concept of ‘territory’ is non-phenomenological through 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. First, he claims that “Spinoza offers philosophers a new 
model: the body in order to ask the question: what can a body do?” (1988b: 17). 
However, this is not the subject or ‘total body’ of phenomenology; the body is instead 
equivalent to a territory; it is a disposition. The body is determined by the affects that 
constitute it and give it power. This is the having that precedes being: what one can do is 
determined by the territory that one has. The ‘body’ or territory does not refer to any 
natural predisposition, but simply to one’s disposition, where one is in a network of 
relations. The body is defined, moreover, “by longitude and latitude” (1988: 127); in 
other words, the body is mapped.32 In order to determine what one can do one must map 
the territory, to survey one’s disposition, to figure out where one is. Deleuze calls the 
“longitude of a body the set of relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest, 
                                                
31 Hence Guattari calls territories ‘existential territories’ (see his essay “Ritornellos and Existential Affects” 
in The Guattari Reader or The Machinic Unconscious).  
32 In his interviews with Claire Parnet, collected in Dialogues II, Deleuze says that “things, people, are 
made up of varied lines, and that they do not necessarily know which line they are on or where they should 
make the line which they are tracing pass; in short, there is a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, 
supple lines, lines of flight, etc.” (2002: 10). 
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between particles that compose it from this point of view, that is, between unformed 
elements”, and understands the latitude as the “set of affects that occupy a body at each 
moment, that is, the intensive states of an anonymous force” i.e. one’s capacity to be 
affected (1988: 127-8). In other words, ethology studies the compositions of relations 
between different things that compose a territory, which also determine, not what 
something is, but what something can do.  
Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the tick. The tick is interesting to them because 
it is able to contract, that is have, the habit of a limited territory (habitat) based on only 
three affects: light, smell, and heat. First, the tick is able to climb to the top of a branch, 
due to sunlight; secondly, it then can wait up on that branch for up to 18 years until it 
smells an animal below, whereupon it falls onto it; and thirdly, it searches a hot area 
where it can dig in to feed on blood (1988b: 124). This is the territory the tick 
territorializes out of the given diversity of the forest: only three affects. Therefore, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, ethology is not interested in studying animals based on history, 
form, being, or organ, but rather “by the affects of which it is capable” (1988b: 124) in a 
particular situation or assemblage, or the territory in which it inhabits and claims.  
However, as mentioned above, territories are never self-contained; they are constantly 
leaking. The ethical test is then not to see how long you can stay in one spot, but is to 
attempt to enter into relations, compositions or connections, which extend one’s power 
rather than decompose it. Deleuze distinguishes these as joyful and sad encounters: “we 
experience joy when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and 
sadness when, on the contrary, a body or an idea threaten our coherence” (1988b: 19). In 
other words, how far can you open your territory or extend your territory without falling 
apart or becoming mad.  
 The idea of the territory here comes close to an understanding of Dasein’s spatiality in 
Heidegger, whose ‘here’ is determined by its ‘there’ and vice versa. The territory, whose 
“interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior” (1988b: 125), is 
nevertheless in communication with an absolute Outside that has no relation to it. In 
What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari call it the ‘Earth’, a plane of immanence. And 
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as Deleuze claims, there is no sheltering oneself from the Outside; as he writes, “[a]ll that 
we call bad is strictly necessary, and yet comes from the outside: the necessity of 
accidents” (1988b: 41-2). Therefore, there is a necessity of contingency as the territory is 
always bordering an Outside it cannot contain or preempt, and that it nevertheless already 
envelops without reducing.  
As a result, ethology is also a study of limits and thresholds, of determining what a body 
is capable of in a certain space and time, not in order to remain, but in order to forge new 
connections and compositions. Limits are the products of relationships. As Claude 
Raffestin claims in his study of the frontier, “any action of relationship with the 
environment, of rapport between beings and objects requires the creation or recognition 
of limits” (1986: 12). They are not only constituted by the relationship between bodies, 
but also mark out the limits of one’s capacity to act. For Deleuze and Guattari, there is a 
conceptual difference between limits and territories: where “the limit designates the 
penultimate marking a necessary rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an 
inevitable change” (1987: 438). The limit, therefore, marks the point at which the 
assemblage “must reproduce itself”, namely it necessitates a relative deterritorialization 
and a reterritorialization, whereas the ‘threshold’ marks the point “when the assemblage 
must change its nature”, an absolute deterritorialization (1987: 438). Thus we see that it is 
at the borders of territories where one either tries something different within the 
assemblage it is in or leaps into a new assemblage or composition. It is at these territorial 
limits that creativity occurs.  
In regard to material, inorganic processes Theodor Schwenk explains that, “it is as though 
the creative, formative impulses needed the boundary surfaces in order to be able to act in 
the material world. Boundary surfaces are everywhere the places where living, formative 
processes can find a hold” (42). This is because it is at the border, where inside meets 
outside, that encounters occur: “[t]he encounter can be located as much at the limit of the 
thought-facility as within a field of radical exteriority” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 73). And 
Zourabichvili continues, the “contingency and exteriority of an encounter […] gives rise 
to an authentic act of problematization, a creation of thought (2012: 73). The encounter 
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spurs us to creation because it jolts us out of the territories we have, that reassure us, into 
a disorienting and incomprehensible exteriority. 
2.4 Territory and Rhythm 
The ‘territory’ is “an act of rhythm that has become expressive” (1987: 315). Territories 
are rhythmic, ‘sonorous landscapes’; they are the actualization of a rhythmic difference, 
the temporary solution or integration of a rhythmic problematic. The notions ‘territory’ 
and ‘rhythm’ are, for Deleuze and Guattari, in essence Kantian. The ‘territory’ is 
connected to the idea of a grund or ground, and the conditions of possibility. While, 
‘rhythm’ is for Deleuze and Guattari, the “‘critical solution of the antinomy’”; for them 
“[m]eter is dogmatic, but rhythm is critical” (1987: 313). Rhythm is a ‘spatio-temporal 
dynamism’, the germ of order, in a heterogeneous chaos. In other words, rhythm is the 
germ of territory, the means by which units of measure33 emerge out of chaos.  
Rhythm, here, is neither a homogeneous beat nor a regular or irregular meter. Meter 
“assumes a coded form whose unit of measure may vary, but in a noncommunicating 
milieu” (1987: 313). Meter occurs within milieus; it is the periodic repetition or coded 
form that stabilizes a milieu; the repetition of the same, a cliché. Rhythm, on the other 
hand, is the repetition that occurs au milieu, between milieus or between a milieu and 
chaos. Rhythm is always of difference; it is the “Unequal or the Incommensurable” 
(1987: 313). As Deleuze and Guattari note, “[rhythm] does not operate in a homogeneous 
space-time, but by heterogeneous blocks. It changes direction” (1987: 313). Rhythm does 
not reproduce an identically coded milieu, but is instead productive. It produces new 
space-times.   
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze also describes it as a ‘rhythm-repetition’, which he 
relates to ‘symmetry’. He draws a distinction, through Matila Ghyka’s work on symmetry 
                                                
33
 This comparable to what Deleuze calls “sedentary distributions” in Difference and Repetition, he 
contrasts this with a “nomadic distribution” or processes of ‘deterritorialization’ (283). “Nomadic 
distribution” also takes the form of “smooth space” in A Thousand Plateaus, where ‘smooth spaces’ are 
non-discrete, non-metric, topological multiplicities. Smooth spaces are rhythmic rather than metric.  
48 
 
and rhythm, between ‘static symmetry’ and ‘dynamic symmetry’.34 Deleuze describes 
static symmetry as “cubic or hexagonal”, whereas dynamic symmetry is “pentagonal and 
appears in a spiral line or in a geometrically progressing pulsation” (1995: 20). In other 
words, he explains, that within a “network of double squares” there is an immanent, 
irrational logic that repeats itself in a delirious, nomadic way. Disguised within 
symmetrical formations are asymmetrical processes. As he points out, “[t]he negative 
expression ‘lack of symmetry’ should not mislead us: it indicates the origin and positivity 
of the causal process” (1995: 20). This is dynamic symmetry. The mathematician 
Hermann Weyl illustrates, in his series of lectures called Symmetry, how life emerges 
from asymmetrical processes: “[i]t is well known that the heart of mammals is an 
asymmetric screw”, and he continues, “the deeper chemical constitution of our human 
body shows that we have a screw, a screw that is turning the same way in every one of 
us” (26; 30). In fact, purely symmetrical processes are states of equilibrium. It is a state 
of rest and order. Asymmetrical systems, on the other hand, are associated with 
dissipative, far-from-equilibrium states (in the language of thermodynamics), where new 
orders emerge and the structure of space is not preserved.   
The notion of a ‘rhythm-repetition’ is also contrasted with a ‘cadence-repetition’, which 
is what was referred to above as ‘meter’: “a regular division of time, an isochronic 
recurrence of identical elements” (1995: 21). In contrast, rhythm-repetition has a “tonic 
accent, commanded by intensities” that creates “inequalities or incommensurabilities 
between metrically equivalent periods or spaces” (1995: 21). Similar to ‘dynamic 
symmetry’ and its asymmetrical productive core, rhythm-repetition, what Deleuze and 
Guattari simply call ‘rhythm’, is the source or matrix of the metered repetition: “a bare, 
material repetition (repetition of the Same) appears only in the sense that another 
repetition is disguised within it, constituting it and constituting itself in disguising itself” 
(1995: 21). Deleuze and Guattari are interested in this idea of rhythm because it is a way 
                                                
34
 He takes this distinction from the historian and mathematician Matila Ghyka’s work on symmetry, 
rhythm and sacred geometry, specifically from his book Nombre d’or. Rites et rythmes pythagoriciens dans 
le développement de la civilization occidentale. Ghyka’s work in English is best summarized in his book 
entitled The Geometry of Art and Life.  
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to understand how extensive magnitudes emerge; it is a way to try and conceptualize the 
‘internal genesis of grounds [grund]’. As Deleuze states, “the ground [fond] as it appears 
in a homogenous extensity is notably a projection of something ‘deeper’ [profond]: only 
the latter may be called Ungrund or groundless” (1995: 229); the Ungrund is the 
intensive space, the space where intensities differentiate, the “pure spatium” (1995: 230). 
It is in this field of dynamic symmetry or rhythm-repetition that there is only “an Idea and 
a pure [spatio-temporal] dynamism which creates a corresponding space” (1995: 20), 
which is the extensive space of the grund or territory. This rhythmic space is an 
intermediate set of possibilities, an intensive depth.  
Deleuze further examines the concept of ‘rhythm’ in his lectures on Kant. Within these 
lectures he describes the role of intensive magnitudes within Kant’s philosophy, in 
relation to the sublime, symbolism and the concomitant ‘discord of the faculties’. He is 
interested in what he calls the great problem within Kant’s philosophy: the 
correspondence between two heterogeneous fields, between ‘spatio-temporal 
determinations’ and ‘conceptual determinations’, which take place through two synthetic 
operations. They are “necessarily synthetic since [they] are heterogeneous, so the act 
which puts them into correspondence can only be a synthesis of heterogeneities”; and 
these synthetic acts are acts of the imagination.35 There is the act of synthesis and the 
schema, which are both productive, ‘productions of space-time’. First, ‘synthesis’ is the 
“synthesis of perception”, it is the means of constituting or contracting a “certain space 
and a certain time in space and time”.36 One marks out the limits of a limited space-time 
out of a given diversity in space and time but also of spaces and times.  
There are three operations that constitute a synthesis of perception. The first is the 
“successive synthesis of the apprehension of parts”, which is to perceive all of the parts 
of the situation; it is a way to figure out what the situation consists of in a particular space 
and time. The second aspect is what he calls the “synthesis of reproduction”: “you must 
                                                
35 These quotations come from Deleuze’s lectures on Kant, which can be found at webdeleuze.com. 
Hereafter I will cite the specific dates of the lecture. This quote comes from 04/04/1978.  
36 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com 
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reproduce the preceding part when you come to the following part so not only must you 
produce successive parts, but you have to reproduce the preceding parts with the 
following ones”. The third operation is then to reduce the given to a general form, an 
object =x or an “any-object-whatever”.37 This is an act of recognition, and for Kant an 
operation of the understanding. As Deleuze explains, “I go beyond purely spatio-
temporal forms towards the form of an any-object-whatever that the spatio-temporal form 
will determine as such or such an object”. In sum, whenever we encounter an object we 
cannot grasp the totality of its parts immediately; instead we must survey and apprehend 
the multiplicity of parts in a space and a time. We also need to take all of the extensive 
parts together as a whole in order to apprehend the object completely, i.e. a ‘synthesis of 
reproduction’ of all of the preceding parts, which is then retroactively synthesized into a 
whole by an act of the imagination. Finally, the understanding attempts to recognize this 
object by squeezing it through its categories. This is, in other words, the labour of 
‘common sense’: the harmonious accord of the faculties, which simplifies the given in 
order to satisfy its desire to know.  
The problem is to find a correspondence across the heterogeneous fields of objects and 
concepts. Deleuze explains this as the search for ‘units of measure’ [metron] that allows 
one to understand the phenomenon. Deleuze illustrates this by explaining that it is a 
“qualitative measure according to the object”; for instance, one sees a tree and carries out 
an ‘apprehension of successive parts’: one surveys the tree, goes from top to bottom, 
from bottom to top, etc., and the tree is then measured as “big as ten men”.38 One, 
therefore, measures phenomena qualitatively, ‘sensibly’. Moreover, “the unit of measure 
is variable in each case in relation to the thing to be perceived”; there is no universal, 
abstract measurement.39 Perception is fundamentally creative. 
The unit of measure must also be in ‘harmony’ with the object measured. As Deleuze 
                                                
37 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com  
38 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com 
39 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com 
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remarks, perception creates “some amazing variations”.40 However, Deleuze finds in the 
later Kant, that there are instances when the correspondence or synthesis is corrupted and 
cannot take place, that is when “what I see is incommensurable to any unit of measure”.41 
The Incommensurable emerges from below. Something other emerges that cannot be 
comprehended, something monstrous, something catastrophic. In A Thousand Plateaus, it 
emerges au milieu, between two coded milieus, and produces a Rhythm. It is difference 
as such. It is, in other words, an encounter and it forces one to think; it is based neither on 
good sense nor common sense, but simply sense [sens]; it forces one to seek a new 
direction, to try something new.  
In other words, recognition occurs from the ground within a coded ‘milieu’. We 
apprehend the objects we perceive according to the local horizons of sense we inhabit. 
This is in fact the act of the transcendental imagination: “to imagine is to determine a 
space and a time in space and time”; one contracts a territory, a habitus.42 However, 
Deleuze is not interested in what occurs on the ground, which is the object of a 
phenomenology. Here formed subjects perceive formed objects. Instead, he seeks to 
grasp the genesis of the ground, how the given is given. As we have seen, Deleuze states, 
“the ground [fond] as it appears in a homogeneous extensity is notably a projection of 
something ‘deeper’ [profound]” (1995: 229). Below the crystalized units of measure, 
there is a secret art, which, Deleuze and Guattari later call the ‘act of territorialization’. 
As Deleuze notes, the synthesis of apprehension, of recognition, “already implies 
something like a lived evaluation of a unit of measure”, which he also calls “the aesthetic 
comprehension of the unit of measure”.43 The extensive units of measure emerge from 
                                                
40 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com 
41 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com 
42 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com 
43 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com. It is important to note that this is not the lived 
experience of phenomenology: the immediate experience of a body or of a subject. As Deleuze notes in the 
lecture from 21/03/1978, “true lived experience [le vécu] is an absolutely abstract thing. The abstract is 
lived experience. I would almost say that once you have reached lived experience, you reach the most fully 
living core of the abstract”. In contrast to Lefebvre, this is an abstract lived experience that goes beyond the 
given to an absolutely transcendental plane, the plane of immanence. We will return to this in the next 
chapter. 
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this lived evaluation, which takes place intensively rather than extensively. It is also what 
Deleuze also calls an “evaluation of rhythm”; evaluations of rhythm allow one to 
determine which unit of measure will work in a given situation.44 We must “plunge into 
[rhythms] in a sort of exploration” in order to create new units of measure, in order to 
apprehend the object we are attempting to perceive. Rhythm is a pure abstraction beyond 
the given, the empirical; it is the consistency of the intensive spatium, the “matrix of all 
extensity” (1995: 229).  
The corruption or disruption of syntheses of apprehension is also an event or an 
encounter with what Kant calls the sublime. As Deleuze writes, “[t]he sublime is when 
the imagination is in the presence of its own limit”.45 The perceiving subject experiences 
a vertigo or disorientation. The subject is abstracted out of all spatial-coordinates: in a 
state of darkness. It does not allow one to carry out a ‘synthesis of apprehension’; instead, 
one can only sense what is incommensurable to any unit of measure. Therefore, the state 
of the sublime shows that our structures of perceptions are founded “not in the sense of a 
ground [fondement], but in the sense of a foundation [foundation or sol]”.46 Thus the 
structures of perception, the foundations of subjectivity, are founded upon an aesthetic 
comprehension or an evaluation of rhythm. It is by plunging into the rhythmic spatium 
that one thinks otherwise and becomes otherwise; it is from here that we can re-
territorialize and produce new subjectivities.   
In his lectures, Deleuze points to a second operation of the productive imagination: the 
schema. The schema is the rule, sketch, or outline that attempts to bridge objects in space 
and time with representational concepts.47 According to Kant, the power of the 
                                                
44 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com 
45 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com 
46 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
distinguishes ground from foundation: “the foundation concerns the soil, how it occupies and possesses it; 
whereas the ground comes from the sky” (79). The ground is transcendent, whereas the foundation or soil 
[sol] comes from the earth and is immanent.  
47 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari, in their own formulation of the schema, refer to it as a 
‘diagram’ or ‘abstract machine’; where the ‘schema’ is no longer tied to a subject or a Transcendental 
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imagination is to schematize sensation by fitting it into categories. The subject accesses 
and apprehends the objects through the schema. However, in Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze indicates the weakness of Kant’s idea of the schema: “since it remains external 
to the concept, it is not clear how it can ensure the harmony of the understanding and 
sensibility, since it does not even have the means to ensure its own harmony with the 
understanding without the appeal to a miracle” (1995: 218; emphasis mine). Deleuze’s 
alternative, from Difference and Repetition, is to investigate “the spatio-temporal 
dynamisms [rhythms] which act within or beneath [the concept], like a hidden art” (218); 
it is to investigate the non-representational dramas or the dramatizations of Ideas, which 
are the differential relations or intensities that produce concepts. It is the “dynamic space 
and time of [the concept’s] actual constitution” (1995: 219). The schema, for Deleuze, 
cannot be related to the transcendental subject because the subject is not an a priori 
ground, but itself is a provisory effect of these spatio-temporal dynamisms. Therefore, for 
Deleuze, in order to understand how concepts or territories form, we need to abstract out 
of the lived experience of a subject, to a ‘plane of immanence’ beyond the empirical, to 
an intensive spatium from which the subject and its categories emerge.  
For Deleuze, the schema is the reverse of the synthesis. A synthesis is an act by which 
“you carry out a spatio-temporal operation and you specify the concept according to this 
determination”, that is you recognize a concept according to the ‘aesthetic 
comprehension’ within a space and a time. The schema on the other hand begins with the 
concept and the problem is “to determine the spatio-temporal relation which correspond 
to this concept”.48 The schema is therefore the “rule of production” of space and time 
according to a concept. The example Deleuze uses is that of the circle. The schemata of a 
circle are not the empirical instantiations of a circle, like a plate or a wheel, but rather 
circumference because it “allows you to make rounds, which allows you to round things, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Subject, but is immanent to the assemblage or territory, the rule according to which heterogeneous 
processes and things organize or are assembled within an assemblage. 
48 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com 
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which is to say to produce in experience something conforming to the concept of the 
circle, that doesn’t depend on the concept of the circle”.49 The schema is the trace or 
outline of a concept. It is not a set of examples but traces the way something occupies 
space and time, its spatio-temporal dynamisms. It is the drama of the concept. For 
instance, he uses the example of the lion. The schema of the lion is not an example of a 
lion, or the genus of the lion, but rather the way it occupies space and time, its “spatio-
temporal rhythms, spatio-temporal attitudes [allures]”, that is its territory and domain, the 
paths it uses at certain times, the manners it has.50 As Deleuze claims, “the schema of an 
animal is its spatio-temporal dynamism”. Deleuze also uses the example of the 
ethnologist. For him, the “ethnologist constructs schemata of men to the extent that he 
describes manners: a civilization defines itself, amongst other ways, by a block of space-
time, by certain spatio-temporal rhythms”.51 Schemata are therefore loose outlines of 
how things occupy space-time; they are spatio-temporal dynamisms without subjects or 
actors.52  
The schema operates, not on the level of representation, but in reality, and neither at the 
level of composed objects in space and time, the level of the extension, but at the 
intensive level, according to spatio-temporal rhythms. The rhythms, as blocks of 
heterogeneous space-times, nevertheless produce new territories; they are not 
reproductive. Rhythm is not a homogeneous beat, but the heterogeneous, the Unequal 
between two beats; like the wasp and the orchid, the effect of two heterogeneous space-
times communicating. The rhythm is this communication. As Zourabichvili states, 
rhythms are haecceities, events that “do not combine two preexisting empirical space-
times, rather [they] precede over their genesis. […]. It is the birth of a space-time” (2012: 
128). Deleuze and Guattari corroborate this in their plateau on the ‘War Machine’, stating 
that a  “rhythm without measure, which relates to the upswell of a flow” (1987: 364) is a 
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50 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, www.webdeleuze.com 
51 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, www.webdeleuze.com 
52 They are in other words maps or diagrams.  
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turbulent, self-organizing form, a vortex within the flow of a river. As Schwenk explains, 
the vortex is a “form which has separated itself off from the general flow of water; a self-
contained region in the mass of the water […]. Closer observation reveals that this vortex 
has a rhythm of its own” (44; emphasis mine). Thereby, rhythms, understood as vortices, 
are the origins of new space-times as they emerge immanently.  
In his essay on the etymological origin of the word rhythm, Émile Benveniste illustrates 
how rhythm or, rhuthmós  [ῥυθµός], refers to an ephemeral form of something unstable; it 
“designates the form in the instant that it is assumed by what is moving, mobile and fluid, 
the form of that which does not have organic consistency; it fits the pattern of a fluid 
element, of a letter arbitrarily shaped, of a robe which one arranges at one’s will” (286). 
Rhuthmós is an arrangement or disposition “without fixity or natural necessity and arising 
from an arrangement which is always subject to change” (Beneveniste 286). As Roland 
Barthes points out, rhuthmós is “very close to and yet very different from schema”, where 
the schema is a fixed form, rhuthmós, as shown above, is “an improvised, changeable 
form” (7). But rhuthmós not only refers to a temporary arrangement, a fluid form, but 
also, as Benveniste writes, it literally means “‘the particular manner of flowing’” (286). 
As a result, it relates to agency and spatio-temporal dynamisms, the way or manner in 
which one moves.53 Rhuthmós, as a result, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, is an 
agencement; the fluid configuration, disposition or spatial arrangement that one is within, 
but also how this spatial arrangement, agencement, gives one agency, or a particular 
manner of flowing and being.  
Rhythm as rhuthmós also helps us understand what Deleuze and Guattari call the 
‘chaosmos’, and thus, how order emerges from chaos immanently. As referred to above, 
where matter takes on form, not according to a hylomorphism, but organizes itself 
immanently, according to immanent relations. These immanent relations consist 
according to potentialities that are developed through the relations or interactions 
between impersonal singularities. They come together as a rhuthmós, a rhythmic and 
                                                
53 In Greek, (th)mós means a way, a manner, a sens.  
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fluid form, as an arbitrarily shaped robe.  
Deleuze also understands these spatio-temporal dynamisms, or rhythms, as the 
dramatization of Ideas. For instance, to refer back to the stage-maker bird, who constructs 
a scene by laying down landmarks, leaves and sticks (1987: 315). This bird is enacting a 
drama, a mise-en-scène. However, this is not a bird constructing a territory intentionally. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, every living thing constructs these scenes, albeit 
unconsciously. We act out our habits, our routines. In ethological terms, the body does 
what a body can do according to the affects afforded to it by its assemblage or territory. 
These are dramas without subjects or representative actors. As Deleuze writes, “[t]here is 
necessarily something cruel in this birth of a world which is a chaosmos, in these worlds 
of movements without subjects, roles without actors” (1995: 219); the cruelty is that the 
actors or subjects are unknowingly produced by their assemblages, and unknowingly 
express their territories. In terms of the stage maker bird, by constructing the scene, it is 
acting out its schema or diagram: the way it occupies space and time, or in other words, 
the drama of its life that the territory expresses.  
For Deleuze, “dynamism thus comprises its own power of determining space and time, 
since it immediately incarnates the differential relations, the singularities and the 
progressivities immanent in the Idea” (1995: 218); the dramas take place at the intensive 
level below concepts and representations, yet incarnate the differential relations of the 
Idea. For instance, the schema of the lion is not the history of its species, nor a typology 
or list of attributes, but its spatio-temporal dynamisms: how it takes up space and 
incarnates the differential relations of its Idea. Territories are the auto-poietic acts that 
make these dramas expressive; the self-consolidation of the dramas into “consolidated 
aggregates, of succession as well as coexistence” (1987: 329). It is the synthesis of 
heterogeneities into a disjunctive synthesis that do not require a subject or a God to 
organize. Territories are not content to come after; they are fundamentally creative, 
organizing and expressing themselves. 
2.5 Conclusion: ‘to dwell as a poet or as an assassin?’ 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of territory is a non-phenomenological concept of space 
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because it is not tied to a subject or body that stands above and organizes or unifies it. For 
instance, Lefebvre’s notion of space, as described in the previous chapter, is inextricably 
tied to the body; the surrounding space is always attached to the body, emerges from the 
body. Or, as in Heidegger, as shown above, the pre-ontological spatiality of Dasein 
revolves around Dasein: the ‘there’, of Da-sein is always anchored to a ‘here’, the 
subject. Therefore, there is no Outside, or non-stratified space, as such. In contrast, the 
concept of ‘territory’ is abstracted beyond the lived experience of a subject or body. It 
allows us to understand a transcendental plane beyond the empirical or the given, which 
is always given to a subject or sensible body. Territory is, rather than being limited by the 
horizon or narrow perspective of a subject, abstracted to a larger plane that includes a set 
of possibilities beyond that of a subject. It brings together as many different and 
heterogeneous connections as possible.  
In fact, this concept replaces that of the ‘subject’. As they note in What is Philosophy?, 
within their ‘geophilosophy’, thought no longer takes place between a subject and an 
object, but “takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (86). There are no 
longer subjects, but territories, which are the spatio-temporal dynamisms or rhythms, the 
dramas, that take place within a set of possibilities in relation to a field of impersonal 
forces. No longer the transcendental subject, but a geography of affects: the ethological 
question about what a body can do according to the assemblages, or set of relations, it is 
in. These are the ‘movements without subjects, roles without actors’ noted above. The 
drama of a landscape as it endures time. For instance, Cézanne’s landscape paintings 
divorced of Cézanne himself. These landscapes are not rhythms, as Cézanne’s body 
perceives them; they take on a life of their own, the self-expression of a territory or 
landscape as it emerges and mutates. It is solely the drama of the spatio-temporal rhythms 
of the landscape.  
These landscapes invoke inhumanism: a space that precedes the human. They also avoid 
the arrogance of a phenomenology that assumes that the world exists solely through the 
correlation of the subject and the surrounding space. However, these dramas, first, 
express an impersonal, asubjective world, a meaningless landscape. As a result, it brings 
up the question of what it means to be in a world that is no longer my world, but that 
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precedes me. In other words, how can we conceive dwelling in a space that one is not 
always already in, or that one is not already in a ‘pre-established harmony’ with? That is, 
how can we conceive of a ‘dwelling’ that does not already begin within a home because 
one is not primordially at home in the world? The concept of territory departs from this 
phenomenological ‘proto-belief’ that we are always beings-in-the-world; instead, the fact 
territories must be constructed. It highlights that we are in a becoming-with the world or 
the space around us, and the creative possibilities that this entails.  
This leads us to the question that Deleuze and Guattari pose: [t]o dwell as a poet or as an 
assassin’?” (1987: 345). That is, it is question concerning how we want to inhabit our 
worlds, what sort of territories should we construct. The assassin blocks assemblages and 
closes off possibilities in despair, whereas the poet opens up the chaosmos “in hopes that 
this will sow the seed of, or even engender, the people to come” (1987: 345). The poet 
does not render the visible, but renders visible the imperceptible forces or the rhythms 
that constitute us; they create monuments, pure blocs of affects and percepts, or territories 
that pulsate on their own. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Occupy: a non-phenomenological dwelling 
As the two previous chapters have shown, both Lefebvre and Deleuze attempt, through 
their respective concepts of space and territory, to assign autonomy to space. Spaces that 
exist and vibrate on their own: a space in itself. The major difference is that Lefebvre’s 
concept of space is still tied to and unified by a body. It is a phenomenological space. 
Territory, in Deleuze and Guattari’s formulations, however exists prior to the subjects 
and objects that emerge from it. Territories are impersonal transcendental fields that pre-
exist subjects and objects, the sets of possibilities or problems that subjects and objects 
are the temporary solutions or formations of. In ethological terms, the territory, i.e. the 
delimited range of activities a body can do, is how we should define a subject or 
understand an actor, rather than according to a typology of attributes or a history of the 
genus. As Deleuze notes, “there is a whole geography in people” (2002: 10). 
Nevertheless, it begets the question, how can we understand ‘dwelling’ in non-
phenomenological spaces and in this case ‘territories’? How do we understand, to rely on 
terms that will be discarded later, being in space-times that exist prior to subjects, and 
from which, subjects emerge? The concept of ‘occupy’ and ‘occupation’ will be a way to 
understand a non-phenomenological dwelling; it is a form of being in space that does not 
assume that one is always at home in the world, but that our homes (worlds) need to be 
constructed, experimented with, in relation to a space that exists alongside it, indifferent 
to it.  
The verb ‘to occupy’ contains three central meanings. Drawing from the French verb 
‘occuper’, due to its richer history, and beginning in the 13th century, one was ‘occupied’ 
[occupé] that is, one had something to do, activities: one had an occupation. To be 
occupied, in other words, was to occupy one’s time, to fill it up, to have duration, and 
therefore it had a more temporal meaning. Beginning in the 14th century, however, 
occupations became military endeavours. It was to possess or seize, to capture a space 
and time, to inhabit another’s territory. Furthermore, aside from being occupied by an 
invading army, ‘to occupy’ also had a more commonplace or everyday sense: that of 
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objects occupying or filling up space (“remplir un certain espace”).54 In other words, 
occupations seize time and space, and occupy them, make them occupied, fill them up 
and make them endure by giving the space something to do. Occupations make space-
times (or assemblages) consist.  
The question of what it means to occupy is also related to the ethological question of 
what a body can do. ‘Occuper’ is derived from the Latin occupare, which carries within 
it the verb ‘capere’ or ‘to capture’. To occupy is then to capture time and space and to 
take hold of it: that is, to appropriate and arrange it. Thus, in reference to the previous 
chapter and the concept of ‘territory’ described therein, occupation is always of a 
territory. To have a territory is to occupy it, to appropriate and to possess the forces or 
affects that a territory consists of. To occupy is to capture the forces and affects that 
makes a territory consist. Therefore, one does not occupy a pre-established territory. 
Occupying is the means of constructing or creating a territory through capture. 
Furthermore, occupying territory is to make it do something and to alter the agency of the 
territory, its agencement.  
The concept of occupation inevitably conjures up images of military occupations and 
colonialism. However, contemporary political movements, generalized under the title of 
the Occupy Movement (they are all preoccupied with the tactics of occupying spaces: 
parks, squares, streets, etc.), have in a sense occupied the common understanding of 
‘occupation’. As W.J.T. Mitchell writes, “[o]ccupations of large civilian populations and 
territories by military administrations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine now must 
face their positive counterparts in the form of democratic occupations that promise to 
bring something new into the world” (7). Therefore, by taking the new meaning of 
‘occupy’ that the recent Occupy movements have created as a loose guiding framework, 
the verb ‘occuper’ will allow us to re-conceptualize how we ontologically take up space. 
In effect, occupation allows us to move beyond the phenomenological concept of 
‘dwelling’; ‘to occupy’ space is not to be in harmony with space, or to dwell with Being, 
                                                
54 http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/occuper. 
61 
 
but instead, occupying space precedes Being, one occupies a ‘space without world’. As a 
result, occupying space is always political in the sense that ‘politics precedes Being” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 203). Occupations are captures of anonymous forces and 
impersonal singularities in a transcendental field of pure immanence prior to the 
formation of subjects and objects. As a result, neither subjects nor objects occupy space; 
occupations are the art of the territory. The concepts of ‘occupy’ and ‘territory’ highlight 
the fact that our occupations in space are primarily, that is, fundamentally, political, and 
only secondarily, ontological. 
3.1  Lefebvre and Dwelling: an architectonics of space 
There is in Lefebvre’s work on space and ‘dwelling’ a nearing towards a concept of 
‘dwelling’ that moves beyond the phenomenological concept of a body-in-space to a 
more political understanding. For Lefebvre, occupying space is a way of orienting it and 
through orientation creating space. As seen in the first chapter, he draws a connection 
between dwelling and appropriation or creation. It is not simply about entering a space 
pre-fabricated, but about creating new space-times; it is not, in other words, a passive 
being-in-the-world, but a creative, appropriative ‘dwelling’. He concretizes Heidegger’s 
concept of ‘dwelling’ [wohnen], and transforms it into a political concept. In other words, 
Lefebvre develops a political ontology out of Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’. 
Lefebvre, as we shall see, comes close to the idea that by occupying one dwells 
politically and not just poetically. But, restricted to phenomenological ideas, he does not 
adequately develop a concept of ‘occupation’ that moves beyond ‘phenomenology’. 
Heidegger develops his concept of ‘dwelling’ [wohnen] through a reference to Höderlin’s 
poem, which says that ‘poetically man dwells’, that is, man is not in the world like an 
object present-at-hand, self-enclosed and indifferent, like a point on a grid, but is in-the-
world, entangled in its web. For Heidegger, as shown in the second chapter, one dwells in 
space, or inhabits, as one who cares for one’s surroundings [Umwelt]. You are in space 
by bringing the ‘there’ here, by making it relevant to you. In contrast, in the later 
Heidegger, dwelling is related to poiesis or creation. Heidegger here differentiates 
between two kinds of space: a pre-ontological spatiality and the profaned spaces that 
emerge. Therefore, a plurality of spaces can emerge from one’s primordial dwelling: 
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“[s]paces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man” (2008: 154). 
Through dwelling in spatiality man builds or, through poiesis man causes-to-appear. 
Dwelling as poiesis makes the profaned objectively present spaces appear. As Heidegger 
writes, “[p]oetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building” (2001: 213). Space 
does not preexist dwelling; instead dwelling in-gathers the world around it and creates 
spaces.  
Lefebvre draws upon these themes in his studies of urban space and dwelling. In The 
Urban Revolution, he distinguishes between dwelling [habiter] and habitat.55 As already 
mentioned, the latter is associated with the functionalism that he finds within the 
urbanism and architecture of postwar France. Thus “[h]abitat was imposed from above as 
the application of a homogeneous global and quantitative space, a requirement that ‘lived 
experience’ allow itself to be enclosed in boxes, cages or ‘dwelling machines’” (2003c: 
81). Habitats are organized according to basic functions: eating, sleeping, reproducing, 
playing, etc. The ideology of the habitat is, in other words, the “segregation of needs and 
their transformation into a self-contained system of functions, the search for an 
equilibrium and the banishment of the spontaneous” (Stanek, 2011: 120); there is no 
room therefore for possibilities other than the function that the space was designed for. 
The lived experiences of space are reduced to the particular functions assigned to the 
spaces; the users of space encaged in ‘dwelling machines’.  
In contrast, habiter is similar to Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’. In The Urban 
Revolution, Lefebvre claims that ‘dwelling’ allows us to get closer to understanding the 
lived experience of the inhabitant; and he understands Heidegger’s analysis as meaning 
“the relation of the ‘human being’ to nature and its own nature, to ‘being’ and its own 
being, is situated in habiting, is realized and read there” (2003c: 82). Lefebvre first 
approached this concept of habiter through his studies of les pavillons (housing projects) 
and les grandes ensembles in France (Stanek, 2011: 82). Within these studies, he was 
                                                
55 In The Production of Space, the translator has translated it as a relationship between ‘housing’ and 
‘residence’, where ‘housing’ refers to habitat and ‘residence’ to habiter or ‘to inhabit’. See in particular p. 
120-122 and 314.  
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primarily interested in how the inhabitant of the pavillon inhabited; that is, how the 
inhabitants occupied and transformed the space. His conclusions maintained that the 
inhabitant did not simply occupy the pavillon as an indifferent user, but as a dweller that 
was in space through care. They cared for their spaces, rendered them familiar, their own.  
As a result, the inhabitant or dweller occupied through the other sense of ‘occupation’, 
appropriation. They re-arranged their spaces, re-created them: a poetics of space. Thus, 
as Stanek notes, Lefebvre, through references to Heidegger and Bachelard, “sketch[es] a 
concept of dwelling that, in the conditions of postwar urbanization, preserves the 
possibility of poetic dwelling understood by means of the Greek term poiēsis, that is to 
say, as a human creation” (2011: 88). These inhabitants did not only abide by the 
functions pre-determined, but appropriated space by manipulating them and the objects in 
space. Therefore, Lefebvre does not remain within the confines of Heidegger’s concept: 
he attempts to concretize it within the ‘everyday’. In his “Preface to the Study of the 
Habitat of the ‘Pavillon’”, Lefebvre writes that “[Heidegger] does not tell us how to 
construct, ‘here and now’, buildings and cities” (2003b: 112). He wants to put Heidegger 
back on his feet. Thus his aim: to show how within the folds of everyday spaces there are 
possibilities for creating another way to live together (by occupying and appropriating 
space).  
The distinction of ‘habiter’ and ‘habitat’ maps onto another distinction Lefebvre offers: 
appropriated spaces and dominant spaces. Dominant spaces are spaces “transformed – 
and mediated – by technology, by practice (1991: 165); it is a construction, rather than a 
work [oeuvre]; it is not, therefore, a creation, but something thoroughly and 
fundamentally planned: an attempt to conduct and manage the use of the space. They are 
construction sites, as Edward S. Casey understands them, “leveled-down, emptied-out, 
planiform residuum of place and space eviscerated of their actual and virtual powers” 
(1997: 183). It is a space devoid of imagination; there is no poetry, only rules and 
calculations.  
Appropriated spaces, by contrast, are full of spontaneity. Appropriation “transforms 
[space] – the body and biological life provided, and the time and space – into human 
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property” (1991: 130). It is a creative activity: “an appropriated space resembles a work 
of art” (1991: 165). In The Production of Space, Lefebvre refers to the spontaneous 
architecture within the favelas of Latin America. For him, “the vast shanty towns of Latin 
American (favelas, barrios, ranchos) manifest a social life far more intense than the 
bourgeois districts of the cities” (373) because they appropriate their spaces. Here the 
habitats are formed spontaneously, without plans, and with found objects. As Lefebvre 
describes, “their poverty notwithstanding, these districts sometimes so effectively order 
their space […] as to elicit a nervous admiration. Appropriation of a remarkably high 
order is to be found here. The spontaneous architecture and planning […] prove greatly 
superior to the organization of space by specialists” (1991: 374). These inhabitants create 
their spaces by using them, by dwelling there.  
Lefebvre, therefore, seemingly in response to Deleuze and Guattari’s question about 
whether to dwell as poets or assassins, writes that the “human being […] cannot do 
anything but inhabit as a poet. If we do not provide him (as an offering and a gift) the 
possibility of inhabiting poetically or of inventing a poetry, he will create it as best as he 
can” (2003c: 82). Insofar as one inhabits a space as a dwelling [habiter] one appropriates 
a space and creates a new manner of being in space. Despite the dominated spaces and 
‘dwelling machines’ that humans are enclosed in, imagination prevails, for Lefebvre: “the 
human being cannot build and dwell, that is to say, possess a dwelling in which he lives, 
without also possessing something more (or less) than himself: his relation to the possible 
and the imaginary” (2003c: 82). Wherever, so long as one is dwelling [habiter], one is 
exposed to the possibilities of another way of living. Dwelling exposes the shadowy folds 
in space, the new space-times that nevertheless exist. 
Within the chapter ‘The Architectonics of Space’ Lefebvre develops an understanding of 
what it means to occupy space and how space is produced through this occupation. He 
seeks to determine the nature of space as the harmony between the body and space: the 
mutual intertwining of the body and space. This middle chapter is the motor of 
Lefebvre’s unitary theory of space. He defines its task as “an approach […] which 
embraces and seeks to reassemble the elements dispersed by the specialized and partial 
disciplines of ethnology, ethnography, human geography, anthropology, prehistory and 
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history, sociology and so on” (1991: 229). Stanek has called it an archaeological analysis 
of space (2011: 194). Thus it is not similar to a Kantian architectonics because it does not 
seek to systematize ‘space’, but rather, like archaeology, it excavates through the many 
strata, perceptions, levels, temporalities and scales of space. 
As an archaeology, the architectonics attempts to capture the immediate genesis of space 
by using the lived body as a unit of measure. There is an immediacy of the body in space: 
we reach space through our bodies. For Lefebvre, there is a complicit and intimate 
relationship between the body and space. Thus, Lefebvre wants to insist that the internal 
consistency or immanent composition of space does not refer to a transcendent form, but 
to the relationship of the body in space: symmetry, affects, energies, the mirror-reflection, 
rhythms, and gestures.56 Instead of Descartes’ spirit and Leibniz’s mathematician god, 
space is understood, here, as a material composition. There is a depth. As Lefebvre asks: 
before the depths of space we stand perplexed: how do we explain it? Instead of resorting 
to a transcendent source, he explains that what confronts us “consists perhaps merely in 
the material modalities of an active ‘occupation’—specifically, the occupation of space” 
(1991: 172). Thus, space is fundamentally occupied by the material forces of the body.   
Lefebvre begins his architectonics of space with Leibniz’s understanding of the 
ontological status of space in itself as ‘indiscernible’. Lefebvre points out, for Leibniz, “in 
order to discern ‘something’ therein, axes and an origin must be introduced, and a right 
and a left, i.e., the direction or orientation of those axes […]. [W]hat Leibniz means to 
say is that it is necessary for space to be occupied” (1991: 169). Empty space, the void, is 
indiscernible: it is nothing. Space, in order to be space, needs to be occupied. Ultimately, 
for Lefebvre, space is occupied by a body; the body which is “capable of indicating 
direction by a gesture, of defining rotation by turning round, of demarcating an orienting 
space” (1991: 170). The body produces its space and occupies it – makes it do something.  
Lefebvre describes the complicity between body and space as such: “[t]his is a truly 
remarkable relationship: the body with its energies at its disposal, the living body, creates 
                                                
56
 As we shall see, however, this is not the case: he does rely on a transcendent form, the Body. 
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or produces its own space; conversely, the laws of space, which is to say the laws of 
discrimination in space, also govern the living body and the deployment of its energies” 
(1991: 170). There is a mutual accord between them. The body produces space, orients it 
according to its gestures, movements, etc., but these very gestures and movements are 
already delimited by the specific material conditions (the space itself) within which they 
are enacted. The body and space work together and affect each other. It is always from 
and against this preoccupation that occupations take place. Thus space is composed from 
within, immanently, according to an “internal rationality” (1991: 174) or the “basic 
geometric laws of space – symmetries, axes, planes, centres and peripheries” (Stanek, 
2011: 192). This is the internal composition of space, what holds it together; it is not a 
transcendent form or creator god, but these internal relationships, resonances or 
rhythms.57 In fact, there is a vitalism inherent in Lefebvre’s architectonics space, ‘a 
biogenetic force’, a creative energy that runs through it, concentrating in places (subjects, 
objects) and exploding (expenditures) as productions of space and time (1991: 399). The 
body is, for Lefebvre, a concentration of energy: an interior milieu holding in reserve 
deployable energy always connected to an exterior milieu and its environment. 
Lefebvre’s architectonics is an attempt to grasp this a priori material realm, the rhythmic 
depths of a space, where the body and space are intertwined. This is the ‘lived 
experience’ of space. Space, as such, is experienced prior to thought: “in the beginning 
was the Topos” (1991: 174); space is thought afterward. Lefebvre describes this intimate 
relation between the body and space through three different lenses: affects, symmetries 
and rhythms.58 
I. Affects 
                                                
57 We can draw a comparison here between these rhythms that hold space together, and the ‘transversal’ 
refrain described in chapter 2; the difference, however, is that, in Lefebvre’s version, that which holds 
together emanates out of the body: the body’s rhythms. In Deleuze and Guattari, the ‘transversal’ is a 
powerful abstraction that does not refer to a transcendent body, but an empty repetition that can draw many 
different things that would otherwise remain apart.  
58
 In the architectonics, Lefebvre also refers to sounds, smells and gestures; however, sounds and smells 
are ultimately affective, while gestures and movements are rhythmic.  
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Before there is an intelligence of the mind there is the “intelligence of the body” (1991: 
174). Here Lefebvre’s analysis has resonances with Deleuze and Guattari’s ethology, 
where the body is marked by a longitude and latitude, the capacity to affect and be 
affected. For instance, Lefebvre refers to “’primitive’ people – seasonally migrant 
herders, let us say” (1991: 192), a conceptual persona akin to, but not quite, the nomad of 
Deleuze and Guattari. For Lefebvre, ‘primitive people’ occupy space not mediated by 
abstractions like a grid or a metrics, but rather “remained purely qualitative in character, 
like those of animals” (1991: 192); in other words, they occupied space according to 
affects or spatial indices “invested with affective significance” (1991: 192-3). Therefore 
space is immediately experienced or lived as affects prior to any representation or 
geometrical abstraction of space. Space is originally oriented or given direction according 
to the affects of a body.  
In order to illustrate this, Lefebvre uses the example of the spider in its web.59 The 
spider’s web is not spun according to a higher design: the spider does not utilize an 
abstract blueprint. Instead, the spider “produces, secrets and it occupies a space which it 
engenders according to its own lights: the space of its web, of its stratagems, of its needs” 
(1991: 173). There is an intelligence of the spider that is not analytic in nature, but 
bodily, affective: “the spider produces, which manifestly calls for ‘thought’, but it does 
not ‘think’ in the same way as we do” (1991: 173); it is capable of “demarcating space 
and orienting itself on the basis of angles” (1991: 173) without the use of abstract units of 
measurement or plans.  
The spider and its web provides Lefebvre with a clear example of how one does not leave 
one’s space: the body is constantly producing its space and even when you try to leave, 
perhaps on a line of flight, you are only producing other different space-times. In fact, 
like the spider, the human cannot leave its web. The living body spins its web through its 
affective relationships. The production of space “beginning with the production of the 
body, extends to the productive secretion of a ‘residence’ [habiter]” (1991: 173). In other 
                                                
59 Deleuze uses a similar example in his study of Marcel Proust, Proust and Signs. See “Conclusion to Part 
II: Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider” (117).   
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words, inhabiting space, dwelling or occupying, is how we create our residences, webs or 
spaces. In the same way that the spider cannot be understood outside of its web, the living 
body cannot be understood outside its space. Hence the complicity between the body and 
the world or the body and space;60 there is not one without the other. As Watson clarifies, 
“Lefebvre is suggesting that the living body, all living bodies, should be understood as an 
environment, consisting in a creature and a structure” (100). There is a pre-established 
harmony between the body and space. The spider does not leave its web and nor the 
living body its dwelling or home. 
II. Mirror-reflections & Symmetry 
For Lefebvre, space is also a mirror, a reflection. One can see one’s body in space 
through space: we even become conscious of ourselves through the reflection of space: 
“it is an activity which serves to generate consciousness” (1991: 184). Yet this is not a 
psychoanalytic mirror because it does not occult the body; instead, this mirror reflection 
emphasizes the role of the body in space: “the mirror discloses the relationship between 
me and myself, my body and the consciousness of my body” (1991: 185). The mirror 
situates one’s body in space; it allows one to imagine oneself in space. In other words, it 
informs us about the body-space relationship. That is, because space is a product of the 
body, I can see myself in space as the space I have produced. The surrounding space is 
organized according to my body; therefore I can see myself in it. 
Moreover, for Lefebvre, the mirror’s reflection repeats what it reflects, yet inversely; it is 
a repetition with difference. As Chris Butler explains, “the mirror’s reflection […] 
provides a symmetrical duplication of the reflected world, but also establishes a virtual 
spatiality founded on differentiation” (193-4). The mirror, as a result, and to use Michel 
Foucault’s term, is a heterotopia.61 For Foucault, “the mirror functions as a heterotopia in 
                                                
60 It is important to note, again, that the Lefebvre does not provide a distinction between his concept of 
space and the phenomenological concept of ‘world’; they are almost indistinguishable, despite, as already 
noted, Lefebvre’s placing it in the ‘concrete’. 
61 While Lefebvre does not directly cite or refer to Michel Foucault’s essay on heterotopias, “Different 
Spaces”, which was published in 1967, about 7 years before The Production of Space, Lefebvre does give 
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the sense that it makes this place I occupy at the moment I look at myself in the glass 
both utterly real, connected with the entire space surrounding it, and utterly unreal—
since, to be perceived, it is obliged to go by way of that virtual point which is over there” 
(1998: 179). The mirror creates an imaginary space, which is actual space repeated 
differently. The mirror as an object produces an imaginary space, an ‘other space’, which 
has a real effect on how one gestures and lives in space. Or, as Lefebvre notes elsewhere, 
“[Space, my space,] is first of all my body and then it is my body’s counter-part, or 
‘other’, its mirror-image or shadow: it is the shifting intersection between that which 
touches, penetrates, threatens or benefits my body on the one hand and all other bodies on 
the other” (1991: 184). Space is the ‘shifting intersection’ between one’s body and other 
bodies, the touched-touching, the sensible-sentient, akin to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the 
flesh.  
The mirror also creates symmetry within the surrounding world; it orients the world and 
gives it material axes. The body, split into a left and a right, reflected in space inversely, 
creates a compass. In order to understand the symmetry of space, Lefebvre, like Deleuze, 
refers to Hermann Weyl’s lectures Symmetry. Symmetry is thus a means of understanding 
the emergence and organization of space materially and immanently. It is, in this sense, 
embodied in space. For instance, crystals or shells organize themselves according to the 
forces or singularities within its space or interior milieu in relation to an exterior milieu. 
In Lefebvre’s words: “the poetry of shells […] has nothing to do with some mysterious 
creative force, but corresponds merely to the way in which energy, under specific 
conditions […] is deployed” (1991: 172); the shell organizes itself immanently according 
to principles of symmetry; they self-regulate, in other words. In geometry and in physical 
systems, symmetry means that there is an invariance of form under any kind of 
transformation, rotational or reflectional, etc. A sphere, for example, would have more 
                                                                                                                                            
 
us a hint by calling the mirror-space, an “’other’ space” (1991: 185), which is in reference to another way 
to translate the title of Foucault’s essay.  
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symmetry than a cube (De Landa 18). For Lefebvre, the importance of the mirror is that it 
“extends a repetition (symmetry) immanent to the body into space” (1991: 182, fn. 14). 
Symmetry allows us to understand how space is occupied; the symmetry of the body is 
projected into space and orients it, and produces it. 
III. Rhythms 
Lefebvre also understands, first in The Production of Space and then more thoroughly in 
Rhythmanalysis, the relationship of the body and space through rhythms. Space is lived 
through rhythms. Both the body and the surrounding world are ‘bundles of rhythms’, 
which intertwine or resonate in a polyrhythmia, a symphony of rhythms. As a result, 
“rhythms in all their multiplicity interpenetrate one another. In the body and around it, as 
on the surface of a body of water, or within the mass of a liquid, rhythms are forever 
crossing and recrossing, superimposing themselves upon each other, always bound to 
space” (1991: 205). Therefore, before the subject and object, there are rhythms 
intertwining or resonating with other rhythms: a body’s access to the world is through 
rhythm. Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis is thereby an attempt to understand the ‘pre-
established harmony’ that the body experiences with its world or space through rhythms; 
the body is capable of perceiving or sensing heterogeneous things by resonating with 
their rhythms. In other words, the body is always already established or connected with 
the surrounding space. 
The rhythmanalyst utilizes his body, his ‘metronome’, in order to access the world, and to 
critically analyze the space-times of the world: “[t]he rhythmanalyst calls on all his 
senses” (2004: 21); his synaesthetic, ‘total body’, as a bundle of rhythms, enters into the 
polyrhythmic world: “by integrating the outside with the inside” (2004: 20). In order to 
illustrate how the rhythmanalyst would work, Lefebvre uses an example of himself on a 
balcony listening and watching a garden below. Here the rhythmanalyst must lose oneself 
in a method akin to Henri Bergson’s concept of ‘intuition’: “to grasp a rhythm it is 
necessary to have been grasped by it; one must let oneself go, give oneself over, abandon 
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oneself to its duration” (2004: 27).62 The rhythmanalyst sympathizes with its fleeting 
object (a bundle of rhythms) in order to be grasped by its duration. Instead, of perceiving 
objects and spaces as static, self-enclosed, the rhythmanalyst sees them 
“polyrhythmically, or if you prefer symphonically” (2004: 31). The body is always in 
connection with the rhythms of the surrounding space, as Lefebvre notes, “the passage 
from subject to object requires neither a leap over an abyss, nor the crossing of a desert” 
(2004: 36); one just has to utilize the method of intuition and to let go of the abstractions 
or conceptions that block the accord. 
3.2 Spaces Without Worlds 
Lefebvre’s understanding of space, when bracketed out of its historical analysis, is 
fundamentally a phenomenological understanding. There is a lived experience of space 
by means of the body; the body is the common denominator. Despite only referencing 
Merleau-Ponty in three notes in The Production of Space, there are clear resonances 
between their understandings of the relationship between the body and the world.  
In Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology, there is no body without the world or 
world without the body. As he describes in the essay “Eye and Mind”, the body is an 
enigma: seeing and seen, sentient and sensing. It is “visible and mobile, my body is a 
thing among things; it is one of them. It is caught in the fabric of the world, and its 
cohesion is that of a thing […]. Things are an annex or prolongation of my body; they are 
incrusted in its flesh […]; the world is made of the very stuff of my body” (354). And as 
philosopher Alia Al-Saji describes “the lived body is a power to synchronize with its 
environment” (110). Al-Saji continues to describe the relation of the body and the world 
as one of negotiation, a relationship between two mutual, consensual partners: “For its 
part, the sensible world does not simply take over my body; it beckons to it and 
negotiates with it” (111; Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 214). It is not an actualized subject that 
confronts a determined world; they are both indeterminate: “both subject and object, 
                                                
62 There is therefore, despite not referencing Bergson, a resonance with his intuitionist method, which he 
refers to as a “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within in an object in order to 
coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (24). 
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sensing and sensible, are constituted through the process of sensation” (Al-Saji 111). 
They are completely enveloped. The body nevertheless pre-emptively develops its 
surrounding world in order to be there in-the-world: it seeks points of resonance in the 
world in order to correspond with. The surrounding world is an augmented body, and the 
body is an augmented world. As a result, there is an intimacy between the world (space) 
and the lived body.  
The later Merleau-Ponty has two notions for the harmony or sympathy between body and 
space: depth and flesh. Depth is the source or matrix of the body-space relationship: it is a 
zone of indetermination, an entanglement, where one cannot locate the limits of the body 
and the limits of the world. Henry Somers-Hall points out that, with the concept of 
‘depth’, “Merleau-Pony is attempting to move beyond the world of perception to the 
conditions for the experience of perception” (125). It is not a world partes extra partes, 
or composed of res extensa; he is interested instead in understanding the genesis of the 
world. In “Eye and Mind”, Merleau-Ponty refers to it as the first dimension, “a global 
‘locality’ in which everything is at the same time” (369), or a volume. In his book Getting 
Back into Place, Edward S. Casey, refers to depth as a primal depth, where the near and 
far coincide in a particular place (68). This primal depth is the Deep, the matrix, out of 
which places emerge and concretize. As Merleau-Ponty indicates, it is “first and foremost 
a participation in the being of space beyond every particular point of view” (363; 
emphasis mine). In the words of Heidegger, it is the spatiality of space, the pre-
ontological basis of space.  
Moreover, the concept of flesh, as depth incarnate, is both the visible and the invisible, 
the perceptible and the imperceptible at once. For instance, he claims that the depth is 
“not a thing, but a possibility, a latency and a flesh of things” (2007c: 395). For Merleau-
Ponty, the body-world relationship is what constitutes flesh; it is a “shared participation 
of the subject and object in a generalized visibility” (Grosz “Flesh” 101); similar to 
Lefebvre’s understanding of the mirror-reflection of space, the flesh is the reflection, 
where one sees oneself seeing oneself. It is a ‘generalized Visible’. Thus, he refers to it as 
a “crisscrossing” (2007c: 395): the feeling of your left hand touching your right hand. 
This is the flesh of the world intertwined with the flesh of the body, where the limit of 
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each is indeterminable. For Merleau-Ponty, then, the flesh of the body-world is the 
spatiality or the ‘depth’ of the world.  
As a result, Deleuze and Guattari describe Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Fleshism’ as the “final 
avatar of phenomenology” (1994: 178) because, while it does attempt to expose the real 
conditions of the possible, it does not move beyond a ‘science of the actual’; it 
nevertheless remains in the empirical realm, tied to the body. Somers-Hall explains that 
this ‘Fleshism’ is the final avatar of phenomenology because it still posits a transcendent 
lived experience, wherein Merleau-Ponty conflates the depth of space with actualized 
space, or in Deleuze’s terms, the virtual and the actual. As he writes in “Eye and Mind”, 
in relation to Cézanne’s paintings: “We must seek space and its content together” (369). 
Here “depth attempts to fulfill two functions”: it attempts to represent the actualization of 
the virtual along with the actual itself (Somers-Hall 127). It results in a ‘hermeneutics of 
facticity’, where Cézanne becomes a kind of icon painter.  
A similar criticism can be applied to Lefebvre’s work. For instance, in Rhythmanalysis, 
(in a veiled allusion to Heidegger) he refers to Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes. As 
he notes, “[f]rom any given object, from a simple thing (Van Gogh’s shoes), a great artist 
creates a strong presence, and he does so on a canvas, a simple surface” (2004: 24). 
Through the depiction of everyday objects Van Gogh was capable of capturing, not 
profaned presents, but a sacred presence, or the thing’s duration. However, this is not a 
negative theology, as Lefebvre makes clear, the rhythmanalyst “is not a mystic!” (2004: 
25). Instead, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, like Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Fleshism’, is an attempt 
to recover ‘the sensible’.  
The issue with Lefebvre’s attempt to recover the ‘sensible’ through the lived body is that 
it remains limited within the realm of the possible. It does not go far enough, settling with 
the empirical body. As a result, space becomes reduced to the body, unified by the body. 
In order to liberate space and to be able to create new spaces, we need to go beyond the 
given, beyond the lived, through what Deleuze calls a ‘transcendental empiricism.’ As 
Deleuze states, “the transcendental exercise must not be traced from the empirical 
exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot be grasped from the point of 
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view of common sense, that which measures the empirical operation of all the faculties 
according to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration” (1995: 
143). As a result, for Deleuze, the lived body or lived experience reintroduces a 
transcendent into space.  
In the case of Lefebvre, who tries to formulate space as immanent, space becomes 
ultimately immanent to the body and the experience of the body in space. A transcendent 
body standing upright in the river of immanence. This, as Zourabichvili highlights, only 
“‘trace[s]’ the conditions from the conditioned, the form of the transcendental from the 
empirical” (2012: 173); it cannot adequately think genesis. Tracing the transcendental 
from the empirical is similar to conflating the actual and its actualization, or the genesis 
of space and space itself. Thus, in Rhythmanalysis, Lefebvre, as shown above, through 
‘intuition’, analyses the rhythms of bodies, which are immanent to the body. But as 
Deleuze notes in Bergsonism, “intuition leads us to go beyond the state of experience 
toward the conditions of experience. But these conditions are neither general nor abstract. 
They are no broader than the conditioned: they are the conditions of real experience” 
(27). Deleuze’s understanding of the method of ‘intuition’ seeks the conditions of real 
experience whereas Lefebvre’s is restricted to the realm of the possible. Real experience, 
for Deleuze, “is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but 
that by which the given is given. It is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible 
[insensible]” (1995: 140). For Deleuze, then, Merleau-Ponty and Lefebvre, as avatars of 
phenomenology, do not go far enough; they restrict their studies to a transcendent body 
or Flesh and, in consequence, cannot adequately think the sensible, the being of the 
sensible. 
In relation to the three ways that Lefebvre claims the body occupies space, as delineated 
above, that is, affect, symmetry and rhythm, it can be shown that his idea of the body is 
limited to the given instead of searching for its genesis. First, Lefebvre states that the 
lived experience of space begins with the affective experience of space via the body. 
Seemingly akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the affect, it does not go far enough 
because it is the body that determines the affect and not vice versa. Thus they are the 
affects or feelings of a subject. Second, space has an immanent consistency based on 
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symmetry; in other words, space is immanently created according to the symmetry of the 
body, which is reflected into space (and reflects back onto the subject). Space is a 
repetition or duplication of the body, yet inversely. This difference, however, is a 
difference that is produced after the form of the Same; it is not difference in itself. As 
developed in Chapter 2, Deleuze refers to a dynamic asymmetry that precedes and 
produces symmetry.63 Lastly, Lefebvre understands space as an animated space of 
rhythms. But these are rhythms of bodies, whereas Deleuze, as he notes in his monograph 
on Francis Bacon, insists that rhythms “can be discovered only by going beyond the 
organism” (2012: 44); rhythms are experienced at the limit of the body. Lefebvre, 
therefore, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, reintroduce the lived body as a 
Transcendent in order to understand the immanence of space. In sum, his ‘architectonics 
of space’ is supposed to describe the immanent constitution of space, but in order to do so 
he relies on a notion of the lived body. 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari trace a brief history of ‘immanence’ in 
philosophy. Within which they summarize it into three distinct phases: 1. The Greek, 
contemplative phase: where “immanence is immanent ‘to’ the One, so that another One, 
this time transcendent, is superimposed on the one in which immanence is extended […]: 
the neo-Platonists’ formula will always be a One beyond the One” (1994: 44). 2. The 
Kantian, reflective phase: immanence is now immanent to a transcendental subject. They 
note that “Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the 
transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but 
that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a self 
that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)” (1994: 46). 3. The 
phenomenological urdoxa, or ‘communication’ phase, where transcendence emerges out 
                                                
63
 For instance, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze discusses a more primary asymmetry that produces 
symmetry. The static repetition of symmetry, for Deleuze, always “refers back to a dynamic repetition” 
(21). Moreover, here, space, or extended space, is not produced according to symmetry, but according to an 
intensive spatium, and ‘symmetry-breaking processes’, which Manuel Delanda describes as “a process 
which converts one of the entities into the other by losing or gaining symmetry. For example, a sphere can 
‘become a cube’ by loosing invariance to some transformations” (18; emphasis his). Therefore, new spaces 
are produced through an asymmetry, symmetry-breaking. The mirror of space can shatter. 
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of immanence, “in Husserl and many of his successors who discover in the Other or in 
the Flesh, the mole of the transcendent within immanence itself” (1994: 46). In 
Lefebvre’s phenomenological understanding of space, he seems to be straddling between 
phase 2 and 3, where immanence is immanent to the body or to the rhythms of the 
sensible world.  
The lived body, as the fundamental ground of space, for Lefebvre, is the ‘transcendent 
mole,’ the Something that space is immanent to. Space is experienced through this lived 
body. As a result, Lefebvre’s philosophy of space presupposes the lived body as self-
evident; it is the pre-philosophical and pre-conceptual ‘Everybody knows’: ‘Everybody 
knows’ that space is accessed through the body (Deleuze, 1995: 129-30). He thus relies 
on a concept of the body as a given without actually addressing how the body is given.  
The lived body, what Lefebvre calls a ‘total’ body, “multisensorial” (Gardiner, 2000: 
243) body, is a synaesthetic body.64 The synaesthetic body is a body whose faculties and 
senses work together, intercommunicate, and agree about a given object; it is a body 
whose faculties are in a ‘harmonious accord’. This body works according to the model 
that Deleuze names ‘recognition’: “[r]ecognition may be defined by the harmonious 
exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object: the same object may be seen, 
touched, remembered, imagined or conceived” (1995: 133). The synaesthetic body 
recognizes a given object within the objective manifold by generalizing it into an object = 
x. The body determines a given intuited object by subsuming it under categories, or in 
other words, the flux of the Outside is reduced to the “sedentary distributions” of the 
Kantian categories. It therefore acts according to a common sense, a sensus communis, 
where all of the faculties work together; and also according to a good sense, that which 
qualifies the object. For Deleuze, “good sense and common sense complete each other in 
the image of thought: together they constitute the two halves of the doxa” (1995: 134). As 
Renoylds and Roffe explain, Kantian and Husserlian phenomenology, “assume that 
sensibility is natively apposite to every form of experience. The subject is in advance 
                                                
64
 The idea of the ‘total’ body is also found in Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology: “[s]ynaesthetic 
perception is the rule” (2002: 265). 
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predisposed to the structure of experience (common sense) and experience is always 
structured meaningfully in advance (good sense)” (232). The lived body, in these terms, 
pre-form the given according to ‘good sense’ and then understand it according to its 
categories or faculties through a ‘common sense’.  
Recognition functions according to a doxa, clichés or opinions that pre-determine how 
one experiences the world; it works like this: “[w]e pick out a quality supposedly 
common to several objects that we perceive, and an affection supposedly common to 
several subjects who experience it and who, along with us, grasp that quality” (1994: 
144). But doxa also refers to a urdoxa, a proto-belief in a pre-established harmony 
between the body and space, “the presupposition of a perfect fit, or a natural harmony, 
between self and world” (Renoylds and Roffe: 232). For instance, Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh as being such a urdoxa; that is, while flesh is 
“freed from the lived body, the perceived world” (1994: 178), it is nevertheless founded 
on the belief that there is a natural harmony between beings, an “ideal coincidence” 
(1994: 178).65 Or as they write elsewhere, phenomenology always “goes in search of 
original opinions which bind us to the world as to our homeland (earth)” (1994: 149). As 
if there is an ontological harmony between self and world, body and space. In Lefebvre’s 
work, this proto-belief in an ontological harmony is most clear in the sympathy he 
assumes between bodies and rhythms, between the rhythms of the body and the rhythms 
that compose the space around the body.  
In contrast to the urdoxa of a pre-established harmony between the body and space, 
Deleuze refers to the para-doxa of a contingent encounter. As discussed in chapter 2, he 
finds in Kant’s philosophy, through the ideas of the sublime and symbolism, a groundless 
ground, the harmonious discord of the faculties. Here, instead of a pre-established 
harmony, there is a “contingent accord of Nature with our faculties” (Deleuze, 1985: 64), 
which, in Difference and Repetition, he renames ‘the encounter’. 
                                                
65
 Compare this to a note Merleau-Ponty has written in his essay “The Intertwining-The Chiasm”, from 
The Visible and the Invisible: “a correspondence between [the world’s] inside and my outside, between my 
inside and [the world’s] outside” (469; ft. 5). The world and the body are intertwined and compose a knot 
of flesh.  
78 
 
The encounter is what forces thought and sensation, whereas in recognition the body 
relies on clichés that pre-emptively constrain the given object: “[s]omething in the world 
forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition, but of a fundamental 
encounter” (1995: 139); the encounter forces us to sense that which can only be sensed; it 
is to perceive the imperceptible. In front of something that we cannot recognize, we are 
forced to create, to think (to think is to create) something new, in order to get a grasp on 
the situation.  
However, it is important to note that there are encounters precisely because there is no 
pre-established harmony between the body and space; there is an encounter because the 
outside cannot be contained in general categories. For Deleuze, in fact, there is only ever 
a contingent accord (or harmony) through the encounter at the limit of the body; 
otherwise, the model of recognition intervenes and pre-emptively guides sensation and 
thought. Therefore, there is no affinity between the body and space; instead, there is the 
man without presuppositions or qualities, the Idiot,66 who gropes around, seeing, hearing, 
touching, and smelling anew. Otherwise, we remain encaged within what Lefebvre had 
called ‘dwelling machines’, and our narcissistic space-worlds within which we confuse 
space with our reflections.  
In fact, there is a cruelty in the space surrounding the body. Space is fundamentally cruel 
because it does not need the body; it does not rely upon the body to be oriented, as 
Lefebvre insists. In other words, there is a reality of space beyond the lived experience of 
the Body — a realism of space that needs to be taken account of. In Difference and 
Repetition, in reference to the poet Antonin Artaud’s notion of cruelty, Deleuze points 
out that “cruelty is nothing but determination as such, that precise point at which the 
determined maintains its essential relation with the undetermined” (29).67 Life is cruel 
                                                
66
 See Deleuze’s discussions of the Idiot in Difference and Repetition, where the idiot is “an underground 
man who recognizes himself no more in the subjective presuppositions of a natural capacity for thought 
than in the objective presuppositions of a culture of the times, and lacks the compass with which to make a 
circle” (130). See also his lecture, published in Two Regimes of Madness: texts and interviews 1975-1995, 
called “What is a Creative Act?”. 
67 Refer to Artaud’s The Theatre and Its Double, particularly the essay “The Theatre and Cruelty” (84). 
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and indifferent. Determination is the unilateral emergence of difference: “[t]he act of 
determination whose line of movement is that of unilateral distinction, […], distinguishes 
x from its chaotic background to make a difference” (Negarestani: 70). This space 
without subjects and objects, without actors, is a world not organized from the point of 
view of the human, for the survival of the human, but is a space in itself that is inherently 
cruel and indifferent. As Deleuze writes,  “[t]here is necessarily something cruel in this 
birth of a world which is a chaosmos, in these worlds of movements without subjects, 
roles without actors” (1995: 219); it is “like a ‘restless space’, or movement of turning 
and wounding gravitation capable of directly affecting the organism […]. Spaces are 
hollowed out…” (1995: 219). These hollowed out spaces are spaces without worlds or 
spaces without metrics, i.e. non-phenomenological spaces.68 They are spaces without 
subjects and objects, a space of absolute immanence. It is a ‘frontier’ space, terra 
incognita.   
In the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson, there is a concept of space that pre-exists 
subjects and objects because it ‘affords’ them. His ‘theory of affordances’ stipulates that 
the environment has niches, or sets of affordances, that are what it “offers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes” (128) and that “different layouts afford different 
behaviours for different animals” (128). It is very similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the assemblage [agencement], which determines what one can do. For Gibson, 
“a niche refers more to how an animal lives than to where it lives” (128). Most 
importantly, however, is that the niche is not the phenomenal world of the inhabitant; it is 
not an Umwelt. The environment exists prior to its inhabitants; it is ‘invariant’. Gibson’s 
ecology posits a real outside of the subject that does not revolve around a subject. As a 
                                                
68 These hollowed out spaces, or spaces without worlds, are comparable to what Emmanuel Levinas calls 
the il y a, or the ‘there is’: the object in its abject objectivity without meaning (see his Existence and 
Existents). It could also be related to what Slavoj Žižek calls, in psychoanalytic terms, the ‘inertia of the 
real’. Moreover, there are resonances with Quentin Meillassoux’s concept of the ‘Great Outdoors’, which is 
a space outside of what he calls ‘correlationalism’, which he describes as “the idea according to which we 
only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered 
apart from the other” (2008: 5). Therefore, he refers to the ‘great outdoors’ as the “outside which was not 
relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself 
regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore with the 
legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere” (2008: 7).  
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result, the environment exhibits a cruelty: it is indifferent to that which inhabits it. For 
Gibson, “the organism depends on its environment for its life, but the environment does 
not depend on the organism for its existence” (129); these hollowed out spaces do not 
care for their dwellers. Space, as a result, is not automatically a dwelling; one must 
capture it, occupy it and territorialize it.69 
These spaces are similar to the chiaroscuro-like differential spaces that Lefebvre asserts is 
produced immediately by the lived body in a lived experience underneath the abstract 
spaces of capitalism. The difference is that there is no harmony, sympathy or unity in the 
cruel, hollowed out spaces. As Deleuze notes, “there is no amicability, such as that 
between the similar and the Same, or even that which unites opposites” (1995: 145). 
There is no dialectical unity here, what Lefebvre refers to as ‘unity in diversity’. Instead, 
there is a transversal communication through the discordant voice of the ‘dark precursor’, 
that is “sufficient to enable communication between difference as such” (1995: 145), but, 
it is important to note that “the dark precursor is not a friend” (1995: 145). The dark 
precursor is cruel, violent, has a habit of betrayal. There is, to reiterate, no harmony, no 
sympathy.  
In the dark spaces of the encounter, the “terra incognita” (1995: 136), subjects are idiots 
in the dark, groping around for a semblance of stability. For Heidegger, as noted in the 
previous chapter, the room is always already familiar; the space of the room is pre-
emptively my world and is oriented in the a priori of my being-in-the-world.70 In an early 
essay of Kant’s, the dark room would be oriented according to the asymmetry of the 
body, the left and the right. However, in his essay “What does it mean to orient oneself in 
thinking?” Kant indicates that when experiencing disorientation in the face of the 
immeasurable supersensible, i.e. when our metrics cannot map onto the world, both 
                                                
69
 This can be understood in other words. For instance, the theory of affordances highlights the fact that 
‘the perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical object to which 
meaning is somehow added […]; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object” (140; 
emphasis added). Therefore, there are values and meanings outside of the phenomenological world of a 
subject. One simply has to capture them in order to territorialize them.  
70 Heidegger: “I necessarily orient myself in and from already being in a ‘familiar world’” (2010: 106). 
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memory and reason prevails. As he states, “it will be a concern of pure reason to guide its 
use when it wants to leave familiar objects (of experience) behind” (2001: 8:135).  In an 
unrecognizable space, i.e. in a dark room, subjective principles, pure reason, will guide 
the subject. Likewise, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalyst, in the dark, would rely on the harmony 
of rhythms; the synaesthetic body would guide the rhythmanalyst around the space it is 
always already concretely, via rhythms, in communication with. As if the there is an 
amicable negotiation without deception: as if the surrounding space is always easily 
grasped. Within all of these examples, faced with the immeasurable horror of 
disorientation, which is the horror of a hollowed out space, the horror of a world without 
meaning, there is Something to rely upon: Being, Reason, the Lived Body.  
However, Deleuze finds within the disorienting darkness of these hollowed spaces, not 
simply a cruelty, but a source of thought and creativity. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to the child who hums a refrain in the dark in order to create territories, 
new units of measure, in order to see in the dark. And in his monograph on Francis 
Bacon, Deleuze refers to the ‘diagram’, which functions as the ‘refrain’ in painting. He 
states that the painter uses the diagram as a means of sketching units of measure, 
experimenting with the chaos in the infinite darkness. He illustrates that the painter, in a 
fit of hysteria, experiences a catastrophe, “where he or she no longer sees anything and 
risks foundering: the collapse of visual coordinates” (2012: 72). It is with the loss of 
vision, a moment of blindness, that the painter experiences a bout of creativity in a zone 
of indetermination. No longer shackled by the clichés attached to recognition, the painter 
can at last paint something new: “the painter’s hand intervenes in order to shake its own 
dependence and break up the sovereign optical organization: one can no longer see 
anything, as in a catastrophe, a chaos” (2012: 71). In the dark room, with the loss of 
visual coordinates, the painter experiences the chaosmos, the rhythms, which pulsate 
below the categories and units of measure of recognition. The painter does not rely on 
Reason, Being or the Lived Body to fend off the chaos; instead, he or she attempts to 
capture and conserve these sensations (affects, percepts) that exist prior to the body and 
the subject. One can only reach the pre-subjective if one lets go of one’s self and one’s 
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body: that is, to occupy the hollowed out spaces of absolute immanence.71  
Hollowed out spaces or spaces without worlds can only be understood as absolutely 
immanent. It is in the dark, during the vertigo of disorientation, that we can experience 
movements of the infinite. In the abyss there is only the infinite, an infinite “abstracted 
from all spatio-temporal coordinates, restored to their pure sense, expressible by the 
infinitive verb” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 191). For Deleuze, absolute immanence, or the 
plane of immanence, can only truly be immanent when it is “no longer immanent to 
something other than itself” (1994: 47). Or as he writes in the essay “Immanence: A 
Life…” “[a]bsolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, not to something; it 
does not depend on an object and does not belong to a subject” (170-1). The plane of 
immanence is therefore without subject and object; it is the transcendental plane prior to 
subjects and objects, the field of perception and lived experience. As Jean Khalfa notes, 
“[i]mmanence most often ends up being conceived no longer in itself, but simply as a 
property, an attribute, as when we say ’being immanent to something’: this implies there 
is something else and the immanence is no longer absolute” (64). It is the transcendental 
field that “escapes every transcendence of the subject as well as of the object” (1999: 
170).72 As a result, “immanence has neither a fixed point nor a horizon that can orient 
thought” (Agamben, 1999: 157): contrary to Kant’s thesis that “to orient oneself means to 
use a given direction (when we divide the horizon into four of them) in order to find the 
others — literally, to find the sunrise” (2001: 8:134), in absolute immanence, a space 
without world, the sun never rises. There are only the speeds and slownesses of the wind, 
the dramas of a desert at night.  
It is important to note, nevertheless, that these hollowed out spaces are not empty or void. 
                                                
71 It is important to note that for Deleuze the plane of immanence can only be thought, it cannot be known 
because it is not experienced by a subject, but only prior to a subject. He thus retains the Kantian 
distinction between thought and knowledge. The plane of immanence is experienced through thought: it 
forces one to think, to create.   
72
 Deleuze retains Kant’s distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental. In fact, he finds a 
notion of an impersonal ‘transcendental’ in Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay The Transcendence of the Ego, where 
Sartre develops “an impersonal transcendental field [that] restores the rights of immanence” (1994: 47).   
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They are occupied by events or haecceities. Subjects and objects come after these 
haecceities. Hence for Deleuze, “the whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology” 
(1995: 52); phenomenology is always secondary. The haecceity is an event that occurs 
before subjects and objects develop; it “presents a mode of immanent individuation 
distinct from the organic individual forms that cut up [découpe] a priori the empirical 
field” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 195). They take place prior to the empirical field, beyond the 
realms of the lived body as anonymous and impersonal forces and affects. They 
constitute what Deleuze and Guattari call “relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness between unformed elements”, “subjectless individuations” (1987: 266). It is the 
space of affects and percepts, and the assemblages that constitute the subjects and 
objects.  
For Deleuze and Guattari, then, on the plane of immanence one is not yet a subject who 
encounters an object; instead there is only a set of affects encounter another set of affects. 
As Deleuze writes, “you will define an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its 
organs, and its functions, and not as a subject either; you will define it by the affects of 
which it is capable” (1988b: 124). In other words, the individual on the plane of 
immanence is not a list of attributes, a typology, but the spatio-temporal rhythms of 
events and haecceities.73 As illustrated in the previous chapter, in his lectures on Kant, 
Deleuze posits that instead of using sedentary categories in order to understand a lion, the 
schema is a resort to abstraction in order to map out the lion’s spatio-temporal rhythms or 
haecceity (how it occupies space) in order to define it. As a result, the plane of 
immanence is not distributed (or ordered) according to a genealogy or history, but 
according to ‘latitudes’ and ‘longitudes’, a geography.  
Thus the haecceity (the unformed bodies that populate the plane of immanence) is a 
“longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set 
                                                
73
 Thus, in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, he uses the example of the plow horse and the ox. Instead of 
understanding organisms according to species or genus, just look at what they are capable of, what sort of 
affects they have. As he writes, “there are greater differences between an ox and a plow horse. This is 
because the racehorse and plow horse do not have the same affects nor the same capacity for being 
affected; the plow horse has affects in common rather with the ox” (124). 
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of nonsubjectified affects” (1987: 262). It is a pre-ontological, yet material field. They 
are assemblages [agencements] or compositions out of which actualized states of affairs 
emerge. The haecceity is, for example, “the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock” (1987: 263). 
The haecceity is the spatio-temporal event of the animal stalking in that place at that 
time; the way it occupies a space and a time within a certain block of space and time. 
As they write, “it should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or 
backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the 
ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity” 
(1987: 262). As they note later, “[s]patiotemporal relations, determinations, are not 
predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities. The street is as much a part of the 
omnibus-horse assemblage as the Hans assemblage the becoming-horse of which it 
initiates” (1987: 263). These events do not take place between a subject and object, but 
the entire assemblage that precedes that confrontation and assembles it.74 These 
haecceities or events that occupy a plane of immanence are therefore spatiotemporal 
assemblages. The actualized subject and object domain emerges from these 
transcendental fields populated by events, haecceities and atmospheres that are subject-
less. 
The plane of immanence is therefore the impersonal transcendental field that precedes 
subjects and objects. It is a subject-less landscape of flux populated only by speeds and 
slownesses. As Deleuze and Guattari write, in What is Philosophy?, “it does not present a 
flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and individualized in that which belongs to 
a self. It presents only events” (47). As illustrated above, this is not an event that refers to 
a subject or an object: “[t]he event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject = 
Self, but on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject” 
(1994: 48; emphasis mine). The transcendental field can no longer take the perspective of 
                                                
74 As Zourabichvili notes, in relation to Deleuze’s reading of Proust, “we do not love someone apart from 
the landscapes, hours and circumstances of all kinds that they envelop” (195). In other words, we do not 
only love a subject, but we love the spaces and times they envelop with them. Or as Deleuze states in his 
interview with Claire Parnet, in L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, “ You never desire someone or something, 
you always desire an aggregate […]. I don’t desire a woman, I also desire a landscape that is enveloped in 
this woman” (‘D comme Désir’).  
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a consciousness unifying it, but is instead, a survey [survol] over a field without a subject. 
Paul Bains refers to it as “autopoeitic immanence”, a field that self-organizes (102).75 
There is nothing external to organize it. All there is is an immanent survey [survol]: “A 
‘fourth person singular’. An in-itself that is not for-itself. Auto-affection. A self-feeling 
unicity. A real space. Not a Cartesian or Bergsonian space” (Bains 105). There is no 
Body here to constitute it; the formed bodies emerge afterward. Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to Ruyer’s concept of ‘survey’ [survol] in order to understand the plane of 
immanence; in French, sur-vol, literally means a ‘flight over’ or an ‘overview’, a view 
from above.76 It is like a satellite recording an image of Earth from above, detached from 
all human perspective. It creates an image that is ‘absolute’, “that is not relative to any 
point of view exterior to itself, which knows itself without observing itself”.77 It is an 
abstracted image beyond the lived experiences of any subject that survey the hollowed 
out spaces or spaces without worlds. 
3.3 Abstraction and Occupation 
We are commonly told that abstractions are passive and withdrawn, removed from a 
living reality. Etymologically, it comes from the Latin abstractus or abstrahere, ‘to be 
drawn away’ or ‘to draw away’— trahere meaning ‘to draw’. Abstraction is then to be 
withdrawn: to draw a line outside. To abstract is to withdraw from the sensible world.78 
Abstract art, for instance, is not concerned with representing the world, or figuration, but 
of creating something else, another world.  
                                                
75
 ‘Autopoiesis’ refers to living systems that are capable of self-reproducing, for instance biological cells. 
The biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela introduced it as a concept in the 1970s. See their 
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (1980). Guattari often refers to Maturana and 
Varela in order to understand the production of subjectivity. See Guattari’s The Three Ecologies.    
76
 Raymond Ruyer was a French philosopher who is known for his work on socio-biology and cybernetics, 
particular in his work Néofinalisme (1952). Deleuze and Guattari refer to his concept of the brain in their 
conclusion to What is Philosophy? in order to conceive of a concept of Life beyond phenomenology.  
77
 This quote is from Ruyer’s Néofinalisme (p. 98), quoted here from Paul Bains’s essay “Subjectless 
Subjectivities” (109); translation his. 
78
 Or abstraction is to draw with the sensible world, instead of imitating or attempting to reproduce it.  
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In his book Abstraction and Empathy, art historian Wilhelm Worringer draws a 
distinction, in order to clarify an understanding of abstraction, from what he calls 
empathy. Empathy is seeing oneself in the external world; artists guided by what he calls 
the ‘urge to empathy’ thereby paint themselves into the outside world, and moreover 
spectators enjoy this art because they, also, see themselves there. As Worringer describes, 
empathy is the “complete confidence in the external world, this unproblematic sense of 
being at home in the world” (45, fn. 14). Worringer, therefore, in proto-Heideggerian 
fashion, declares that empathetic art seeks to portray man’s dwelling, a being-in-the-
world. Empathetic art is ultimately a phenomenological art: it paints the pre-established 
harmony between humans and space as if humans are always already at home.  
In contrast, abstraction, or the ‘urge to abstraction’, is, for Worringer, the urge “to wrest 
the object of the external world out of its natural context, out of the unending flux of 
being” (16-7). One abstracts in order to escape the horrors of an incommensurable world: 
the urge to abstraction in art is, for Worringer, the “outcome of a great inner unrest 
inspired in man by the phenomena of the outside”, and he describes this state as “an 
immense spiritual dread of space” (15). Abstraction is then a way to assuage the cruelty 
of the space outside of one’s dwelling. The painter paints abstractions because he or she 
understands that there is no pre-established harmony between the interiority of the subject 
and the external world.79  
In Marxist terms, moreover, abstraction is alienation: to abstract out of reality is to be 
alienated from the concrete relations of production of labour and of society. Capitalism 
is, in the words of Alberto Toscano, “the culture of abstraction par excellence, as a 
society that, pace many of the more humanist denunciations of the dominant ideology, is 
really driven, in many respects, by abstract entities, traversed by powers of abstraction” 
(2008a: 273). As the latter half of the quote maintains, not only does capitalism work 
with abstractions, but it also functions through abstractions. Toscano continues: 
                                                
79 However, it is also clear that Worringer’s concept of empathy, or the ‘urge to empathy’, seems to 
function according to the same dread; and instead of seeing the outside world as such the painter paints his 
reflection there as a façade; as a result, it is still an abstraction. 
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“something really happens when abstraction takes place” (2008a: 279) because 
“abstractions are not mental categories that ideally precede the concrete totality; they are 
real abstractions that are truly caught up in the social whole, the social relation” (2008a: 
275). In other words, abstractions have a real effect in concrete relations; they are not 
totally withdrawn in an ideal realm. In fact, what Marx calls ‘real’ or ‘concrete’ 
abstraction precedes thought and is “operative in the world” (Toscano, 2008b: 68). 
Abstractions thereby have a constitutive effect in reality. In order to understand how we 
are ‘in’ space, we cannot solely invoke immediate lived experience, but need to address 
the role of abstractions in the occupations of space and territories.  
Paolo Virno, in his essay “The Two Masks of Materialism,” summarizes the issue of 
reducing abstraction to a pure ideality. In this essay, he points out that in critical thought, 
notably Marxist, there are two different figures: the sensationalist and the materialist-
sociologist. The latter seeks to “shed light upon the socio-historical conditionings of 
abstract thought and thereby to deny its supposed purity” (167), but during this journey 
(“looking for dirty laundry”) this figure “fail[s] to grasp the status of knowledge, he also 
loses hold of the very ‘society’ in whose name he claims to speak: he fails to notice the 
abstract connections (‘real abstractions’, as Marx called them) that pervade society and 
make it cohere” (168).  In contrast, the sensationalist’s “dominant theme is the shadow 
thrown by the body unto thought, the role played by the sensible in the abstraction that 
would like to efface it” (168). The sensationalist seeks in an immediate experience the 
differences that the categories of language cannot contain or could not foresee, where 
“what is perceived in the silence of touch remains independent from the speculative 
power of language”  (169). However, what this figure fails to notice are the real or 
concrete abstractions that have an effect in reality. In both cases, the figures lose touch 
with the ‘real abstractions’ that pervade society, both productive and produced. Virno’s 
thesis is that instead of simply searching for the socio-historical conditions or accessing 
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via an intuition or the body an immediate experience, abstractions need to be 
politicized.80 
Lefebvre is caught between these two figures; he straddles the line as a Marxist and a 
phenomenologist, the sociologist and the philosopher. The main thread throughout his 
oeuvre attempts to understand how Marx’s concept of ‘alienation’ infiltrates everyday 
life (and space). For Marx, alienation is what “estranges man [sic] from his own body, 
from nature as it exists outside him, from his spiritual essence [Wesen], his human 
essence” (1992: 794); alienation abstracts the human from his or her concrete relations 
within the world, from his or her ‘species-being.’ Abstractions are not only mental 
categories, but have a social influence.  
The clearest example of Lefebvre tackling the issue of abstraction is through his concept 
of ‘abstract space’, which as shown in the first chapter, is the space that capitalism 
produces. However, it is important to note that he considers theses ‘abstract spaces’ as 
concrete abstractions that nevertheless have an impact in how spaces are lived in and 
conceived. Stanek states that Lefebvre bases his understanding of abstract space as a 
concrete abstraction from “Marx’s analysis of labor in his Grundrisse as an ‘abstraction 
which became true in practice’” (2008: 67). To return briefly to Lefebvre’s concept of 
‘abstract space’, it is important to remember that ‘abstract spaces’ attempt to smother the 
differences that the lived experiences of space produce through conceptions and 
discourses of space, the ‘representations of space.’ These are abstractions, however, that 
do not only have an effect at the level of ideas, but, as Derek McCormick points out, “for 
Lefebvre the space of capitalism can be understood as a concrete abstraction – something 
borne of a withdrawal from the world which nevertheless becomes a constitutive element 
of that world” (718). In other words, the abstract representations of space are not 
detached from the relations within space, but have a constitutive effect upon spatial 
practices. In a sense, these abstractions are enacted and lived. As Lefebvre explains, 
“lived experience is crushed, vanquished by what is ‘conceived of’” (1991: 51).  These 
                                                
80 For example, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the ‘line of flight’, which is an abstraction, drawn out of 
reality, yet nevertheless carves through reality in search of weapons.  
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are lived abstractions: “how abstractions affect us and modify our capacity to affect and 
be affected by other agencies and forces in the world” (McCormick 728). Moreover, they 
are not descriptions, but affect the capacity to imagine other possibilities, or other space-
times. In relation to Worringer’s distinctions above, ‘abstract spaces’ are representations 
of space that attempt to cover-over the dread that space elicits; they are façades that 
render the external world livable according to a common sense.  
Yet in reference to Virno’s two figures above, it is still unclear which mask Lefebvre 
wears. As he expresses the importance of the lived experience of the body, he appears to 
be, what Virno calls, a ‘sensationalist’. The body is always already in revolt; it is the 
source of differences against the abstractions of capital. However, this is not completely 
correct. In The Production of Space, for instance, Lefebvre refers to the role of art and 
‘representational spaces’, the creation of spaces in art as a means to imagine new spaces 
in reality. The abstract art of Klee and Picasso, for him, “bore witness to the emergence 
of another space, a space not fragmented but differential” (1991: 303). Lefebvre 
highlights the fact that one cannot escape abstraction when dealing with space, which is 
evident in consideration of his spatial dialectic: space must be understood through the 
three different moments at once; in other words, it can never be experienced without an 
abstraction. Nevertheless, as McCormick points out, Lefebvre does not explicitly develop 
“an affirmative critique of abstraction” (720). His criticism of abstract space relies on a 
‘phenomenologically’ influenced notion of lived experience that precedes thought and 
logos. The immediate presence of the body prevails.  
Abstract Machines 
Lefebvre’s understanding of dwelling and space is limited because he bases them on the 
immediacy of a lived experience, missing the fact that abstractions are a constitutive fact 
of being in space, and a means of creating different spaces. It “is a constituent element of 
the background infrastructures that allow life to show up and register as experience. Seen 
in this way, abstraction is an irreducible part of the ontogenetic character of the worlds 
we inhabit” (McCormick 720). For instance, perceptual systems rely on abstractions in 
order to register information that comes form the external world. There is no immediately 
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lived experience prior to abstraction. In fact, what Deleuze’s concept of the encounter 
illustrates is that the experiences of the plane of immanence that occur beyond the doxa 
of coded and striated space are fundamentally abstract. 
Abstractions allow us to withdraw from the actual states of affairs, of the empirical field. 
As McKenzie Wark writes, “[t]o abstract is to construct a plane upon which otherwise 
different and unrelated matters may be brought into relations” (008). As a result, 
abstractions are not simplifications or reductions, but move beyond the naturalized 
borders of the human body in order confront the transcendental conditions of real 
conditions, i.e. what Deleuze calls the ‘virtual’. Abstractions in this sense will allow one 
to construct many different unnatural mixtures, that is, to experiment with heterogeneous 
spaces and times.  
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari rebuke certain linguists whose 
abstractions are “not abstract enough” (1987: 141), and then, in contrast, offer a form of 
abstraction they call the ‘abstract machine’, which does not set up abstract limits, but 
instead withdraws in order to allow for a greater connection between disparate things. 
Abstract machines, for them, are the immanent motors of assemblages. As Deleuze and 
Guattari describe it, the abstract machine “in itself is destratified, deterritorialized; it has 
no form of its own (much less substance) and makes no distinction within itself between 
content and expression” (1987: 141). It is a “pure abstracted function” that “links two 
incongruous systems together” (Zdebik 5; 4). Essentially, abstract machines or 
abstractions as such, for Deleuze and Guattari, are neither meant to reduce the world into 
“schematic simplification[s]” nor in order to reproduce or retain a “resemblance to any 
previous reality (whether conceived or existing)” (Vellodi 87), but are to “connect with, 
and draw together, as much of the world as possible without reducing it” (McCormick 
723). It is, therefore, the essence of assemblages as they mutate or modulate; the abstract 
machine is its ‘piloting device’, probing into future connections or conjugations, 
sharpening the edges of deterritorialization.  
Moreover, the abstract machine is a ‘concrete’ or ‘real’ abstraction, operative in reality. 
As Deleuze and Guattari claim, “this is the height of abstraction, but also the moment at 
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which abstraction becomes real” (1987: 145-6); it is a “Real-Abstract” (1987: 142). 
Reality is constructed through abstractions.81 The abstract machine operates, therefore, 
on what Deleuze has called, elsewhere, the virtual. Abstract machines map out virtualities 
in their processes of actualization and in effect accelerate these actualizations. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, reality is a construction, not by humans or society, but by abstract 
machines that disregard any nature-culture divide. McCormick describes it as a concept 
“that provides a way of plugging into materialities across diverse forms of life, allowing 
them to be conceived in terms of non-reducible consistencies and gatherings rather than 
in terms of concreteness” (723). The abstract machine is not quite a ‘structure’ in the 
sense of ‘structuralism’ because its “alliances weave a supple and transversal network” 
that renders the structure supple in a “perpetual disequilibrium” (Deleuze, 1988a: 36); it 
is instead a virtual framework, the ‘immanent cause’ of the assemblage as it mutates, de- 
and re-territorializing on the ‘plane of immanence’.  
The abstract machine, for Deleuze and Guattari, takes on different names: the diagram 
and the map/cartography. However, despite these terms, the abstractions of the diagram 
or the abstractions of the map, despite being withdrawn from the world, do not intend on 
imitating or reproducing the world, but are constructive and pragmatic. They construct 
new types of realities: “[t]he diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to 
represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type 
of reality” (1987: 142; emphasis mine). That is, new spaces or new worlds. Abstractions, 
do not simply experiment with ideas, but with reality. John Rajchman underlines the 
constructive nature of abstractions: they “consist in an impure mixing and mixing up, 
prior to Forms, a reassemble that moves toward an outside rather than a purification that 
turns up to essential Ideas” (56). In a word, abstractions affirm the ab-, the ‘outside’ and 
non-stratified space. Rajchman continues: “[o]ne can then see abstraction not as 
elimination of figure or story but rather as an invention of other spaces with original sorts 
of mixture or assemblage, a prodigious ‘and’” (61). These abstractions not only allow us 
                                                
81 Not in the sense that there is no ‘real’ outside of our constructions, nor that ‘reality’ consists solely of 
social constructions. Deleuze and Guattari insist that there is a reality in itself, but that material processes 
construct this reality.  
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to understand how heterogeneous things hold together, but also, how we can experiment 
and construct new types of mixtures, new types of spaces.  
Moreover, abstractions are tools that allow us to perceive and work with space. Space, 
contrary to the urdoxa of phenomenology, is not something that can be immediately 
experienced. Abstractions must be understood as means to experiment with spaces; they 
are necessary “precisely because something of lived experience is always partially 
withdrawn from us” (McCormick 720). Contrary to Lefebvre’s theory of space, there is 
no pre-established harmony between the body and space. Therefore, insofar as 
abstraction is a withdrawal from the reality of space, and insofar as space is always 
withdrawn from the subject (one is not always already at home in the world): “the 
abstraction provides a way of drawing out elements of the world in ways that make them 
thinkable and sense-able” (McCormick 727). They are tools for capturing anonymous 
forces that precede subjects and objects; that is, tools for experiencing the plane of 
immanence.82 To occupy, then, is a way to introduce the power of abstraction into 
‘dwelling’; in other words, to occupy is not to dwell in a home, but to take up a space that 
is always in connection with the Outside via abstractions and to construct territories.  
Diagrams and Cartography 
A diagram is an example of an abstraction as an epistemic tool: it is a way to capture 
information and to experiment with spaces that are not already known, and thus to create 
new spaces. The diagram itself, however, is a “configuration of lines” (Zdebik 1); it is a 
type of spatialized thought, abstracted out of an actualized state of affairs, in order to 
experiment with other spatial forms in order to create new spaces by capturing forces. It 
does not seek to represent a fully formed object, but an object-in-movement, an emergent 
object. For instance, in architecture, the diagram does not represent the building 
actualized, but is rather an abstraction of the building in its process of being built, as it 
actualizes. Etymologically, from the Greek diagramma, the diagram is a drawing of lines, 
                                                
82 Keeping in mind the double meaning of the world experience in French: not only in the sense of a 
practical contact with events or facts, but also the sense of experimentation.  
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or to withdraw via lines, and not simply of a corresponding reality, but in order to forge a 
new kind of reality. Jakub Zdebik describes Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the 
diagram as “the dynamic, fluctuating process occurring between static structures. As a 
concept, it describes the flexible, elastic, incorporeal functions before they are setting into 
a definitive form” (1). In a sense, it operates au milieu between stratified structures. It is a 
sketch or schema that seeks to map processes of actualization.  
In his impressive study of the diagram in mathematics and science, Figuring Space: 
Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, Gilles Châtelet equates the diagram to a thought 
experiment “where Nature and the Understanding switch places” (12). For instance, in 
moments where the faculties of the understanding break down, in, what Deleuze calls, an 
encounter. He uses the example of Archimedes in his bathtub where Archimedes 
“imagines that his body is nothing but a gourd of water” (12), where he is becoming-
wineskin because “to understand floating, it is necessary to turn oneself into a wineskin” 
(12). Diagrams are not attempts to understand being, what something is. Instead, it is a 
non-representative and spatial means for grasping states of becoming. As Châtelet 
describes, “[diagrams] capture gestures mid-flight; for those capable of attention, they are 
moments where being is glimpsed smiling” (10). Yet the diagram can never contain the 
smile. The ‘dotted lines’ of diagrams, for Châtelet, are not attempts at immobilizing a 
gesture; they refer “neither to the point and its discrete destination, nor to the line and its 
continuous trace, but to the pressure of the virtuality” (10; emphasis mine). The diagram 
does not trace the real, but attempts to capture a heterogeneous reality in becoming. It is a 
way to understand the virtual abstracted out of the actualized states of affairs. The dotted 
lines do not reproduce an actualized object, but delimit the real conditions of the object’s 
actualization. 
The diagram, then, does not attempt to reduce reality to essential, Platonic Forms. 
Instead, the diagrammatic abstraction “as a process is provisional and prospective, 
intended to open up potential space-times rather than close them down” (McCormick 
724). As the spaces around us withdraw, diagrams can be utilized in order to capture 
potential space-times, instead of fixing them according to sedentary categories. They are 
then ‘devices of equilibrium’ that allow us to make cuts out of the real in order to 
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confront the chaos of reality.83 Diagrams are used to make cuts out of the real, to remove 
pieces of matter, and to attach it somewhere else, where it did not ‘belong.’ As Châtelet 
describes the process: “this consists in cutting out a part by thought and propelling 
oneself there, inventing a passage by an interior and exterior decided on by the geometer” 
(34). Diagrams allow us to construct with reality, to create new mixtures and new 
disjunctive and heterogeneous syntheses.  
Deleuze ultimately draws his understanding of the diagram from the work of Michel 
Foucault, who is no longer, for him, a historian, an archivist, but a cartographer, he who 
plots lines. For Deleuze’s Foucault, the abstract machine or diagram is the ‘immanent 
cause’ within in a field of power: the power relations that precede reality and produce it. 
Deleuze defines Foucualt’s diagram as that which “acts as a non-unifying immanent 
cause that is coextensive with the whole social field: the abstract machine is like the 
cause of the concrete assemblages that executes its relations; and these relations between 
forces take place ‘not above’ but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce” 
(1988a: 37). In other words, the diagram, here, consists of the spatio-temporal relations 
out of which society organizes itself: the real conditions of reality. It is “a machine that is 
almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak” (1988a: 34). It 
determines the visible and the sayable: the real ‘distribution of the sensible’ and 
thinkable.84 It determines what can be experienced and thought.  
However, the diagram is not something actualized; it is the virtual transcendental field of 
real conditions of experience. In the example of the Panopticon, the diagram is not the 
actual prison, but captures the function of seeing without being seen. As Zdebik 
describes, the diagram is not “the cells, the walls and the tower, but the relationship 
                                                
83
 Refer to Deleuze’s discussion of the technique of découpage in cinema, which is the act of cutting and 
reassemblage or the process of constructing blocs of space-time in film. See p. xii of Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image (1986) for the translator’s explanation of this idea and the productive and constructive 
relation it draws between cinema and philosophy.  
84
 Jacques Rancière has developed the concept of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ in order to understand 
the nexus between politics and aesthetics; while there are resonances between his work and Deleuze’s and 
Foucault’s, his concept is ultimately limited to the possible conditions of sensible experience. See his book 
The Politics of the Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (2004).  
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between the prisoners within that environment. This relationship, abstracted from the 
prison structure, can be transposed to other structures — such as schools, barracks and 
hospitals — which are built around a similar relationship between surveillance for the 
purpose of control” (5-6). It does not represent the actual prison, but is concerned with 
the abstract functions of power. In a disciplinary society, like the one Foucault describes, 
the Panopticon is the diagram of how the society immanently organizes itself. As 
Deleuze writes, a diagram of power or of organization is solely concerned with imposing 
“a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity” (1988a: 34; emphasis his). It 
produces a reality according to the specific function of ‘seeing without being seen’.  
The diagram is essentially a tool for mapping out the relations of force or power that 
constitute society. Therefore, for Deleuze’s Foucault, the cartographer, “the diagram is 
no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography coextensive with the 
whole social field” (1988a: 34). As a map, the diagram does not solely trace extensive 
space, but “is a map of relations between forces, a map of density, or intensity, which 
proceeds by primary non-localizable relations (1988a: 36). The cartographer is not 
concerned with Being, which is the historian’s domain: “history is the archive, the design 
of what we are and cease being” (2007b: 345). The cartographer’s map is concerned with 
becoming; it is a non-representative tool for capturing anonymous forces. Thus Foucault, 
as a cartographer, is not concerned with the past, but with what Deleuze calls 
‘currentness’, where “the current is the sketch [i.e. diagram] of what we will become” 
(2007b: 345).85 The cartographer draws diagrams, sketches, of a possible future.  
Deleuze also describes Foucault’s concept of the ‘dispositif’ as a map.86 It is “a skein, a 
multilinear whole. It is composed of lines of different natures. […]. Each line is broken, 
                                                
85 Later in this essay, Deleuze relates ‘currentness’ to what Nietzsche has called the ‘untimely’, i.e. “not 
predicting, but being attentive to the unknown at the door” (2007b: 346). Giorgio Agamben, in his essay 
“What is Contemporary?” describes this untimeliness or time-out-of-jointness as a relationship with time, a 
con-temporariness, where one “firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to perceive not its light, but 
rather its darkness” (2009: 44). 
86 It is important to note the difference between ‘apparatus’ [appareil] and dispositif. Apparatus refers to 
the idea of machinery, a device, a system, whereas the dispositif (disposition) has a meaning closer to the 
idea of a heterogeneous arrangement of things in movement, like the disposition of troops in battle or of 
sheep in a pasture. (See: Bussolini 95).  
96 
 
subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subjected to derivations” 
(2007b: 338). As the abstract machine of society, the ‘dispositif’ is an immanent map, a 
configuration of lines, of latitudes and longitudes. It “acts in part by determining what 
one can see and say in a certain historical configuration of forces” (Bussolini 100). Thus, 
Foucault’s critical ontology is a cartographic or an ethological project, where “to criticize 
means to expose one’s own ontological status” (Lemke 70-1); that is, to draw a map, to 
map out one’s dispositif, to determine the limits of what one can do and to experiment 
with them. As Deleuze states, “[u]ntangling the lines of an apparatus [dispositif] means, 
in each case, preparing a map, a cartography, a survey [survol] of unexplored lands” 
(2007b: 338-9).  The map of the dispositif is not in order to determine what one is, but to 
determine where one is going; it is a way to analyze a multiplicity of forces in movement; 
it is a “tool to think about power in the perpetually dynamic social field” (Bussolini 90) 
that does not reduce it to a prior reality, but seeks to capture it in its movement and 
transformations.  
Cartography also supplies a new ‘image of thought’, not tied to a Transcendental Subject 
or consciousness, but rather a rhizomatic image of thought that surveys [survol] from an 
absolute point of view and allows, instead of a singular perspective, a multiplicity or 
heterogeneity of perspectives. In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to cartography as the fifth principle of the rhizome because the map does 
not seek to trace the real, but experiment with it; it does not seek to grasp what something 
is (Being), but to sketch where it is going (Becoming). It is similar to Foucualt’s critical 
ontology, which is a “historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond” (1997: 
127). The rhizome-map is a pragmatic and experimental groping, a ‘probing device’. As 
Manola Antonioli asserts, in his essay “Singularités cartographiques”, “[l]ike the 
rhizome, the map appears like a tool that aims to multiply the routes of access to the real, 
that affirms the complexity, multiplicity and singularity through a productive or 
constructive activity of which never has a pre-given sense”.87 As a spatial tool, the map 
                                                
87
 “Comme le rhizome, la carte apparaît ainsi comme un outil qui vise à multiplier les voies d’accès au 
réel, qui affirme la complexité, la multiplicité et la singularité grâce à use activité de production et de 
construction d’un sens qui n’est jamais donné préalablement”. 
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provides a means to experiment with space, i.e. the spaces without world. Both the map 
and the diagram operate on the plane of immanence. They are not transcendent; but, like 
Ruyer’s ‘absolute survey’, the map surveys the plane of immanence at infinite speeds. It 
is an absolute point of view that connects heterogeneous spatio-temporal realities. It is a 
tool to aid our thinking of the plane of immanence about which we cannot have 
knowledge or experience. Hence it is an ‘image of thought’.  
In his essay “What Children Say” and in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze refers to the 
work of Fernand Deligny, whose method of psychology was to map out the movements 
of autistic children. Deligny develops what Deleuze calls a “geoanalysis” (2002: 128). 
For Deleuze, Deligny’s maps are instructive because, in contrast to the ‘archaeological 
model’ of psychoanalysis, they do not search for the origin of the symptom in the past, 
but instead maps out lines of trajectories in movement. He describes these maps of 
autistic children as a mixture of lines, “the lines of custom and also the supple lines 
where the child produces a loop, finds something, claps his hand, hums a ritornello, 
retraces his steps, and then the ‘lines of wandering’ mixed up in the two others. All these 
lines are tangled” (2002: 127). In other words, these maps do not intend on reducing the 
children to their pasts (as subjects), but are the maps of the children’s spatio-temporal 
dynamisms, their rhythms. These are the dramas of a milieu, of a set of problems. The 
map captures the haecceity of the child as it occupies a certain space-time or milieu. It 
does not follow a subject, but instead allows us to follow “the subjectivity of the milieu 
itself, insofar as it is reflected in those who travel through it” (1997: 61). It is a map of a 
territory, of a space-time, and not of a subject; it is not a photograph, but a map. It seeks 
to capture a mise-en-scène, a drama without actors, a scene not reduced to the perspective 
of a body or of a subject.  
The map provides an image of thought, not tied to a subject, but abstracted out to a 
territory or assemblage; it expresses the set of real conditions of experience: what a body 
is capable of in a certain space-time. Deleuze notes that a map is comparable to a painting 
“insofar as a painting is less a window on the world à la Italienne, than an arrangement 
[agencement] on a surface” (1997: 66). In other words, the map does not present a single 
field reduced to the linear perspective of a consciousness or of a particular body, but a 
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cartographic plane that brings together a heterogeneity of perspectives and possibilities, a 
multiplicity of lines. The images of maps should not “be understood only in extension, in 
relation to a space constituted by trajectories. There are also maps of intensity, of density, 
that are concerned with what fills space, what subtends the trajectory” (1997: 63); that is, 
with what occupies a territory. These are maps of the intensive spatium or of the virtual.  
As a result, cartography produces a new type of visibility, an image of thought, which is 
akin to Ruyer’s ‘absolute survey’ [survol], a sort of satellite view. Christine Buci-
Glucksmann describes the cartographic perspective as a “veritable alternative to the 
Albertian model of the window opened onto the world, and it gives rise to a descriptive 
and constructed visual arrangement, a space that is open to multiple entrances, a 
‘plateau’ where the gaze becomes nomadic”.88 Infinite space shifts from the black hole of 
linear perspective to the nomadic gaze that traverses the planar space. The map 
introduces what Buci-Glucksmann calls “un œil monde” (1997: 56), the look of a world, 
or a cartographic eye, that captures “two infinities: the cosmic infinity of the world (the 
sea dusted with light at the horizon) and the extreme concern with the molecular detail of 
places and surfaces”.89 Space is not reduced to the phenomenological subject or body. 
Instead there is the ‘cartographic cogito’, which is “thus that of a voyage in space-time 
and of a plural subject: being here and elsewhere, being near and far, being multiple”.90 
In this sense, cartography posits a new kind of cogito removed from its bodily cage 
(‘dwelling cage’) in order to grasp itself as a spatial or territorial being, a spatio-temporal 
dynamism, a set of habits and routines, that are nevertheless open to other possibilities, 
other trajectories, other lines.  
Abstractions moves thought beyond the restrictions of phenomenology and the lived 
experience of the body in order to capture the becomings that are drawn in spatio-
temporal territories and assemblages. For Deleuze, becomings “belong to geography, 
they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” (2002: 2); the map is an attempt to 
                                                
88 From her essay, “From the Cartographic View to the Virtual”.  
89 From her essay, “An Impure Abstraction: from Marcel Duchamp to Cartography”.  
90 From her essay, “From the Cartographic View to the Virtual”.  
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capture this geography that takes place beyond consciousness and bodily experiences. 
The map is, moreover, an abstraction that facilitates occupations; it allows us to survey 
[survol] the ‘virtual,’ to evaluate lines of becoming, ways to experiment with space, to 
create more connections, to construct different assemblages, and produce different 
subjectivities.91  
3.4 Conclusion: Occupation as the Art of the Territory 
As shown above, Lefebvre’s concept of space is necessarily tied to the idea of a lived 
body through the concept of ‘dwelling’ [habiter], where, if one brackets history out, 
space is organized and oriented according to the lived body, that is according to affects, 
symmetry and rhythms. It is fundamentally a ‘phenomenological’ concept of space. It is, 
in other words, the lived experience of a body in space that produces space prior to the 
‘representations of space’ of the dominant mode of production. For Lefebvre, “the fleshy 
(spatio-temporal) body is already in revolt” (1991: 201). As a result, it assumes that the 
body and space are always already in harmony, in a pre-established harmony. But this 
does not allow for a space without a subject, or a space that is not already pre-emptively 
organized and oriented by a subject or the body. In this case, the body is a transcendent 
force that unifies space into a field of perception. It reduces space the level of the 
empirical, the given, indistinguishable from a phenomenological ‘world’.  
In order to move beyond phenomenology, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize a 
transcendental field that is not traced from the empirical, but rather explains the genesis 
of the empirical or how the given is given. That is, not the sensible, but the being of the 
sensible. This concept of the transcendental however differs from the Kantian 
transcendental, which concerns the conditions of possible experience. The transcendental 
here concerns the conditions of real experience; it is what Deleuze calls the virtual.  
                                                
91 This is how Deleuze and Guattari describes the pragmatic use of abstraction: “This is how it should be 
done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place 
on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce 
flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot 
of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines 
of flight” (1987: 160).  
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Where a ‘dwelling’ [habiter] posits an always already being-in-the-world, the pre-
established harmony with a space, a space that revolves around a body, occupation 
emphasizes the necessity for the construction and creation of territories in a space-
without-world. Occupation is a non-phenomenological dwelling because it goes beyond 
the lived experiences of the subject or of the body through abstractions that allows one to 
think the transcendental conditions of real experiences. Abstractions like diagrams and 
maps facilitate occupations by allowing one to survey the transcendental field, to select 
and evaluate possible routes, possible lines to take to create new states of affairs. 
Occupations do not construct phenomenological spaces that emerge from a transcendent 
body; rather they are captures of forces and affects that precede the lived experience of a 
subject or body. Dwelling is always to return home, to return to Being, whereas 
occupation is a betrayal of Being, the capture of a time and a space, in order to 
territorialize it.  
Occupations, in other words, allow us to experiment and connect with the spaces without 
worlds that precede and exist without us; in fact, we occupy the world before we dwell in 
it, that is, before we build our houses to dwell in there are the occupations that are like the 
spatio-temporal dynamisms or the dramas without actors that Deleuze discusses in 
Difference and Repetition. As discussed in chapter 2, occupations have a rhythmic form, 
the rhythmós—a fluid dis-position. They are how both organic and non-organic things 
take up space and time in an intensive spatium. It is, in other words, the art of the 
territory, the dramatizations that the territory expresses. For instance, the schema or map 
of the lion traces its spatio-temporal dynamisms, its particular dramas in its everyday life, 
or how it occupies space-time, which is what the territory expresses. The lion is how it 
occupies space and time, what sorts of movements it is capable of; its subjectivity is not 
simply determined by the territories it occupies, but is that territory. Occupations are how 
territories (a notion of a subject abstracted beyond its lived body to the sets of affects it is 
capable of within a particular space-time or assemblage [agencement]) capture 
impersonal forces and subjective affects, like the cold mists of the space without world. 
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 Conclusion: “…Man [sic] Politically Occupies…”  
The Occupy movement as it has manifested around the world, and beyond its seeming 
success or failure within the judgments of History, has altered the way politics is 
understood. It has renewed a set of problems and possibilities for political practice. This 
thesis has taken it as a guide to re-conceptualize how one occupies space in terms of 
politics. In fact, all occupations of space are primarily political. In other words, the 
Occupy movement highlights, not only that politics occurs in space, but also that politics 
is of space. For example, W.J.T. Mitchell indicates, “the iconic moments, the images that 
promise to become monuments of the global revolution of 2011 are not those of face but 
of space” (12). It is a politics without identity and without representation. It can be 
understood in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘minor politics’, where, as Nick Thoburn 
points out, “there is no identity to unfurl [because] the ‘people’, as Deleuze puts it, ‘are 
missing’”.92 It is a politics abstracted beyond that of the lived experience of a people to a 
politics of space, to spaces of possibilities, or ‘territories’ that will, in turn, be the 
‘fabulation’ of a new people.  
Occupy is the politics of spaces, territories and assemblages. The squares, parks, places, 
and streets: these are the actors in the politics of Occupy. Politics is, as a result, the 
construction of space-times, of assemblages [agencements], of territories, which is 
fundamentally the production of subjectivity. It is akin to the way Deleuze and Guattari 
describe the board game Go. In contrast to chess, which “codes and decodes space”, “Go 
proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterritorializing [space] (make the 
outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, 
adjacent territory; deterritorializes the enemy by shattering his territory from within; 
deterritorializes oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere…). Another justice, another 
movement, another space-time” (1987: 353). It is an inhuman politics: no longer 
                                                
92 See Thoburn’s essay: http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/minor-politics-territory-and-occupy 
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anthropomorphic, but ‘geomorphic’, the shifting landscape of a de-populated space, the 
dramas of the desert.  
The ethico-politics of Deleuze and Guattari also emphasizes a sober, pragmatic 
constructivism: the construction of territories. As Simon O’Sullivan argues, in Deleuze 
and Guattari, the “emphasis on cohesiveness, on a consolidated territory, is needed before 
anything new can either be identified or utilized. This amounts to saying that a rupture or 
acceleration on its own is not enough and that the production of subjectivity is nothing if 
not a procedural and constructive project” (97). As a result, despite the typical criticisms 
of Deleuzean politics,93 it is not only a valorization of acceleration, but also emphasizes 
the slow and sober processes of construction and creation. In fact, politics is the 
construction of territories, of capturing a specific space and transforming it, and out of 
which new subjectivities, new practices and new agencies emerge.94 In the words of 
Isabelle Stengers, politics is the betrayal of a territory: “the fabrication of a line of flight 
[…] does not denounce, but rather betrays, makes perceptible, the special power of the 
territory” (42). There is no experience of the virtual, or the molecular as such. A political 
practice that emphasizes virtual or molecular processes nevertheless must go through the 
actual.95 There are only experiences of the ‘actual’. Hence the necessity of abstractions, 
maps and diagrams, in order to access the ‘special power of the territory’ that latently lies 
there, imperceptibly.  
                                                
93 See the works of Slavoj Žižek, Peter Hallward, and Alain Badiou for the typical criticisms of Deleuean 
politics, which they all claim is incapable of explaining how a politics could take place in the ‘actual’, and 
thus it valorizes the ‘virtual’; and in Žižek’s case, he goes so far to call Deleuze and Guattari the ideologists 
of neoliberal capitalism.  
94  See Thomas Nail, who writes in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s political constructivism: “while 
philosophy creates concepts, politics creates practices” (27); that is, politics creates new space-times or 
assemblages out of which new practices emerge.  
95 See Rodriogo Nunes’s essay “Politics in the Middle: For a Political Interpretation of the Dualisms in 
Deleuze and Guattari”, wherein he describes the actual/virtual, molar/molecular, striated/smooth as ‘dyads’ 
instead of dualisms because there is “no choice between the two poles, because one can only ever choose in 
between them” (120). One can only experience the ‘virtual’ “insofar as it is mediated by an actual 
encounter” (119).  
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Occupy, then, as a politics without subjects, is not a ‘voluntarist’ politics,96 instead it 
occurs through what Zourabichvili calls Deleuze’s ‘involuntarism.’97 Involuntarism is a 
politics of the event, chances and accidents, which one cannot anticipate. For example, 
one experiences an encounter and cannot recognize what is happening; in response, one 
must construct or create an idea or a concept in order to regain orientation. One must re-
orient the space around them, or in other words: construct new territories. Veronique 
Bergen describes it as a “passivity inscribed in a constructivist choice” (38-9). It is a 
politics that is oriented towards the virtual conditions of an actual state of affairs; it is 
about constructing new real conditions of Being.98  
In other words, occupation can be called the ‘art’ of the territory. Art, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, never aims to reproduce or imitate a preceding reality; its aim is solely “of 
capturing forces” (2012: 40) i.e. the impersonal percepts and asubjective affects that 
precede the subject and produce subjectivities. As Anne Sauvagnargue writes, “the task 
of [art] is to make the haecceity last by fixing it to a support” (140). It is to express pure 
spatio-temporal events, to render visible otherwise imperceptible events. Therefore, the 
occupation of the territory, or the art of occupation, is to capture the event of a space-
time, which the territory expresses. Occupation is not the art of dwelling: it is “not 
synthesthesia in the flesh, but blocs of sensation in the territory” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994:184). Occupation, in sum, is the politics of capturing forces that construct new 
manners of being, new spatio-temporal dynamisms that the territory expresses.  
 In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that architecture is the first art; it 
is the construction of territories or houses wherein the phenomenological body blossoms. 
Territories are like the meaningless bones that give structure to our flesh. However, they 
take pains to note that these houses are not composed of insular walls and always have 
                                                
96 For instance, those espoused by Peter Hallward and Alain Badiou 
97 See Zourabichvili’s essay “Les deux pensées de Deleuze et Negri” wherein he describes Deleuze’s 
‘involuntarism’ as where “on ne sauriat anticiper ce qui ne peut être que créé […], ou bien il est possible de 
souligner des axes de lutte d’un nouveau type parce que ces luttes sont déjà à l’œuvre” (2002: 2-3). 
98 As Deleuze and Guattari write, “before Being, there is politics” (1987: 249). 
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windows open onto the cosmos.  
Taking an example from the Occupy movement, the ‘tent’ is perhaps that wherein one 
does not dwell, but ‘occupies’. Tents are easily built, yet easily taken down: they are the 
territories of the nomad. In his excellent description of the tent, Vilém Flusser writes, the 
tent is “a piece of cloth that is open to experiences (open to the wind, open to the spirit 
and that stores this experience) […]. The screen wall blowing in the wind assembles 
experience, processes it and disseminates it, and it is to be thanked for the fact that the 
tent is a creative nest” (110-1). The tent does not assume we are eternally beings-in-the-
world; it is a ‘creative nest’ that captures forces and assembles new experiences, or new 
ways of being-in-the-world.  
The tents that occupied the various parks and squares during the Occupy movement, 
moreover, transformed those spaces, manifesting different spatio-temporal rhythms and 
different manners of Being. They constructed new territories. The ‘tent’ commands a 
different lifestyle, different spatial practices and a different spatial code. People take up 
space differently. As a result, the Occupy movement was a revolution of space because it 
transformed how one lived in those spaces at that time by constructing a different space 
or different assemblages.  
     *********** 
In order to conclude, therefore, with a great resonance between the works of Deleuze and 
Guattari and Lefebvre: revolutions are always of space. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 
“the success of a revolution resides only in itself, precisely in the vibrations, clinches and 
openings it gave to men and women at the moment of its making” (1994: 177). 
Revolutions, for them, are a question of geography: of taking up space-time differently, 
according to new sets of possibilities and new territories. Likewise for Lefebvre, who 
asserts that revolution only occurs through a transformation of the spatio-temporal 
rhythms of everyday life, a revolution of space.99  
                                                
99 For instance, in his discussion of the Paris Commune, Lefebvre notes that the Commune was not a failure 
because it did not successfully transform society’s mode of production (as Marx and Lenin both assert), but 
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A common theme then: the politics of space, or the construction of new spaces and new 
territories, which create new ways of being in the world. The difference is that Lefebvre 
reduces space to the lived experience of a ‘phenomenological’ body, whereas Deleuze 
opens it up to a virtual plane where different and unrelated matters are connected. Where 
Lefebvre ends with a symphony of rhythms, Deleuze leaves out the window, straddling a 
witch’s broom, into the cosmos. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
was actually a success for those who lived it: during the Commune, Lefebvre writes, “Paris lived its 
revolutionary process” (2003b: 189), which means that the everyday life of Paris had changed, had vibrated 
to a different set of rhythms. And that is all that mattered.  
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